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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOTS.
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Function of U.S. Armed Forces to provide military assistance to civilian authorities in restoring law and order in domestic civil disturbances as a last resort.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Function of U.S. Armed Forces to provide military assistance to civilian authorities in restoring law and order in domestic civil distrubances as a last resort. Legal considerations. Examines appropriateness of the military response in Los Angeles, California; its implementation, shortcomings, effective results. Socio-economic issues involved. Loss of control by LAPD.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE & CIVIL DISTURBANCES: LOS ANGELES RIOTS CASE A. Identification of the Appropriate Military Response to Civil Disturbances Based on Doctrine and Which Organization Should Accomplish This Response. United States armed forces have traditionally been available to provide military assistance to civilian authorities (MACDIS or MACA) in restoring law and order in domestic civil disturbances. However, under Department of Defense (DOD) Directive Number 3025.12, 4 Feb 1994 (1994 Directive) and its 1991 predecessor, the armed forces renders MACDIS only as a last resort where its "use . . . is necessary to prevent the loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order" and when "duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation" (sec. 4.2.2.1). Sec. 4.1.3 provides that "the primary

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insisted on bypassing the county level (LA CountySheriff's Office) and sending requests directly to the CANG" (p. Schnaubelt criticized theircommand, however, for designating freeways as the geographic boundariesbetween CANG and Army units. As the violence spread, Wilsonasked for federal troops on May 1. Schnaubelt pointed out that "most solders on the street-and the police officers they were supporting-believed that [the situation]. 42). MILITARY ASSISTANCE & CIVIL DISTURBANCES: LOS ANGELES RIOTS CASE A. Other socio-economic issues were involved, but the riots wereprompted by the adverse and largely spontaneous reaction of the blackcommunity to the acquittal by an all-white Simi Valley jury of Los AngelesPolice Department (LAPD) officers accused of beating a black motoristRodney King. (3) The federal response was timely. Joint Force Quarterly, 1 8-115 (168-177 ofthe materials). . 62). 55). AfterGovernor Pete Wilson ordered CANG to intervene, Schnaubelt said "the cityof Los Angeles . secs. 55).However, 52 persons died, 7 businesses were burned and about one billiondollars in property damages ensued (Scheips, p. 1, sec. (1997, Spring). 'Epilogue' from "The Role of federal militaryauthority in civil disturbances." (Materials 41-49). The most telling criticism of the command and control structure ofJTFLA under its commander, Maj. Explaining the Legal Considerations for MACDIS for CivilDisturbances and How the Posse Comitatus And Insurrection Acts ImpactsSituations Like the Los Angeles Riot Crisis. 17 ). . The combined response was, however, less than optimal in a number ofrespects: (1) LAPD lost control of the streets in South Central prior to April29 and underestimated the likelihood of a disturbance which it alone couldnot control. Authority for federal MACDISto state and local officials in civil disturbances lies in Article 1, sec.8 of the Constitution which authorizes the President to call out themilitia "to execute the laws of the union [and to] suppress insurrections .. secs. References Delk, J. 4.2.1 through 4.26 containsmore specific mission criteria. The initial core of the riots was in South Central Los Angelesbut disorder quickly spread to over 15 square miles of the city. Army field manual, Civil disturbances (1985). The city in crisis: Areport by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on thecivil disorder in Los Angeles.----------------------- 1 M. Examination of the Efficacy/Adequacy/Appropriateness of the ActualResponse to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots and Its Implementation, IncludingShortcomings and Available Alternatives. Itstroops did not arrive in the streets until 17 hours after Wilson's order ornot until the evening of April 3 . 4.1.3, the AG is responsible forthe management of the Federal response to civil disturbances. The Webster Commission said"General Covault, through a misunderstanding of the law, not only refusedto allow regular forces to participate in law-enforcement missions, butalso forbade the National Guard to do so when it was federalized" (Scheips,p. Conclusion The combined federal, state and local response to the 1992 LosAngeles riots while effective in terms of its results left much to bedesired in terms of contingency planning, promptness of response by LAPDand CANG and numerous other aspects of command, control, coordination,logistics and training. & Williams, H. 67). The April 29-May 5, 1992 LosAngeles riots presented a serious and largely unexpected challenge to lawand order. Department of Defense directive number 3 25.12, military assistancefor civil authorities (MACDIS), 4 Feb 1994. is necessary to prevent the loss oflife or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmentalfunctioning and public order" and when "duly constituted local authoritiesare unable to control the situation" (sec. 331-335. 4.2.2.1). A better alternative might have been to "match militaryunits to the jurisdictional boundaries of the law enforcement entities theywere supporting" (p. 68). . Grange, D., & Johnson, R. Schnaubelt, C. Such a limit on unilateral federal action is necessary to preservecivil and local authority in a democratic and federalism-based polity.Higher level approvals are needed to ensure that such assistance isrendered in a manner consistent with other national security needs andpolicy and to ensure proper coordination with the Department of Justice andits lead agency, the FBI. He said this created overlapping and confusionsince the freeways "did not correspond to political or operationalrelevance" (p. (2) CANG's initial response was slow and somewhat disorganized. 4.1.1 &4.16 of the 1994 Directive). Insurrection Act, 18 U.S.C. Delk (1992, September) said "no soldiers were killed or seriouslyinjured, and no innocent civilians were injured by the soldiers" (p. . Forgotten mission:Military support to the nation. 65). Under sec.4.3.1, the Army acting under the overall control of the SecDef and theJoint Chiefs of Staff has the primary responsibility for MACDIS. Training was inadequate and predicated on themistaken belief that the troops would face only a riot and not "low-intensity conflict (or urban warfare)," (Delk, p. (n.p. Department of Defense directive number 3 25.15, military assistanceto civil authorities (MACA), 18 Feb 1997. The 1997 Directive in secs. Sec. Const., Art. 4.7.1 attempts to give the forcecommander on the spot sufficient latitude to respond immediately in anemergency to requests from civil authorities. 69). According to Schnaubelt, 1 percent of law enforcement taskingrequests were approved by CANG prior to its federalization, only 2 percentby JTFLA thereafter (p. U.S. He suggestedthat conditions of urban warfare require greater delegation of authority tolower level officers and noncommissioned officers at the scene and clearermission approval criteria than was the case (p. sec.1385, "stricltly limits the use of federal troops for law enforcement"(Grange & Johnson, 1997, Spring, p. . J. (n.d.). 68). President George Bush promptly issuedExecutive Order 6427 which federalized CANG and ordered federal forces intothe city.The Joint Task Force LOS ANGELES (JTFLA) was formed on May 2. sec. However, underDepartment of Defense (DOD) Directive Number 3 25.12, 4 Feb 1994 (1994Directive) and its 1991 predecessor, the armed forces renders MACDIS onlyas a last resort where its "use . (1997, Summer). Lacking proper warning by LAPD, CANGloaned out to local agencies key items of riot control equipment such asface shields, riot batons and lock plates for their M-16 rifles. required a higher state of readiness than AO-1" (p. Working together, 5 LAPD officers, about 4, other policeofficers, more than 4, California National Guardsmen (CANG) and about4, regular Army and Marine troops quelled within a few days one of theworst civil disturbances in American history (Schnaubelt, 1997, Summer, p.67). However, the 1997 Directivestill incorporates many and unnecessarily multi-layered and potentiallyconfusing and action-inhibiting levels of approval. After the riots broke out, LAPD withdrew from the area.According to Schnaubelt, "the riots might have been avoided had policeresponded with a massive effort to quell the unrest" (p. Schnaubelt added that "absolutely no one, civilian ormilitary, expected a situation where the National Guard would be needed onthe streets in a matter of hours" (p. Too often, troops were kept at a low state of armedreadiness (AO-1). (1992, Sept.), Military assistance in LosAngeles, Military Review, 13-19 (41-49 of materials). . Sec. 4.7.2.1 and4.7.2.2 of DOD Directive Number 3 25.15, 18 February, 1997 (1997 Directive)clarify that the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) must approve authority forany request "involving lethal support" or "for assistance with potentialfor confrontation with civilians." MACDIS is governed by rules ofengagement approved by the DOD General Counsel and the Attorney General(AG). 68). . Nevertheless, the Webster Commission reporthighlighted the need to streamline the internal Army/DOD approval processin order to restore the needed tactical flexibility to lower level officersand to respond promptly to law enforcement requests in a civil disturbanceas critical as the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 47). 4.5.2 & 4.5.3). Schnaubeltargues that "the riots were essentially over by the time JTFLA wasestablished and active component troops began arriving the night of 1 May"(p. U.S. Federal military forcesare to provide MACDIS in coordination with and in support of National Guardunits which the President may federalize in order to ensure unified commandand control (secs. Lessons in command and control fromthe Los Angeles riots. 1992). The Webster Report (1992) said JTFLA "requiredeach request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determinewhether the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or amilitary function" (Schnaubelt, p. The level,intensity and nature of violence directed at bystanders and law enforcement(automatic sniper fire, homicidal drivers, etc.) far exceeded thatexperienced during the 1965 Watts riots. 4.5.1). B. Identification of the Appropriate Military Response to CivilDisturbances Based on Doctrine and Which Organization Should AccomplishThis Response. 331-335, whichauthorizes such interventions "to suppress [any] insurrection" or "unlawfulobstructions, combinations, or assemblages" and "to enforce . Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. Scheips (n.d.) notes the traditional "need for minimum force wheneverfederal forces responded to civil unrest" (p. 4.1.3 providesthat "the primary responsibility for protecting life and property andmaintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in the Stateand local governments". 49). 48). The federal forces acted with moderation and restraint, firing onlyin defense of themselves and other officers. 1385. Logisticsfailures included ammunition shortages and transportation andcommunications snafus. H. 4.2.7 of the 1994 Directive provides that "the DOD Componentsshall not take charge of any function of civil government unless absolutelynecessary under conditions of extreme emergency." Normally only the President may authorize the employment of activeduty military forces in domestic civil disturbances through the issuance ofan executive order based on requests from lower level local, state orfederal authorities channelled through the AG and the SecDef (secs. C. Schnaubelt saidtraining before and during the crisis was based on out of date "crowdcontrol" techniques prescribed in the 1985 Army Field Manual 19-15, CivilDisturbances. ." and the federal Insurrection Act, 18 U.S.C. the lawsof the United States." The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. General Marvin Covault, was that it washesitant and slow in approving and implementing tasking requests from CANGand LAPD. Under sec. LocalNational Guard Units under the command of state Governors have primaryresponsibility for providing MACDIS (sec. Scheips, P. Webster, W. United States armed forces have traditionally been availableto provide military assistance to civilian authorities (MACDIS or MACA) inrestoring law and order in domestic civil disturbances. 68). 8. This was in part based on amisunderstanding by Covault of the applicable rules of engagement and lawbut also reflected bureaucratic delays which amounted to as much as six toeight hours (p. Scheips reports that since 1992, the Army "has coordinated itsefforts with those of the National Guard, assisting that force with theadoption of equipment, training, and rules of engagement that meet federalstandards" (p. . However, the widespread public perception, which was reinforced bythe mass media, that LAPD/ CANG could not cope with the situation justifiedthe President's response. 6 ). SecDef Richard Cheney put 4, Army and Marine troops on alert on April 3 . D. Parameters, 88-1 9 (57-77 of the materials). Sec. 73). L. 72). Secs.

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