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CHECHEN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT.
Term Paper ID:29910
Essay Subject:
Discusses historical legacy of Chechen-Russian relations.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Discusses historical legacy of Chechen-Russian relations. Stalin & USSR policy. Growth of nationalism & ethnic independence. President Yeltsin & 1994 Russian invanion of Chechnya & the ensuing war. Politics & objectives of Dudayev's regime & establishment of free economic zone in Chechen. Yeltin's economic blocade. Chechen gangs. Unpopularity of Chechen War in Russia.
Paper Introduction:
“In the Caucasian Wars of the nineteenth century "the policy chosen was one of total attack, leaving the natives no option but to resist as desperately as they could" (Gall and De Waal 50).
Since the late eighteenth century dozens of Russian military campaigns have been launched against the tiny North Caucasian region of Chechnya and its neighbors. Throughout that span of time the struggles between Russians and Chechens have produced extraordinary efforts of both resistance and repression. In the nineteenth century Imam Shamil, in 25 years of resistance against the Tsars, waged what is probably the longest guerrilla war in history. The Chechen people revolted against the Soviet state more frequently than any other people, and the struggle included "uprisings in 1922, 1924 and 1925 and continued well into the 1930s (Lapidus 8). In the 1940s Stalin, fearful of Chechen colla
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On the Russian side the government pursued a double policy in whichthe political and economic deterioration in Chechnya enabled the Russianleadership to "exploit the growing political cleavages within Chechnya tovilify the 'criminal regime' in Grozny, challenge the legitimacy ofDudayev's rule, and unify" the opposition (Lapidus 14). References Cuny, Frederick C. But Dudayev prevailed and, afteran arbitrary dividing line was drawn separating the two Vainakh peoples--the Chechens and the Ingush, their "distinct but linguistically relatedneighbors," Congress-run elections were held (Matlock 3). Thus, as the Chechen people rose totheir own defense, they resented the necessity of war that had been forcedon them. "Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy ofChechnya." International Security 23: 5-49. It was "themost ambitious operation" of all of Stalin's efforts to physically remove apeople from its traditional homeland (Gall and de Waal 58). Since the late eighteenth century dozens of Russian militarycampaigns have been launched against the tiny North Caucasian region ofChechnya and its neighbors. Numerous factions within the Russian government took differentpositions on Chechnya -- ranging from Defense Minister Pavel Grachev'sdesire for a war that would provide "a convenient distraction from histroubles with corrupt officers returning from Eastern Europe" to SergeiStepashin's desire to revitalize the role of his FederalCounterintelligence Service (formerly the KGB) with covert action againstDudayev (McFaul 153). By the time of the war in Chechnya not only the soldiers but a largesegment of the Russian people were "perplexed about the nature of thecountry that they were supposed to defend and even the nature of the peoplewhom they were supposedly protecting" (Shlapentokh 76). At the least theseautonomous republics wished to have the status of equal members in any newRussian Federation and the general trend in these republics was toestablish a firm presence and garner as much influence as possible inMoscow as the central control of the USSR began to dwindle. led to mounting civilian casualties, Russian and Chechen alike" and, asthe government's minimizing of casualties was ruthlessly exposed as lies bythe free press and television coverage "offered a vast audience graphicfootage of the unfolding carnage" Yeltsin's approval ratings dropped below2 percent in 1995 (Lapidus 16). . In the 194 s Stalin, fearful of Chechen collaboration withGermany and generally committed to the destruction of ethnic minorities,had every Chechen and Ingush deported to Kazakhstan and the Republic ofChechen-Ingushetia "ceased to exist" (Gall and de Waal 61). A relentless blast of criticism of thewar came not only from the Russian people but from the other republics, who"issued harsh criticisms of the intervention," and from the neighboringregions who feared the war's "destabilizing impact on their ownterritories" (Lapidus 17). Nearly every Chechen over the age of 32 hadbeen born in exile in Kazakhstan and had made the return journey toChechnya, while many of the older generation clearly recalled theiroriginal deportation. reverse the erosion in Yeltsin'spopularity and increase his chances in upcoming elections" (Lapidus 16).Accordingly the intervention of Russian forces in Chechnya began onDecember 11, 1994. But events of late 1993 in Russia and mid-1994 in Chechnya conspiredto render this policy ineffective from a political and an economic point ofview. For Yeltsin this policy provided a somewhat calminterval in which he was able to relegate the Chechnya problem to thebottom of his list of concerns and for the elites in Grozny the periodproduced an ill-gotten economic boom. Russiantroops were rapidly withdrawn. In the end,despite the fact that the war began because political elites in Moscow andGrozny were in hot pursuit of their own interests, the outcome was due tothe confrontation between the Chechen people's very strong sense of whothey were and the Russian people's confusion over who they might be. Theenthusiastic group of more than 1, delegates forced the Supreme Sovietof Chechen-Ingushetia to pass a declaration of the republic's status as asovereign state, "created as a result of the self-determination of theChechen and Ingush peoples" (quoted in Gall and de Waal 82). The claims oflegitimacy and a 72 percent voter turnout "seem farfetched" but there wasconsiderable enthusiasm for what many "saw as their first-ever free all-Chechen elections" and Dudayev was elected president (Gall and de Waal 99). And rather than restoringRussian military prestige the war became a series of escalatinghumiliations. But the threat of invasion, as manyChechens saw it, produced "military countermobilization in Chechnya . Hisprincipal goal was to position himself as a political candidate who waslocated between the reformers and the nationalists, "or better yet as acandidate who personified both of these political platforms" (McFaul 151).But in mid-1994 Dudayev's regime went farther than ever as he began tocourt "Muslim radicals in Iran and the Middle East [and] toy[ed] withdeclaring an Islamic state and imposing Shariah" (Cuny 16). Yeltsin's advisers promised a "small but victorious war" that would"consolidate Russia's statehood . Dudayev was dead and Yeltsin, which would have surprised most peoplea few years earlier, was reelected President. The Chechen people revolted against the Sovietstate more frequently than any other people, and the struggle included"uprisings in 1922, 1924 and 1925 and continued well into the 193 s(Lapidus 8). As Shlapentokh pointsout, this was not a matter of inadequate supplies or poor conditions. But popular support for the war did not materialize among Russianseither. McFaul, Michael. Gall, Carlotta, and Thomas de Waal. "The Chechen Tragedy." New YorkReview of Books: 3-5. Continuing inthis vein of superlatives there is near universal agreement that theRussian invasion of Chechnya in 1994 and the subsequent bloody war was oneof the two or three most futile, pointless engagements of the twentiethcentury -- in which it does not lack for competition. One ofthe most impressive acts of opposition to the war was "the extraordinarymovement by thousands of soldiers' mothers who travel[ed] to the war zonedemanding to see their sons [and then] pull[ed] them out of the ranks andtr[ied] to take them home" (Cuny 17). Chechnya: Calamity in theCaucasus. Yeltsin did not consider outright invasion of Chechnya at first. Rather thancapitulating the Chechens mounted a vigorous defense. In this atmosphere in November 1991 theCongress of the Chechen People heard the stirring speech of General Dudayevin which he called for the declaration of an independent state. None of the Russian expectations was met by this action. When Stepashin's attempted assassination of Dudayevfailed in November 1994 invasion became the favored option. All thesedangers were compounded by Dudayev's inexperience and extremely poorjudgment, exemplified by his use of anti-Russian propaganda to consolidatehis own standing -- a serious error in that it "played into the hands ofhard-line political and military groups in Russia who favored 'settling'all Caucasian problems by force" at the precise time that these forces weremoving into position as Yeltsin's primary advisers (Lapidus 12). 1997). BothYeltsin's assertion that he merely defended the integrity of the RussianFederation and Dudayev's contention that his resistance was motivatedsolely by the desire for Chechen sovereignty are, and were, regarded withthorough skepticism as fairly hollow claims. But, most importantly, neither the Russian nor the Chechenpeople reacted as Yeltsin and his entourage had predicted. . "In the Caucasian Wars of the nineteenth century "the policy chosenwas one of total attack, leaving the natives no option but to resist asdesperately as they could" (Gall and De Waal 5 ). Rather thanrestoring Chechnya to the Federation and alleviating drains on the economythe war, by March 1995, had "fuel[ed] inflation and strain[ed] the 1995budget with an estimated cost of $5 billion, which equals 2.5 percent ofRussia's gross national product" (McFaul 149). Throughout that span of time the strugglesbetween Russians and Chechens have produced extraordinary efforts of bothresistance and repression. Chechen-Ingushetiawas one of the many autonomous republics within the Russian FederatedSoviet Socialist Republic and, like many others, wanted the same status asthe fifteen "union republics," such a Georgia and Ukraine which "had theformal right to secede from the USSR" (Matlock 3). And both Russian and Chechen opposition to the war was enormouslystrengthened by the government's pursuit of the same policy the Tsaristgovernment had employed a century-and-a-half earlier. Thearrival of the Russian army engendered "a surge of popular support" forDudayev's regime "now inseparably linked to the defense of the homeland"and relegated his political opponents to the status of "Russianaccomplices" (Lapidus 17). Yet there was little widespread sympathy for armedrevolt against the Russian Federation, especially in view of thepossibilities raised by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and newfreedoms in the autonomous republics. (16 Feb. By 1992 Chechnya was "a major hub ofboth arms and narcotics trafficking" which easily avoided the economicblockade set up by Yeltsin (Matlock 4). But the greatest irony of thewar in Chechnya is that, despite the fact that it derived from thepolitical and economic motivations of Yeltsin and Dudayev and conflictsamong the elites in Moscow and Grozny, the outcome of the war relied on theRussian people's (especially the Russian soldiers') conceptions ofethnicity and the nation and the Chechen people's firm commitment to ethnicsovereignty and their belief in the need to protect themselves fromobliteration. Two months after the election theRussian Federation also completed treaty negotiations with the autonomousrepublic of Tatarstan and this left Chechnya as the sole, and veryconspicuous, challenger to Moscow's authority over the Federation.Combined with the Russian people's "deep contempt for the Chechen people asthe perceived kingpins of the Moscow underworld," another challenge thatZhirinovsky's law-and-order party claimed it would take on, the challengeto Russia's authority seemed to Yeltsin to make an active stance towardChechnya a politically sound position (Cuny 16). From January 1992 to the spring of 1994.therefore, Russian policy toward Chechnya followed a course that Lapidusdescribes as "benign but profitable neglect" (13). Chechnya was in achaotic state throughout 1991 with a considerable number of Chechensvehemently opposed to Dudayev's tactics. Lapidus, Gail W. At the same timethe Russians "engaged in a variety of official dealings with Grozny"--wherethe ruble and the Russian passport had never been relinquished--and madevarious unsuccessful attempts at negotiations regarding the republic'sstatus (Lapidus 14). A briefabortive military intervention in Chechnya was quickly abandoned when theSupreme Soviet overruled a state of emergency declared by Yeltsin. In keeping with the Chechen tradition ofresistance the nationalist movement in Chechnya grew in strength during the1988-91 period of liberalization. Early in the war desertion inChechnya was so high that the army, eager to avoid confronting the problem,set up an office in Moscow where deserters could surrender "and apply forreassignment to other units without prejudice" (Cuny 17). . (1998). In the Russian elections of December 1993 the pro-reform and pro-Yeltsin bloc, Russia's Choice, failed to gather more than 15.5 percent ofthe national vote while Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic party,with its "extreme nationalist views, law-and-order rhetoric, and racistundertones," captured an unexpected 25 percent of the vote (McFaul 151).The results of this election showed Yeltsin that he was in serious dangerof losing his leadership position and "persuaded [him] to jettison hisliberal image, supporters, and advisers" in favor of a new nationalist,authoritarian stance (Lapidus 14). .consolidate[d] support around Dudayev . In the end casualties and fatalities among civilians (includingethnic Russians in Chechnya) and the two armies approached 1 , , thecapital city of Grozny and many towns and villages were almost completelydestroyed, and refugee and homeless Chechens numbered in the hundreds ofthousands. Thisdeclaration was not truly "intended to be taken at face-value" and wasregarded by most delegates as a part of the general "parade ofsovereignties" among Russia's autonomous republics that followed on BorisYeltsin's famous 199 phrase (and political slogan), "take as muchsovereignty as you can swallow" (Gall and de Waal 83). . 1995). By the time the USSR began to disintegrateone year later, however, Dudayev had accomplished the radicalization of therenamed Chechen National Congress and initiated the revolt against theRussian Federation that took advantage of the coup attempt againstGorbachev that resulted in a victory for Yeltsin. "The Chechen War and Russia'sIdentity Crisis." Contemporary Review: 72-77. The Chechen people had returned to their homeland in the195 s and between that time and 1991, with one of the highest birth ratesin the Soviet Union, the Chechen population had increased from around3 , to one million. The Russian reaction to the events of this time centered around theconflict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin and was extremely erratic. . (1995). Numerous explanations ofRussia's military failure were forthcoming. Dudayev immediately declared "unilateral independence and proceeded to setup an independent state" (Cuny 15). Shlapentokh, Dmitry. (Feb. In the all-outattack on Chechnya, "heavy-handed and indiscriminate shelling and bombing .. The origins of the conflict lay in the "historical legacy of Chechen-Russian relations and the political fluidity associated with thedissolution of the USSR made this relationship an exceptionally contentiousone" (Lapidus 7). Dudayev was chosen Chairman of the Congress but returned to hismilitary posting in Estonia. These motiveswere reinforced -- but neither practically nor ethically justified -- bythe economic implications of Chechen separatism and independence and thelawlessness and criminality that flourished in Chechnya under theleadership of the former Soviet air force general Jokhar Dudayev. 1995). (6 Apr. But, while militarycorruption, poor training, inadequate equipment, lack of commandcoordination and numerous other factors were valid explanations, the realproblem was the poor morale of the Russian troops. Matlock, Jack F. But in Chechnya the Russian soldier not only had no clear idea of whyhe was fighting, he also faced considerable disapproval from home. But, unlike Afghanistan, Chechnya's war was one of Russia'sbloodiest ever and in the first three months of fighting more people werekilled "than the 15, to 2 , Soviet soldiers lost in ten years offighting in Afghanistan" (Cuny 15). "Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics afterChechnya." Foreign Policy 99: 149-65. The Russian invasion of their homeland assumed for all Chechens, nomatter how disgusted they had been with Dudayev's rule, a place in the lineof military oppression that had been going on for over 2 years. Yet, and this is the secondgreat irony of the war, very little had changed in the status of Chechnya(now the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) which, since the May 1997 signing ofthe Treaty of Peace and the Principles of Mutual Relations, found itselfback where it began, awaiting a resolution of its relationship to theRussian Federation which, theoretically, will take place in 2 1. . served to rekindle hostilitytoward Russian domination and raised the political costs of any renewedmilitary action" (Lapidus 13). The country's economywas all but destroyed and unemployment reached greater heights than ever ina chronically underemployed region. Just as widespread as the perception of the war's irrelevance is theperception that Russian President Yeltsin's decision to prosecute a waragainst Chechnya was based on cynical political motives. The Russian military, "an army that had once seemed poised forglobal predominance," was defeated by the Chechen guerrillas (Shlapentokh72). (1998). Theethnic independence of the Chechens, claimed by Dudayev as his principalmotivation, and the integrity of the Russian state, offered as Yeltsin'srationale, turned out to be determining factors after all. Whentruly motivated Russian soldiers have historically shown incredibletenacity even when "there was almost no chance for survival" (Shlapentokh72). New York: New York UP. But, while Chechen resistance was exceptionally skillful and fierce,the war against the republic would not have turned into a Russian debaclehalf so quickly if the Russians themselves had seen any genuine purpose tothe conflict, any justification for the war that touched them even remotelyin the ways the war touched the Chechens. As one Chechen soldier told Gall five days into the war, he had aspecial bullet for the Russian president because "Yeltsin himself madebandits out of us" (quoted in Gall and de Waal 194). Even prominent military and political leaderswithin Russia warned that the engagement was likely to become anotherAfghanistan. At the same time Chechen gangsthroughout Russia "intensified their activities, shaking down businessestablishments, funneling the proceeds of illicit trade and racketeeringinto ostensibly legitimate fronts" and establishing a broad reputation forfearsome violence (Matlock 4). Livingconditions had deteriorated so badly in Chechnya and the corrupt regime inGrozny seemed so susceptible to pressure that Yeltsin and his advisersassumed that it would take no more than a solid military presence "topersuade [the Chechens] to abandon Dudayev in a showdown with Moscow" (Cuny16). In the nineteenth century Imam Shamil, in 25years of resistance against the Tsars, waged what is probably the longestguerrilla war in history. In addition tocontinuing to send enormous amounts of untaxed goods into Russia Chechnyawas also a major problem as the economic and strategic importance of theCaucasus grew "as Western contracts to exploit the massive oil and gasreserves of the Caspian basin" increased rapidly (Lapidus 13). "Killing Chechnya." New York Reviewof Books: 15-17. On the Chechen side Dudayev's regime established Chechnya as a freeeconomic zone in which almost anything was allowed.
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