For more information
Call 1-800-351-0222

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN.
  Term Paper ID:29589 		Get This Paper Free! or
Essay Subject:
Examines political development in 1910s and 1920s.... More...
5 Pages / 1125 Words
1 sources, 14 Citations, APA Format
$20.00

More Papers on This Topic


Paper Abstract:
Examines political development in 1910s and 1920s. Forces driving Japanese national development. Parliamentary government in the 1920s; transformation from Meiji rule. Shift toward party politics and shifting power base of the oligarchs. Japanese imperialism. Agrarian economy failure following World War I. Social unrest and protest. Rise of militarism. Based on K. B. Pyle's THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN.

Paper Introduction:
This research examines the emergence of political institutions in Japan in the 1910s and 1920s and the impact of political development in the country as a consequence of the way in which the institutions developed. One view of the dynamics is that through the 1920s Japan was developing democratic institutions at home and emerging as a status-quo-oriented country in geopolitical terms, and that the economic downturn in the 1920s affected internal politics in ways that enabled the rise of a policy of militarist imperialism and ultimately to the geopolitical aggressions of the 1930s. Other interpretations are also possible, as this research will show. The forces driving Japanese national development in the first decades of the 20th century can be distinguished from the aggressive position of Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. Rule by oliga

Text of the Paper:
The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper.


Meanwhile, the combination of mainly preindustrialagrarian and increasingly cottage-industry peasant economy began to assumepolitical shape based on increased wealth of formerly marginal classes.Political pressure from these classes challenged the elite bureaucracy,assuming shape as political parties that could affect bureaucraticfunctioning,f or good or ill. 167) There were food riots and demonstrations against profiteering onagriculture (indeed, the rice market eventually collapsed altogether), aswell as increased communist and trade-union activities. The Russian Revolution, the popularity of Wilsonian democracy, the growing alienation of intellectuals from the social order in Japan, and the unrest in society . Pyle (p.161f) refers to the mobilization of the nation along these lines, alsonoting the shift in Japanese political institutions that had beenoriginally conceived in terms of Tokugawa feudalism but that increasinglybecame subject to partisan politics (with the emperor a definite presencein both models). But this did not necessarily foster efficient government. It may be true that in thecontext of economic downturns, the ratios of power in Japan's bureaucraticand militarist elites grew during the prewar period (Pyle, p. (1996). The whole effect was tocreate the equivalent of a vacuum. But Pyle's argument cannot be sustained, chiefly becausehe makes too much of the influence of internal Japanese politicalinstitutions to curtail imperialist behavior of Japan toward the rest ofAsia in the 193 s. The abstract goal of Japanese leadership inAsia, manifest in Japan's well-known takeover of Korea in 191 , was neverabandoned. The political-party system turned out to be vulnerableto the vagaries of economic unpredictability, and Pyle explains that, evenin Japan, which was historically priding itself on having a stable societyin which people always knew their social place and class, there was socialunrest. Pyle looks at the course of world history in Asia from World War Ithrough World War II and sees that the aftermath of World War I, togetherwith internal politics of Japan, had stopped Japan's continue imperialistexpansion that had begun in Korea before the Great War. 2d ed. led to a striking diversity of ideologies that could not but be worrisome to government leaders (Pyle, pp. For always there is evidence of specialappeals to the special quality of Japanese culture, society, and nation;always there is that combination of intensity and insecurity of which Pylespeaks. Other interpretations are also possible, as this research willshow. Japanese imperialism was driven by continuing preoccupation withstrategic advantage and a peculiar combination of nationalist pride andinsecurity" (Pyle, 1996, p. But the truth is that theywere never far below the surface of Japanese consciousness throughout thefirst decades of the 2 th century. The result was "an unwieldy politicalsystem" (Pyle, p. 195) andhelped make fascism and militarism congenial. The worries developed something of a life of their own in the contextof economic failure. In the aftermath of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in19 6, "the majority strongly favored improvement of Japan's continentalposition. 179),there stepped the rise of militarism that was eventually to overtake allother political persuasions in Japan. Into it, according to Pyle (p. Pyle himself cites statements that connect Meiji ideology with that ofsamurai feudalism and the ever present warrior code: bushido (Pyle, 1996,p. References Pyle, K.B. Thus the choices that thegovernment almost always made, Pyle explains, went in the direction ofnational mobilization and suppression. This created problems of governance: Social unrest, militant labor, and radical ideologies were all present for everyone to see. As a matter of fact, the weight of evidence is that the emperor,however deified and however distant, was a very precious symbol of nationalidentity, power, prestige, and entitlement. This cooperation wasincreasingly formalized between by the 192 s, with political parties"infiltrating" the main elites: oligarchy, bureaucracy, and military. . In practical terms, then, to accomplishgoals, "oligarchs were willing to make limited concessions to the partiesin order to gain the passage of budgets" (Pyle, 162). In part, the shift toward party politics was a function of theshifting power base of the oligarchs, but there were certain constants ofnational experience present. It is also very difficult to distinguish between the dominantculture of the Tokugawa, the elitist Meiji, ruling political parties suchas the LDP, the bureaucratic elite, the oligarchs, and the keiretsu (heirsof the zaibatsu of the prewar period). The uncomfortable conclusion is that Japanese fascism and militarism--which are, as Pyle explains, a difficult historical legacy for Japan--didnot become an "effect" caused by economic depression and political change.Rather, these elements were a disease constantly bubbling beneath thesurface of Japanese culture for hundreds of years. At the same time, the ruling government thatcontrolled the bureaucracy could dissolve parliament in order to avoidchallenge from it (Pyle, p. The forces driving Japanese national development in the first decadesof the 2 th century can be distinguished from the aggressive position ofJapan in the 193 s and 194 s. Accordingly, after World War I, when the agrarianeconomy failed and unrest spread throughout Japan, there was created a"crisis atmosphere," complicated by: extraordinary influx of radical thought. While the formal abolition of Tokugawa feudalistic class structure wasaccomplished by the Meiji, it was replaced by an administrative partisan,bureaucratic elite, which became strongly influential in positioning Japanas a world leader. Rule by oligarchs in the Meiji periodprogressed to a form of parliamentary government in the 192 s, but thenshifted to totalitarianism and total war in the 193 s and 194 s. Dominance, not democracy, is thekey. To see why this is so, it is necessary to look at Pyle's own statementthat only "awed reverence for the Emperor" persisted across classes ofinterest, and this became "a distant symbol of national identity" (Pyle, p.193). The aggressions of the193 s and 194 s were just the rash and fever reflecting the disease. 1 9). Instead,there was increased factionalism and overlapping of elitist, bureaucratic,and party agendas (Pyle, pp. 176). 161). 145). One could no longer speak of "prevention" and "acting early." The choice was now either to enact immediate social reforms to alleviate unrest, or else to resort to intensified national mobilization and suppression (Pyle, 1996, p. 163-4). Lexington, Mass.:D.C. 168-9). The making of modern Japan. This kind of unrestwas quite unfamiliar to Japanese culture. In other words, social order wasthreatened, and with it the power of the elites--which, by the way, werepresent in the political parties that nominally challenged them but thatreally had not enough institutional strength to survive repeated challengesfrom various constituencies (Pyle, 1996, p. Heath. Society had become more complex under the parliamentary system ofthe 192 s than it had been under the feudal system of the Tokugawas or therule of the oligarchs under the Meiji. There is a view,indeed, that values emphasizing the special nature of Japan and its peopleenabled the Japanese to find national purpose and a path toward restorationeven in the midst of defeat after Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Pyle, 1996, pp.229-3 ). Unrest led tomilitarism, which led to the rise of Japanese fascism and reinvigoratedconquest ideology. This research examines the emergence of political institutions inJapan in the 191 s and 192 s and the impact of political development in thecountry as a consequence of the way in which the institutions developed.One view of the dynamics is that through the 192 s Japan was developingdemocratic institutions at home and emerging as a status-quo-orientedcountry in geopolitical terms, and that the economic downturn in the 192 saffected internal politics in ways that enabled the rise of a policy ofmilitarist imperialism and ultimately to the geopolitical aggressions ofthe 193 s. 165). In other words, the Japanese ideologylooked outward to the geopolitical arena to resolve problems that had beenemerging inside the country. . A warrior mentality reinforcing the mentality of the specialquality of being Japanese is difficult to overlook. Thetransformation of Japanese political culture from Meiji rule towardparliamentary rule can be seen as being based on appeals to the specialqualities of Japanese society, people, and historical traditions.

If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again:

Search for:

or

We can write a Custom Essay just for you.


Browse Essays by Subject