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CIVIL WAR BETWEEN MUSLIM FACTIONS.
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Discusses factors leading to the war.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Discusses factors leading to the war. Why one side had more advantages and power. Conflict between the new segment and the traditional segment. Major socioeconomic and political differences. Based on Ibrahim Mahmood's book MERCHANT CEPITAL AND ISLAM. Why the struggle was won by the side with the most capital.
Paper Introduction:
This study will discuss the factors leading to the civil war of 655-661 C.E. between Muslim factions, and the course of that war in terms of why one side had the most advantages and power, allowing that side to win the war. The war as depicted by Ibrahim Mahmood in Merchant Capital and Islam was one essentially between the New Segment and the Traditional Segment, and the major differences between those two segments were socioeconomic and political, with the advantage clearly leaning toward the Traditional Segment.
The title of the book is the first clue to Mahmood's analysis. He presents a clear, comprehensive and compelling argument that because of their greater experience with capital accumulation, and with the exercise of the different forms of power which come from that possession of capital (social,
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The New Segment had simply not beentogether long enough to have seen the necessity of putting aside itsseveral differences for the sake of unity of effort and purpose. Those conventional analyses focus on "religiousgrounds, tribal antagonism, or the nomadic/settled paradigm" (126).Basically, the author holds, as stated, that the conflict was based on adifference in capital and related power, that this difference led to thewar, and that the same difference settled the war in favor of theTraditional Segment. The Traditional leaders soon beganthe fight for power, with victory in Basra and elsewhere. Mahmood's analysis is unconventional in its focus on economics andthe political power which flows from that capital power. Mahmood concludes, Unlike the inexperienced New Segment, the Traditional Segment had ample experience in government and could draw on vast resources to mobilize an effective challenge to its adversaries. As the author convincingly points out, all the Traditional Segment'sleadership had to do was maintain the status quo, whether the struggle wasbeing carried out in negotiations or on the battlefield. The brilliance of the strategy of the leader of the TraditionalSegment, Mu'awaiya, is emphasized by Mahmood. At the same time that opportunities for wealth were opening to moreand more Muslims--the New Segment--those opportunities were more limitedthan they appeared, because of the pre-existing conditions which favoredthe Traditional Segment which already had capital and knew how to exerciseit to their benefit in relation to the New Segment. Their economic andpolitical power expanded as a result of the war, as the power of the NewSegment was diminished. In all such cases, the weakerclass or segment of society is told that it is now time for them to takewhat is theirs, as long as they don't try to take more than the traditionalpowerholders say they can take. That political power was at the heart of the civil war, and theultimate outcome was the result of not only the greater capitalaccumulation of the Traditional Segment, not only the greater experience inorganization and strategy and military tactics and strategy, but mostimportantly it was the result of the power and experience which thatSegment gathered through merchant capital. . Mahmood notes that each Segment was "as determined to fight for itsinterests." In addition, "the moral and military positions of each of thesegments were equally strong." However, the author adds, "at each stage inthis drawn-out stalemate, Ali's position weakened. This situation of inequality ofcapital and power existed before the emergence of Islam in the Arabcommunity, and during that emergence and through the civil war andafterward. The revolutionaries responded by eventually killing the caliph and"the murder of Uthman tore the Muslim community apart" (156). Their experience in finance offered them an edge over members of the New Segment, many of whom had had no opportunity to deal with capital before. Uthman, in any case, was seen as the cause of a land distributionprogram which heavily favored the Traditional Segment. . The Traditional Segment came out on top becauseit went in on top, so to speak. Therefore, theconquering of lands and peoples by the Muslim armies was deeply connectedto the conditions which would eventually lead to civil war. The reality, however, was quite differentbefore the war and before the split between the two segments became seriousenough that only war could bring a solution: [A]s it turned out, distribution [of wealth and the opportunity to accumulate it] favored the merchants, who made up the bulk of the Traditional Segment. He carefully undermined the power of Ali step by step innegotiation and then in small but significant battles won victories thatserved to "destabilize Ali's hold over Egypt, Arabia, and Iraq. His murder bythe revolutionaries representing the New Segment was the act whichprecipitated the war, but it appears that the conflict was so severe bythen that some tragic event or other would have brought war sooner orlater. His growing weaknessallowed the contradictions within the New Segment to emerge" (171). Finally, Ali was defeated and soonthereafter assassinated (18 ). Mahmood rejects "conventional explanations"for the growing conflictbetween the two segments. Not only wasthe Traditional Segment's leader killed, the New Segment's first leader Aliwas appointed, based on qualifications established by Islamic tradition,which in this case favored the New Segment. One is reminded of the United States in which traditional powerwas retained by white males at the same time that women and minorities werebeing encouraged to acquire their own power. Those with the capital and theknowledge and experience in handling that capital, in most cases, willemerge victorious when confronted by a rising group which has much passionbut less experience and less capital: Mu'awiya established the Umayyad caliphate to articulate the interests of the Traditional Segment. The New Segment was at adisadvantage from the start. As in pre-Islamic Mecca, the merchants were best represented by the Umayyads, whose continuity in power was the visible and practical symbol of the continuity of the control of the Traditional Segment of both the state structure and the distribution of wealth (182). That is,opportunities were offered but gave rise to conflicts between the segmentswhich led to the war. He performed every neededaction at each point in both the arbitration struggle and the militarystruggle. TheNew Segment, on the other hand, was not only divided but impatient as well,and that impatience led to aggravation of existing differences. The most wealthy determine the political process, and thattruth held in the struggle between the New Segment and the TraditionalSegment. Again, in this area as in others, the power ofthe Traditional Segment flowed from a long period of organization,steadiness, cooperation and single-mindedness, whereas the New Segment wasmarked by passion and divisions. Essentially, thecivil war between the two Segments had begun and would rage for the nextsix years. That policy, after all, was merely the latest expressionof the same system which had favored the Traditional Segment since Islamtook root and spread. Those differences, again, did not suddenly come into existence in thecivil war itself, but were established long before the war started, andeven before Islam itself was established. It is no accident, then, that the merchants who formed theTraditional Segment in the beginning (even before Islam) formed the classwhich most benefitted from the outcome of the civil war. Ali's inexperience led him to refuse to compromise with theleaders of the Traditional Segment, which drove those leaders to considerconfrontation rather than cooperation. This was a deliberate process which was instituted in orderto establish greater Muslim control over conquered areas: The expansion, accomplished through jihad, was a movement for the purpose of gaining political control of the surrounding surplus- producing regions for the advantage of the merchants, who were the most visible components of the state, its leaders, organizers, administrators and commanders (125). Mahmood also notes that the relative weakness and inexperience of theNew Segment was intensified by the divisions within the membership andleadership of that Segment. This study will discuss the factors leading to the civil war of 655-661 C.E. Thegranting of economic opportunities to what became the New Segment was partof the Muslim strategy of dominating other lands and peoples. We recall that the Arab merchantclass which existed before Islam was the same class which evolved into theTraditional Segment when Islam was established. . . In theory, as the author points out, the members of the Muslimcommunity had equal access to capital, its accumulation, and the power itallowed those who possessed it. Thus the conditions for conflict were present, and so were conditionsfor the ultimate victory of the Traditional Segment in the civil war. The New Segment felt deprivedbecause of the superior economic and political position of the TraditionalSegment, but the New Segment was never able to overcome that superiority atany stage of the struggle. Rather, their dispute was clearly over political office (167). Not only were contradictions among the New Segment highlighted insuch struggles as who would lead and how and what issues were open to whichmethods of arbitration, but at each of several stages the New Segment wasoutsmarted by the more experienced and savvy Traditional leadership. Mahmood makes clear that the question of economic power can not beviewed in isolation from other forms of power in society, particularlypolitical power. Merchant Capital and Islam. (199 ). Austin:University of Texas Press. That is because the Traditional Segment hadthe experience which taught it to retain a unified front and purpose. Mahmood also notes that this difference in terms of capital extendedto the military, obviously an important factor in the civil war: In addition to and because of the advantage of their historical experience, the Traditional Segment had a visible and commanding role in the service of Islam, whether in administration or in leading the armies of the state. However, just as the NewSegment entered the world of capital at a disadvantage in relation to theTraditional Segment, so did the new leader of the New Segment enter theworld of political power at a disadvantage, "inexperienced and weakened byfactionalism" (156). Several factors tilted distribution in their favor. . The New Segment was able to gain some measure of power brieflyin that time, but the great inequality favored the Traditional Segmentthroughout the entire period in question. . Confronted withthese charges by the New Segment, the caliph held steady and refused tochange his policy. It is ironic that Muslim leaders encouragedthe New Segment to accumulate wealth as a strategy to extend its power overconquered lands, but at the same time those leaders limited the power andcapital available to that New Segment, by controlling the politicalprocesses which kept the advantages in the hands of the TraditionalSegment. The inexperience of Ali was met with great experience on the part ofthe Traditional Segment, which quickly undermined Ali's power andauthority. The coming of Islam to the Arab world, and then the victories ofMuslim armies over their foes, presented great opportunities to Arabseconomically. There is no doubt that there were religious factors at work, as theconventional interpretation of the war has it, but the religious element toMahmood was not the cause which led to the war (which he says waseconomic), not was it the deciding factor or the factor which gave anyadvantage to one side or the other. Hepresents a clear, comprehensive and compelling argument that because oftheir greater experience with capital accumulation, and with the exerciseof the different forms of power which come from that possession of capital(social, political, institutional, bureaucratic), the Traditional Segmentnow appears to have been destined to win the war. It isalso important to note that the New Segment had to negotiate anunquestioned victory, for to come to a conclusion based on the status quowould only give the power to the Segment which held that power before thewar, which had been the Traditional Segment. More important, the factionalism of the New Segment, as opposed to the solid block of the Traditional Segment, allowed Mu'awiya to bring out the contradictions within it with a well-orchestrated strategy (181). As long as thestatus quo was maintained, the Traditional Segment's greater power wouldeventually become clear to all. (127). The war as depicted by Ibrahim Mahmood in Merchant Capital andIslam was one essentially between the New Segment and the TraditionalSegment, and the major differences between those two segments weresocioeconomic and political, with the advantage clearly leaning toward theTraditional Segment. In other words, from the beginning of its expansion to other lands,then, Islam tied together the religious, the economic, and the political,and the Traditional Segment's merchants were themselves "warriors" in termsof the stronghold they gave Muslims in the conquered territories. . As officials, they had control of the resources and a ready access to the wealth of the treasury (127). The Traditional Segment emerged victorious from the civil war becauseit entered the war in a superior position. In other words, those who had were able to use what they had to getmore, and those who had less were hampered in their effort to get morebecause they had less to begin with. The role of the caliph Uthman then enters the picture. The title of the book is the first clue to Mahmood's analysis. References Ibrahim, Mahmood. between Muslim factions, and the course of that war in terms ofwhy one side had the most advantages and power, allowing that side to winthe war. did not dispute religious issues or claim that one side was more pious than the other. Politics and economics go hand-in-hand in the story of the Muslimcivil war just as they go hand-in-hand in most great struggles betweendiffering nations or groups or segments. Onlythen could Mu'awaiya deal the final blow to Ali and reestablish the rule ofthe Traditional Segment" (176). . Experience in dealing with capital helped the traditionally wealthy accumulate more capital than others by virtue of already-accumulated capital. He rejects thereligious argument by simply pointing out that these two groups of Muslims .
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