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DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS.
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Discusses the 1995 DPA that ended the Civil War in Bosnia.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Discusses the 1995 DPA that ended the Civil War in Bosnia. Division of Bosnia into the Serb Republic and the Federation (Muslim-Croat). DPA successful in peace keeping but ineffective in consensus building. High ethnic animosity. Issue of war crimes. Factors that act against reunification of Bosnia.
Paper Introduction:
The principal achievement of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) was the cessation of the civil war in Bosnia. The peace has been maintained for nearly six years, but this is only because of the presence of large numbers of U.S. and coalition troops. Some DPA objectives have barely begun to be accomplished. The return of minority refugees to various parts of the country, for instance, has been extremely slow and has met with resistance from potential returnees and those who drove them out in the first place. Ethnic animosity has remained extremely high according to most reports and this is mirrored in the perpetual instability of the central government of the Republic now known as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the successful maintenance of peace the Dayton Accords offer very little in the way of a viable framework for reuniting Bosnia into an
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Review debate: Is it time to rewriteDayton? The recentremoval from office of the three presidents who signed the accords may meanthat less hardline nationalists will be able to forge a new kind of nationin Bosnia. Theproponents of war-crimes justice claim that the process will have "ahealing effect" but in order to do so it "must be seen as fair" and BosnianSerbs do not generally perceive it in this way (Boyd, 1998, p. It is the latter position that is the more convincing. As the Human RightsWatch (2 1) noted, it was not until 2 that a significant number ofBosnia 1 million refugees (the majority living within the country) beganreturning to their homes. World Report2 . Serbianmayors, for example, were required to certify that they would support multi-ethnicity--an impossibility for most politicians--yet mayors in the Muslimand Croat regions were not required to do so (Boyd, 1998). Available:http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/bosnia.html Smith, R. As of 1998,for example, more than $5.1 billion had been supplied in aid to Bosnia bythe International Donors Reconstruction Program. (2 ). Borden, T, & Server, D. Some DPA objectives have barelybegun to be accomplished. The peace has been maintainedfor nearly six years, but this is only because of the presence of largenumbers of U.S. There has, thus far, been almost no sign that this goal ofthe DPA is feasible. Nor do the Serb and Croat parties worryexcessively about the Bosnian state, per se, and look more to their mothercountries--with the Croatian Democratic Union, for example, running inelections in Bosnia as well as in Croatia where Bosnian Croats elect somemembers of the parliament. 7). The return of minority refugees to various partsof the country, for instance, has been extremely slow and has met withresistance from potential returnees and those who drove them out in thefirst place. The irony, of course, is that a program intended to enable self-defense is likely to enable a new, even more ferocious, war if thepeacekeeping troops are withdrawn. NATO Review, 48(4), 22-27. A third major factor is the accords' demand for justice for warcrimes perpetrators. Economist, 6-8. But fully 98 percent ofthe aid had gone to the Federation and only 2 percent to the Republika.The claim was made that the Serbians simply refused to comply with theDayton agreement and were, therefore, ineligible to receive aid. 51). 48).Federation forces were supplied with up-to-date equipment, sophisticatedtraining, and plentiful operations and maintenance funding while, on theother hand, the DPA called for a reduction in levels of Serbian militaryequipment. The larger Republic elects threepresidents and, thus far, the arrangement has not been conspicuouslysuccessful. Even the withholding of economic aid, for example, "has notvanquished the dreams of many political leaders for Serb unity onethnically pure territory" (Smith, 2 , p. The nation devised by the Dayton Accords is divided into twoconstituent parts: the Republika Srpska, or Serb Republic, and theFederation, a Muslim-Croat entity that is, effectively, not united at all;Croats look to Zagreb and largely favor union with Croatia and many Muslimsstill contemplate independence. The Dayton Accords have done a great deal in terms of peace-keeping but have been ineffective in consensus building. (2 1). But DPA goals such as the resettlement of refugees mayinterfere with progress. Thedisproportionate distribution of aid in a spirit of "righteous retribution"directed toward Bosnian Serbs and the so-called Train and Equip programwhich has built a Muslim army more powerful than that of the Serbs havehardly been conducive to reconciliation (Boyd, 1998, p. As theEconomist noted, for Bosnian politicians "the line between politics andbusiness is invisible," the SDS could be characterized as "a machine forsmuggling and extortion [while] the other two parties are hardly lessvenal" (Precarious, 1998, p. This is a volatile question but as more high-level Serbs (and a fewothers) have been arrested it has become clear that "even high-rankingfigures can be detained without widespread retaliation by the civilianpopulation" (Human Rights Watch, 2 1). 23). As Bildt notes,Bosnia is almost completely dependent on foreign aid and has "a huge andunsustainable trade deficit, virtually no domestic investments, overblownand unsustainable budgets, massive unemployment, and semicorrupt andinefficient institutions" (2 , p. (2 1). Unless these structures areunited and, as Server notes, "a doctrine developed that aims at protectingall of Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than each of its communities against theothers" there is little hope for a lasting peace (Borden & Server, 2 , p.23). Yet even such pro-DPAcritics see the accords as little more than, in Server's words, "an untidycompromise that froze in place the armies and nationalist politicalparties" that had already destroyed the first attempt at self-governance inthe newly independent Bosnia, and they acknowledge that this will be a veryslow process indeed (Borden & Server, 2 , p. Foreign Affairs, 77(1), 42-55. 6). The Western coalition remainscommitted to preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent nation,largely because splitting off the Serbian and Croatian factions to jointheir ethnic fellows would leave the resulting Muslim state nearlydefenseless between two nations that desire its territory and have shownlittle hesitation or discretion in trying to acquire it by whatever meansit takes. The generalpolicy of no aid for Serbians was defended by some U.S. (1998, January 24). The DPA cannot, of course, be dismantled but serious thoughtmust be given to the creation of stable economic and political institutionsthat are not reliant on Western assistance or Western peacekeepers becausethe state of Bosnia-Herzegovina will exist only so long as outsiders holdit together. Although this notion is satisfying to Westerngovernments it has not only been inequitably directed against Serbs but hascreated a situation in which, almost absurdly, "the ethnic cleansers wereasked to remix their communities and arrest themselves" (Precarious, 1998,p. (2 , November 1 ). Human Rights Watch. But, as Boyd (1998) noted, whilethe goal of bringing war criminals to justice figures prominently in theplans of the Western powers no more than six percent of any Bosnian factionregarded it as a matter of great importance. And the parties remainfully committed to business as usual in other respects as well. A Precarious Peace. J. But even with itsinequitable distribution the billions of dollars in aid have had littleeffect on the parts of the country that did receive it. This program was designed to enablethe Federation, but particularly the Muslims, "to defend against potentialSerb offensives should the peace process fail" (Boyd, 1998, p. [On-line report]. Ethnic Hatred permeates Bosnia'sbitter peace: Five years after Dayton Accords, nationalist ideology stillstrong. TheDPA have merely been a way of maintaining the status quo achieved by theethnic cleansing campaigns and have not been able to manage any significantshift to reintegration of the country. Intheir view the DPA lessens the chances of the formation of a stable,democratic nation and many argue that the last six years have done littlemore than allow the factions time to regroup and devote themselves anew totheir goals of separation and/or elimination of other ethnic groups. A second chance in the Balkans. 7). Washington Post, p. One problem with the idea ofjustice for war crimes is that such a significant percentage of thepolitical and military structures ordered, carried out, or supported theseactions that this complicates the already crippled process ofreconstruction. The hardline ethnic nationalismespoused by the largest parties has barely altered in the years the DPA hasbeen in force. Military force keeps thefactions apart but the DPA has merely confirmed the results of the war.Despite the intention to reintegrate the population and build a commitmentto multi-ethnicity this has not happened and is not seen as desirable bythe great majority of the population. Even as more Muslim and Croat criminalsare indicted, however, Serbs remain the highest number and the perceptionof disproportionate justice is what will compel Serb opinion. Furthermore, other policies (primarily those of the United States)have militated against peaceful reintegration of Bosnia's peoples. References Bildt, C. Ethnic animosity has remained extremely high according tomost reports and this is mirrored in the perpetual instability of thecentral government of the Republic now known as Bosnia-Herzegovina.Despite the successful maintenance of peace the Dayton Accords offer verylittle in the way of a viable framework for reuniting Bosnia into anindependent state and many of their provisions actually work against thisgoal. Still, some proponents of the DPA argue that they do not need to berevised and that the framework is now in place for a successful evolutionof a democratic and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet in the first six months of that year alittle less than 2 , people returned--a very small percentage--and "theincreased return was accompanied by an increasing number of return-relatedabuses" throughout the country. Other factors that mitigate against the successful reunion of thefactions in Bosnia include the nature of political parties and theseparation of powers among the factions. Foreign Affairs,8 (1), 148-158. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Others hold that, while the peace has beena positive thing, "the constitutional house of cards known as the DaytonAgreement" is, as Borden puts it, "the most unhealthy and unstablepolitical framework in the region" (Borden & Server, 2 , p. Such skewed views of the problems of the region on the part of thosewho have control over much of its future demonstrates the lingeringprejudice against the Serbs who, while guilty of an immense number of warcrimes and the most extensive ethnic 'cleansing,' were hardly alone inthese behaviors. The DaytonAccords have merely established a stand-off in which the three centralfactions in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain devoted to the principles of ethnicnationalism and largely see the DPA as a temporary means to hold things inplace until they can accomplish that end. G. In addition, the DPA has resulted not just in three presidents but inthree intelligence services and three armies. and coalition troops. The relative ignorance of many of those in the U.S.Congress and in London and Brussels who have so much to say about whathappens in the country is not a promising sign. Even more significantly, however, the actualdisproportionate interest in punishing Serbian war criminals makes it hardto claim that the process is fair. (1998). Making Bosnia Work. officials on thebasis that aid would only help solidify the position of the SerbianDemocratic Party (SDS) yet there was no recognition of the likelihood thatit would do the same for equally hardline Muslim and Croat parties. A3 ). 22). The Train and Equip program also reflected the comforting Westernassumption that one party could be held entirely to blame for theatrocities and for the war in general. 47). Boyd, C. 152). As an Economist article noted, the accords wishto move the nation "towards the norms of democracy" as well as "to restoreBosnia to something like its pre-war ethnic mix" and these, possiblyirreconcilable, goals can be accomplished, according to Westerners in theregion, through the removal and replacement of hardline ethnic nationalistsand political parties which will result in a state in which the threeethnic minorities can work together as they did in the past (Precarious,1998, p. The principal achievement of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) wasthe cessation of the civil war in Bosnia. A3 .
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