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CAMBRIDGE SPIES.
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Analysis of British spies who worked for Soviet intelligence in WWII & early Cold War era. Ideological views held by the spies. Undermining of British & American positions.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analysis of British spies who worked for Soviet intelligence in WWII & early Cold War era. Ideological views held by the spies. Undermining of British & American positions.
Paper Introduction:
The story of the group of men who became known as the Cambridge Spies is one of the most extended and most extensive cases of Western nationals spying on their own government in the twentieth century. The principal persons involved -- Guy Burgess (1910-63), Donald Maclean (1915-83), Anthony Blunt (1907-83), and "Kim" Philby (1912-88) -- worked on behalf of the Soviet Union throughout World War II and the early Cold War era. Their activities were only very gradually uncovered and the full story has been even more gradually revealed to the public. The opening of the KGB archives in Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union seems to have brought the exposures to their conclusion -- but there is no saying whether further information might be revealed in years to come. Although a number of other persons were connected with this group's spying on Britain and, less directly,
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The ironicaspect of their story, however, is that the more that is revealed aboutthese men and their activities the less there is that seems to be knownabout their motivations. In the Soviet Union Burgess lived out a miserable, uncomfortable lifewhile Maclean was allowed to carry on the writing of his memoirs. In MI5 Blunt's principal espionage function was the passing on ofdocuments obtained while acting as commander of details assigned to protectthe couriers of the Allied governments-in-exile, such as Poland, Holland,and Denmark, as well as those of neutral nations such as Spain,Switzerland, and Sweden. While Blunt engaged in the pretense that Burgess was theCambridge mastermind, Philby reported that it was merely Burgess' guessabout Maclean's recruitment by the Soviets that, because of his chronicindiscretion, meant that "there was only one way out -- to recruit Burgess. Instead he was instructed togive up his left-wing political affiliations and to enter the DiplomaticService, "where at the right moment he would best be able to serve thecause" (Cecil 36). But Blunt's confession served to diminish his ownsignificance in the spy ring and he "went to great lengths to ensuregeneral acceptance of his account" in which he misleadingly labeled Burgessas "the mastermind of the Cambridge Communists" and his own recruiter(Costello 44). His recruitment at Cambridge was classic inits outlines. But whatever the circumstances were surrounding Burgess' recruitmenthe charmed his way into the confidence of many important people and came tohave considerable value to the spy ring. The story of the group of men who became known as the Cambridge Spiesis one of the most extended and most extensive cases of Western nationalsspying on their own government in the twentieth century. Works CitedBorovik, Genrikh. Whileworking for McNeil Burgess' access enabled him "to supply his Soviet mentorwith a steady stream of gossipy but accurate assessments on every twist andturn in departmental thinking and policy planning" and to remove andphotocopy numerous documents which he passed on as well (Boyle 281). Soviet intelligence worked from a long-term plan to develop "moles"who would infiltrate Britain's intelligence, government, and diplomaticservices. Even more arresting, however, is the fact thateach new set of revelations produced new questions just as each piece ofdisinformation supplied by Philby and Blunt raised fresh questions abouttheir motives in lying even when they were beyond the reach of Britishjustice. The extraordinary success of the spies (as, it seems, theSoviets intended) was predicated on their membership -- on the basis ofbirth and education -- in the nation's elite managing/ruling class. The diminishment of Blunt's importance was a matter ofpolicy for British intelligence since the government had failed to make hisinvolvement known and generally hoped "to keep the truth from the publicand England's allies" (Costello 44). Philbyconceived of himself as a spy on the grand scale and was prone to cast evenminor episodes in a very romanticized light. Within two years, however, the Soviets had an even better source inplace in Washington when Philby was sent to serve as the liaison betweenMI6 and the CIA. Maclean, yet another distinctive personality, had been working forthe Foreign Office since leaving Cambridge with high honors. Both Burgess and Philby were convinced, however, that Macleanwould fold under pressure and it is possible that Burgess simply decidedthat the heavy-drinking Maclean should not be trusted by himself.Unfortunately the Russians handlers realistically decided that "the over-zealous bungler had better accompany Donald Maclean all the way to Moscowtoo" (Boyle 377). The breaking of the code revealed that ahighly placed mole had operated in the British Embassy in the mid 194 s andvarious clues made it increasingly clear that Maclean had been the culprit. Burgess and Philby were both ordered to turn from theircommunist associations, loudly switching sides and attaching themselves topro-fascist organizations, but Maclean took the subtler tack of acting "therole of a man of compassion, whose head was just beginning to take commandfrom his heart" (Cecil 4 ). It was not difficult to persuade Cambridge intellectuals of theimportance of the cause of justice for all, peace, and anti-Fascist actionin the 193 s. Maclean, who wassometimes mistakenly thought of as a drab but hardworking functionary, usedhis reputation to ensure ever wider access. He was the son of St. The Fourth Man: The Definitive Account of Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean and Who Recruited Them to Spy for Russia. In the end none of the Cambridge spiesdisplayed any remorse for his activities. Because of an error made by a Soviet cipher clerk Americancryptographers managed to break the Russian code in 195 and, since theArmy had been intercepting Soviet intelligence transmissions for years butcould do nothing with them. The opening of the KGBarchives in Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union seems to have broughtthe exposures to their conclusion -- but there is no saying whether furtherinformation might be revealed in years to come. At Washington no job was toomuch for him and "he gained the reputation of one who would always takeover a tangled skein from a colleague who was sick, or going on leave, orsimply less zealous" and in this way he "he was able manoeuvre himself intothe hidden places that were of most interest to the NKVD" (predecessor tothe KGB) (Cecil 74). John Philby, aneccentric sometime civil servant who was a fascist, a convert to Islam, anda supporter of Ibn Saud--working in favor of his dynasty contrary to theplans of the Foreign Office for the Middle East. The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby. This work wasimportant in facilitating the "the Soviet takeover of eastern Europe at theend of the war" (Costello 42). AndBlunt's confession was even more problematic. Thedetails of much of Churchill's and Roosevelt's (and, later, Truman's)communications were also obtained by Maclean and passed on to hiscontrollers. But Burgess' decline into alcoholism, hisincreasingly disheveled appearance and erratic behavior eventually forcedthe ministry to take action in order to reduce the potential disgrace theysaw coming. The four men worked, according to plan, in whatever confidentialpositions they could achieve. And as quickly as possible" (Borovik 49). The intensive cultivation of espionage networks had been policy evenbefore the revolution. The Bolsheviks had developed "a highlysophisticated psychological screening proves" during the struggle againstthe Tsars and after 1917 it was employed in the recruitment of Westernnationals as "part of a prolonged and subtle operation" that used theCommunist Party in some nations (Newton 33-34). Philby weathered the storm at first, and was evenpublicly exonerated of suspicion of involvement in warning Maclean. He was knighted in 1856 and even after histreachery was revealed, despite being stripped of honors and positions, helived comfortably in England until his death. Philby deputed Burgess to warn Maclean, then in England, that he was aboutto be arrested. Recruiters would invite candidates to 'studygroups' and place them under all kinds of unnecessary, elaborate secrecyrestrictions, eventually selecting those who displayed the greatestpredilection for these maneuvers. New York: Dial-James Wade, 1979.Cecil, Robert. In Britain, however, themost promising potential recruits from the nation's elite were usuallydiscouraged from joining the Party at all and some were encouraged tobecome fairly vocal supporters of the fascist regimes. He continued to be invaluable on his posting toWashington but his presence there was also critical to Maclean's escape toRussia. But Blunt also managed a number of otherspies in MI5 and they worked hard at fabricating legends for variousoperatives in order to mislead both the British service and the CIA intohiring supposed anti-communists who were actually Soviet agents. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991. In 1948, however, Maclean's success at his work led to hispromotion to the level of Counsellor -- the youngest in the DiplomaticService -- and he was posted to Cairo where he was to be head of Chanceryat the embassy. A Divided Life: A Personal Portrait of the Spy Donald Maclean. He was, however, supported in his efforts at disinformationby British intelligence which had granted him immunity from prosecution andthe cloak of secrecy until, in 1979, Prime Minister Thatcher was forced toreveal his name. Theshocks that accompanied their unveiling forced a fresh look at therelatively unquestioned assumptions that allowed such a class-based systemto flourish to the point where reliance on family background and schoolingseemed to relieve security operations of the need for the proper checks andcontrols that should be standard operating procedure to protect againstespionage. Yet, as Newton noted, the service was the site of "whatwas doubtless his greatest undercover coup" -- the fact that he managed to"pull Philby in after him" (266). But in1963, as investigators again closed in him, Philby too escaped to Moscow. Many authorities believe that, despite a certaindegree of early idealism, Philby's true motivation lay in his pleasure in"blind obedience to the semimilitary underground party whose orders heobeyed without reference to any system of beliefs, morals, or ideology"(Newton 48). Whether this was due to ideologicalcommitment, love of deception, or the simple desire to avoid exposure thefact remained that, in their various capacities, all four men had seriouslyfurthered the Soviet cause in the War and continued to undermine theposition of Britain and the United States in many ways during the Cold War. Philby was the most unusual personality among thedisparate group of Cambridge spies. Theirmotivations have been accounted for in terms of their personalities,ideological commitments, and their attitudes toward their own environmentsbut the true reason that they chose this course of action remains an enigmawith, perhaps, as many answers as there are spies. He had begun well at the Foreign Office and had even been acceptedfor permanent assignment. And, although Burgess suffered agreat deal, Philby was happy writing his own glamorous version of his life,Maclean -- while never entirely happy to be in Russia -- was kept incomfort with his family and was treated well, and Blunt flourished andseemed not at all repentant even after his public disgrace. The principalpersons involved -- Guy Burgess (191 -63), Donald Maclean (1915-83),Anthony Blunt (19 7-83), and "Kim" Philby (1912-88) -- worked on behalf ofthe Soviet Union throughout World War II and the early Cold War era. But, as Boyle notes, there were many Britishintellectuals, artists, and other members of all classes who werethoroughly blinded by propaganda to the evils of Stalin's regime and theongoing nature of the Soviet leaders' "messianic determinism" whichprepared them "to wade through seas of blood to demonstrate their love forhumanity in the abstract" (Boyle 135). In the confused atmosphere of the 193 sCommunism legitimately seemed to many people to embody the world's greathope for peace and justice and the careful management of the Sovietsperpetuated this idea. He was thearchetypal Cambridge spy who fulfilled the Soviets' requirements of birth(his father was a prominent Cabinet minister), education (he was abrilliant student), and career (he was accepted into the Foreign Officeearlier than most and had an excellent career there -- all the whileserving the Soviet interest). Burgess' primary work, however, was donein his subsequent years at the Foreign Office where he served as personalassistant to the Foreign Minister's right-hand man, Hector McNeil, who was"captivated by Burgess's electric mind" and valued his tendency to always"run counter to the prevailing bureaucratic views" (Newton 266-67). His efforts in thisrespect were particularly important in the Soviet domination of EasternEurope after the war. Yet they allowed him toendanger "their most valuable penetration" of the British service andofficial Washington (Newton 268). intelligence services. This came about when Burgess wassent to warn Maclean of his impending apprehension and Burgess decided,against Philby's explicit orders, to defect with Maclean to the U.S.S.R. It was complex work that "required iron nerve andsplit-second timing" and Blunt was adept in applying blackmail whenever hisposition was threatened with exposure (Costello 396). If Burgess needed a jobit was certainly within the Soviets' power to get him one or even tosubsidize his retirement from the service. And there were also large numbersof upper- and middle-class Britons who supported Hitler and the otherfascist regimes -- usually, but not always, seeing them primarily as ameans of combating communism. New York: Little, Brown, 1994.Boyle, Andrew. This was the very trait exemplified byPhilby's desire to color even innocuous elements of his past with supposeddanger and secrecy -- of which it certainly had no small measure already.The most likely subjects were then subjected to subtle, but intensive,persuasion regarding the need to fight the Western powers whose own secrecywas, they said, employed in the oppression of the masses. New York: William Morrow, 1988.Newton, Verne W. Philby had always beencalled Kim, after Kipling's boy hero who was a spy for the Raj, and he grewup envying the boldness of his domineering father. The greatest services provided by Maclean came about during histenure at the British Embassy in Washington (1944-48). Despite the factthat even eminent anti-communists such as the philosopher Isaiah Berlin,Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and Prime Minister WinstonChurchill also found Burgess' brilliance to be "of an exceptional nature"he was so "erratic, unpredictable, and outrageous" that he hardly seemedlike the type of person the Soviet spy masters were interested in (Newton265-66). He recalled, for example, hiseagerness for admission to the Communist Party being met with suspicion andcaution because, he was told, "the Party, as you know, is illegal" (quotedin Borovik 24). But Philby's autobiography was fully in line withSoviet propaganda needs; a "skilful but doctored personal account" that"contributed to the perpetuation of his own legend" (Boyle 444). Philby,however, was treated as a hero and became a teacher of espionage agentsattached to Soviet intelligence. Onfollowing Burgess into MI6 he worked with the cryptographers at BletchleyPark and later became a section head, training many of the very spies whoseidentities he would later reveal to the Soviets. Burgess arranged his own disgrace by getting threespeeding tickets in a single day and complaining to the Ambassador aboutthe impounding of his car. But he was also asomewhat dependent person and "needed a universal faith to command hisloyalty" (Boyle 1 6). Theiractivities were only very gradually uncovered and the full story has beeneven more gradually revealed to the public. The successive scandals also did permanent damage to Britain'sstanding as an international power and to the "special relationship"enjoyed by that nation and U.S. But the decision on his placement remains one of the oddestunsolved questions in the story of the Cambridge spies. The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess in America. The Communist Party had never been illegal in England, butPhilby's tendency to cast a pall of danger over all his actions led him todo so with even the most insignificant and easily disproved matters. In the postwar years he continued hischosen career, becoming one of the most eminent art historians in theworld, director of the Courtauld Institute, and advisor to the Royal Familyon their art collections. Despite all itseffects, however, and the enormous amount of research and writing on thesubject, the Cambridge Spies retain some of their mystery. What is known about the activities of the spies comes from manysources -- from the self-reports of Philby's autobiography and Blunt'sconfession to the assessments of intelligence experts and historians to thearchives of the KGB. Rather thanremoving Burgess to some inconsequential remote locale the diplomaticservice sent "this admittedly disgraceful individual to Washington, whichwas their most important and sensitive outpost" (Newton 268). Mask of Treachery. But, as many writers have noted, Philby was also enamored ofthe secrecy of espionage and the glamour that he believed was attached tohis bold life as a spy. He was a committed socialist and planned to spend time inRussia, teaching English, after graduation. Blunt was the only one ofthe group not to defect and MI5, unable to actually prove his involvement,finally settled on an offer of immunity in exchange for his confession.Blunt held that he "could not confess until all my friends were safe" andheld off on providing his account until after Burgess' death in 1963(quoted in Costello 47). The ideological commitment of the Cambridge spies is thesubject of considerable debate and many have argued that their truemotivations ranged from their enjoyment of spying and pleasure in the "drugof deceit" to their personal rejection of their own hypocritical class andeven to the extension of the rejection they experienced as homosexuals (inthe cases of Burgess and Blunt) and a vengeance-like response to thatrejection (Newton 41). These records havealso revealed that Soviet efforts at establishing spy networks based onrecruitment from British universities had begun in the early 192 s and wereknown to the government -- and communicated to the United States -- evenbefore Blunt and the others attended Cambridge. He was flamboyant in everything from his flauntedhomosexuality to his outrageous humor and, during his Cambridge career, hissupport of socialism. But the government had been protecting itself for many decades.Britain's severe Official Secrets Act muzzles the press regarding anythingthe government deems a secret and investigations of MI5, the internal-security network of the Home Office, and MI6, the Foreign Office's SecretIntelligence Service (SIS), supposedly so secret that "no governmentofficial knowingly admits to its existence," would have been all butimpossible had it not been for the existence of MI5 files and othermaterials in various American archives (Costello 36). But he was also extremely intelligent and "the word'brilliant' is as inescapably fixed to Burgess's name as 'charm' is toPhilby's, and 'efficient' to Maclean's" (Newton 264). As Costello notes, suchrevelations "must raise serious questions of either negligence or criminalhigh-level conspiracy within the British security services years before MI5opened its doors to Blunt, Philby, and Burgess" (4 ). Blunt's principal direct work as a spy wasduring his wartime service with MI5. Burgess -- a very different sort of person from the cold,calculating, and very discrete Blunt -- was famous for his indiscreet andexcessive nature. The move wasequally perplexing from the Soviet point of view since Burgess was not onlyput into the proximity of Philby, one of their best agents, they evenallowed him to take up residence in Philby's home. Philby was by far the most important spy among the four men. New York: William Morrow, 1989.Costello, John. Although a number of otherpersons were connected with this group's spying on Britain and, lessdirectly, the United States these four had, as far as is known, the mostsignificant roles of the men who were recruited by the Soviets in the193 s. Maclean was heavily involved in the British JointMission on atomic power, for example, and was instrumental in supplying theSoviets with accurate data on Western troops and installations as well asAmerican plans for and attitudes about the use of the atomic bomb. Thus, as Boyle asks, "how could the adventure-seeking but non-intellectual Philby, the solemn yet assuredly immatureMaclean, or the brashly irresponsible Burgess have been expected to graspso gruesome a paradox?" (135). Burgess did, however, continue toprovide valuable information to the Soviets during his tenure inWashington, but his actions were eventually contribute to the fall ofPhilby -- as might have been expected. Burgess' time with MI6 waspredictably short for even in the somewhat relaxed acceptance of peoplebased on their family connections and schooling Burgess was too outrageousto be effective. Philby believed that he had found this in the SovietUnion's claimed attempt "to cure systematically all the ills bedevillingthe human race" and he found the structure he needed in the clandestinelife offered by the Soviet recruiters while simultaneously emulating hisfather's pleasure in always taking the opposing position against England(Boyle 1 6). Whatever mitigation may be supplied by their early beliefs or theirpersonal quirks, however, the four spies did not change allegiance evenafter the War -- when Stalin's intentions and methods became increasinglyclear to nearly everyone -- and continued to serve the interests of theSoviet Union until they were exposed. He was duly sent home in disgrace where,contrary to Philby's instructions, he joined Maclean in fleeing to theU.S.S.R. Partly because the British intelligence services have released solittle information on the cases, and despite dozens of books, reports, andarticles, the Cambridge spies remain in the shadows to a surprisingly largedegree. Instead of marchingParty members the recruiters were interested in those individuals whopossessed "a love of conspiracy [or] a predisposition for conspiratorialrelationships" (Newton 35).
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