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VIETNAM POLICY UNDER EISENHOWER.
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Analyzes President's policy in Indochina, based on Cold War ideology. Impact of Trumam policy, relations with & aid to French, military & political issues, leadership, diplomacy, Geneva Agreement, intervention.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analyzes President's policy in Indochina, based on Cold War ideology. Impact of Trumam policy, relations with & aid to French, military & political issues, leadership, diplomacy, Geneva Agreement, intervention.
Paper Introduction:
AMERICAN VIETNAM POLICY DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
This research paper traces the evolution of United States policy toward Vietnam during the administration of President
Dwight Eisenhower (January 1953-January 1961) and discusses the
factors which shaped that policy and contributed to its ultimate failure. The focus of this paper is on the mind-set and operating assumptions of President Eisenhower and other key members of his national security team and their manifestation in Vietnam policy. Its theses are that:
(1) from the late 1940s and throughout the Eisenhower administration, American policy toward Indochina/Vietnam was strongly shaped by Cold War tensions and was dictated primarily by Cold War considerations --i.e. the imperative need as
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Eisenhower Portrait of a Hero. .became an open aggressor in Korea . Ibid., 2 5.47. . We can't usethose awful things against Asians for the second time in ten years. Involvement inIndochina, 1945-1953," in Shadow on the White House Presidents and theVietnam War, 1945-1975, ed. In relation to Vietnam, heis principally remembered as the President who refused to commit Americanforces to fighting in the jungles and rice paddies of Indochina. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 416.77. Military Factors. Accordingto McMahon, in 1947, "the Truman administration continued to view Frenchmilitary exertions as a misguided effort to turn back the clock."[vii]French cooperation in the recovery of Western Europe was deemed much moreimportant by American policymakers than catering to the wishes of Asiannationalists. However, theirattitudes and approach to the problems posed by Vietnam were not shaped ina vacuum. "Statement by the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding PlenarySession of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954," in Ibid., 57 -571.64. Eisenhower saidlater "there were grave doubts in my mind about the effectiveness of suchair strikes on deployed troops where good cover was available."[xxiv] OnMarch 18, 1954, General Paul Ely, the head of the French armed forcesstaff, arrived in Washington. Diemthoroughly alienated the population in the countryside, 9 per cent of thetotal, by abolishing locally elected village elders and councils, andreplacing them with appointees of the central government who were oftencorrupt.In general, McNamara et al. Eden thought that Dulles' efforts to deter the Chinese throughthreatening speeches were pointless since the Vietminh, not the Chinese,had defeated the French. and partisan opportunities."[xlii] Hoopes said "he was to become,through the alchemy of politics, a dramatic exponent of the newunilateralism in Asia."[xliii] Although as a diplomat and former lawyer,Dulles could be as flexible as required by circumstances, he frequentlyengaged, said Hoopes, in "strident moralism, a self-righteous and oftenapocalyptic rhetoric."[xliv] With respect to Southeast Asia, Hoopes said Dulles and his colleagues,"still judging the Mao regime to be basically the agent of a unified,compulsively expansionist movement controlled by the Kremlin, . MyGod."[lxii] United States and The Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954 The Geneva Conference, which began on April 26, 1954 and ended on July21, 1954, ended the first Indochina War. As Cold War tensions escalated after 1948, the Republican right wingsavaged Truman and Acheson for their alleged softness on communism.Internally, Senator Joseph McCarthy embarked on witchhunts in search ofalleged subversives, which in early 1954 had not yet abated, and accusedthe State Department of harboring communist spies. Arnold, 342.95. The unresponsiveness of Diem to American military as well aspolitical advice was one reason among many why Collins recommended in 1955that Diem be replaced, but he was overruled by (Foster) Dulles. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support ofNgo Dinh Diem," in Anderson, 45.19. that the schizophrenic French policy of professing supportwhile acting to undermine Diem's regime was largely to blame for Diem'sdifficulties."[lxxv] By early 1955, most French troops had been removed andFrench influence had been replaced by the Americans. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. . . Fred I. Arnold, The First Domino Eisenhower, The Military, AndAmerica's Intervention in Vietnam (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 21.7. Hilsman, 418.83. remains classified."[liv] Ambrose statedthat the elaborate process of consultation Eisenhower went through afterthe first week of April was "for the record and to protect himself againstright-wing assaults."[lv] Halberstam referred to American diplomacy betweenearly April and the fall of Dien Bien Phu in early May as "an elaborateshadow dance."[lvi] No matter when Eisenhower made his decision not to intervenemilitarily, he had good reason for not revealing it until a broad policyconsensus developed. The only readily available military option was airstrikes on the Vietminh forces surrounding Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower, 371.66. (Later as Ambassador to South Vietnam he supported the bombing ofNorth Vietnam). Bernard B. Schandler, Argument Without End In Search ofAnswers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Perseus Books, 1999), 64.1 . Army Chief of StaffMatthew Ridgway led the opposition. 416-419.Hoopes, Townsend. . Basic document setting forth American policy toward South Vietnamafter the Geneva Conference and until the end of the Eisenhoweradministration.Anderson, David L. . In late April,the French made a last desperate appeal for military assistance which thewar hawks in Washington supported. Arnold, 36 -361.97. For example, the 1959 Draper committee,which was to provide an objective, nonpartisan evaluation of theeffectiveness of the American military assistance program reported that"the vitality and effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces" wasimpressive.[lxxxv] Not all American military advisors and observers weremisled. Arnold said Lansdale "worked with great success toearn Diem's respect."[lxxi] According to Halberstam, "Lansdale played a keyrole in convincing a very dubious U.S. In March and April 1954, Eisenhower seriously considered thepossibility of American military intervention in Indochina. . New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. Gravel, "25 June 1952 Statement of Policy by the National SecurityCouncil on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect toSoutheast Asia," 385-386.2 . Biersteker, and Col. that the United States ought to reexamine its its China policy. The point man in the Eisenhower administration for articulating itsmore aggressive East Asian policy was Dulles.Dulles helped the State Department negotiate the 1951 Japanese peacetreaty. He thought . We gave up India.Why shouldn't France give up Indo-China?" Montgomery: "Indo-China matters strategically. (Ed.). Their approach to Southeast Asian defense was tomake the best deal possible on Indochina at Geneva and to draw the line atfurther communist expansion in Southeast Asia along the Kra Peninsula northof Malaya. The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers,1959), 17 and 24.33. Anderson, 44.74. The Ridgway Report which provided Eisenhower with the militaryrationale for refusing to authorize Operation Vulture in the spring of 1954to save the French at Dien Bien Phu. . divisionsor their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would berequired to win a victory in Indochina."[xxv] According to Hoopes, "overthe years, Eisenhower treated Radford's judgments with skepticism, and, onthe issue of intervention in Indochina, he thought General Ridgway'scomments were cogent and compelling."[xxvi] Alternatively, the United States could have sent in ground troops;but, according to Ambrose, Eisenhower had told the NSC in January 1954: "he[Ike] simply could not imagine the United States putting ground troopsanywhere in Southeast Asia, except possibly Malaya . Trumannever replied to letters sent to him by Ho Chi Minh, leader of thecommunist Vietminh and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which Hoannounced on September 2, 1945. Gravel, 53.9. Cambodia and Laos were guaranteedtheir independence. The force of Vietnamese nationalism was recognized, but was accordedless importance as a basis for policy than the belief that the Vietnamesecommunists were directed from Beijing as a part of a vast communist globalconspiracy. We had to see the struggle in Vietnam through theprism of the Cold War and had, in effect, already begun the process of making a commitment to a small, artificial country where the other side held complete title to nationalism.[xcviii] It may very well be that more determined and realistic Americanefforts might have prevented the Diem regime from sliding off the clifftoward oligarchic and unresponsive rule. Senator Mike Gravel, 361. Moreover, there is no reasonto doubt the sincerity of Eisenhower's oft-repeated statements that he wasunwilling to go to war without full Congressional and public support. Involvement in Indochina, 1945-1953." In Shadow on the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975, ed. Contains in pp. Many factors entered into the ultimate failure of American policy inVietnam after Geneva, the legacy of French colonialism, American ignoranceof Vietnamese history, culture and personalities, Dulles' reflexive anti-communism which dominated the administration's thinking after 1954 anduntil his death in 1959, Eisenhower's relative inattention to Vietnameseaffairs after his 1955 heart attack and American arrogance in dealing withtheir South Vietnamese counterparts. "Harry S. Arnold, 355. came to the aid of the French in Indochina not because we approved of what they were doing, but because we needed their support for our policies in regard to NATO and Germany. "Dwight D. The most thorough exploration to date of the relationship betweenEisenhower and the American military establishment and the role of thelatter in formulating and implementing Vietnam policy during the Eisenhoweradministration.Brown, Weldon A. In his first State of theUnion address, Eisenhower briefly remarked that France was holding "theline of freedom" as part of the global effort against "Communist aggressionthroughout the free world."[xviii] Eisenhower fully subscribed to the viewof the Truman administration that preventing a communist victory inIndochina was a vital Western interest. Apparently he was now becomingarbitrary and blind to the situation."[xcvii] The American failure in Vietnam during 1955-196 must also be sharedwith Congress which failed in any significant way to be critical of theadministration's policy after 1954. The Hidden-Hand Presidency Eisenhower As Leader. theimperative need as perceived by American national security policymakers tocontain communist expansion in Indochina, and, after mid-1954, to prevent acommunist takeover in South Vietnam; (2) although the roots of American involvement in Vietnam during thisperiod reflected a bipartisan political and policy consensus, domesticpolitical conflict and controversy led during the Eisenhower years to ahardening and rigidification of American Vietnam policy which represented adistinctive Republican response to the threat of communism in SoutheastAsia; (3) the ineffectiveness of both the Vietnam policy inherited by theEisenhower administration and the reorientation of that policy which beganin 1953 was exposed by the Dien Bien Phu crisis of the spring of 1954; and (4) the administration's response to that crisis and its immediateaftermath resulted in a much deeper and more direct American commitment inVietnam than had existed previously which was based on, and helpedperpetuate, basic misconceptions concerning military and politicalrealities in Vietnam. Hoopes, a former senior official in the Defense Departmentunder the Truman administration and a consultant to the White House onforeign policy during the Eisenhower era, paints an intimate, detailed anddevastating portrait of Secretary of State Dulles as a zealot concerningissues relating to Asian communism who was barely kept within reasonablebounds by the President who nonetheless found him useful.Karnow, Stanley. Eisenhower The President. Truman and the Roots of U.S. British leaders were inclinedto believe that the French had been unwise in resisting the force ofVietnamese nationalism. Eden and Dulles never got along. . Anderson, 43-62. Edmonds, The War in Vietnam (Westport: Greenwood Press,1998), 8.2. In his report, Ridgway said: "amilitary victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998. . Eisenhower, 375.59. The Best and The Brightest. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. Free elections by secret ballot were to be held in allareas of the former Indochina within two years under the supervision of anInternational Control Commission consisting of Canada, India and Poland.The elections were intended to unify Vietnam. Ibid., 83.16. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. The best early study of Western failures in Indochina through early1954. He decidedagainst such action on grounds which proved to be sound militarily andpolitically, but in the process, he was forced to cope with considerabledisarray and conflict within his administration, with the Congress andimportant allies abroad. Indochina/Vietnam policy was not an issue in the presidentialelections of 1952, 1956 or 196 . AMERICAN VIETNAM POLICY DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION This research paper traces the evolution of United States policytoward Vietnam during the administration of PresidentDwight Eisenhower (January 1953-January 1961) and discusses thefactors which shaped that policy and contributed to its ultimate failure.The focus of this paper is on the mind-set and operating assumptions ofPresident Eisenhower and other key members of his national security teamand their manifestation in Vietnam policy. Karnow, 251.96. Hoopes, 251.7 . . . Herbert Y. The United States participated in thenegotiations on Korea but not in those on Indochina to which it sentUndersecretary of State Walter Smith as an observer. SEATO had no standing army. Senator John Kennedy, who had beencritical of the French in Indochina, did, together with Mansfield,criticize in the late 195 s the American overemphasis on military aid asopposed to political and economic reforms in South Vietnam. New York: Villard Books, 1993. Ambrose, 174.34. Last Reflections on a War. .believed that Paris had essentially forfeited its influence on Westernpolicies on Indochina with its weak performance" there.[lxxiv] The task ofeasing the French out was assigned primarily to General J. Gravel, 82; and Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History (New York: PenguinBooks, 1984), 192.18. He haslittle to say in this or in his succeeding volume, Waging Peace 1956-1961.Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, about Diem or his government.Fall, Bernard B. Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh on May 7,1954. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem." In Shadow on the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975, ed. Hoopes said that in his dealings with communist powers,"Dulles steadfastly refused to acknowledge the existence of any reasonableor legitimate claims on the Communist side," a stance symbolized by hisbrusque refusal at Geneva to shake hands with Beijing's Foreign Minister,Zhou Enlai.[lviii] Eisenhower was inclined to be more pragmatic. The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I. This otherwise hagiographical portrayal of Eisenhower's presidency isa good source of basic facts on the Dien Bien Phu crisis.McMahon, Robert J. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, all hostilities were declaredended. Kennedy,Johnson, who had helped Ike avoid intervening militarily in 1954, andNixon, who favored intervention in 1954, all were left to cope with theweary task of sustaining successive South Vietnamese governments amidst awar which divided America. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993. Boston: Beacon Press, 361. Dulles said that the Truman administration's policy of containmentled only to "strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere."[xxviii] Instead,he proposed in February 1952 that the free world take the psychologicaloffensive and adopt a policy of liberation "which will try to give hope andcreate a resistance mood within the Soviet empire."[xxix] To deterpotential communist aggression, the Eisenhower administration embraced thestrategy of massive retaliation, which Dulles explained in January 1954meant: the free world [must] develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back, by means of our own choosing.[xxx] Ambrose said "the basic structure of the New Look was an expandedstrategic air force and a much-reduced conventional force on land and atsea. After the Chinese intervention in Korea, Hoopes said he becamecritical of the Truman/Acheson containment policy in Asia both because of"a genuine fear of Chinese Communist expansion . Senator Mike Gravel, 361. Anderson, 43.68. On July 5, 1953, Churchill had the following colloquy with FieldMarshal Bernard Montgomery: Churchill: "Indochina . Diem regime to be a vast improvement over the succession ofFrench-backed non-Communist regimes which had preceded it."[lxxviii]Hilsman said Diem's accomplishments included the resettlement of therefugees, substantial increases in the production of rice, rubber and pork,the introduction of new crops, "substantial progress in eradicatingmalaria," great strides in expanding public education and "a beginning on ahealth and sanitation program for the villages."[lxxix] When Eisenhower offered Diem in his message of October 23, 1954 aid"to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining astrong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion oraggression through military means," he conditioned that aid with theproviso that "your Government be prepared to give assurances as to thestandard of performance it would be able to maintain."[lxxx] Ike's messagewas the fount of a long series of American attempts to persuade and cajolethe Diem regime to enact and implement various reforms which the U.S.government believed were necessary to give it political viability andstaying power. 4 5 the interconnections between domestic politicsover American policy toward China and widespread American misconceptionsand misperceptions of Vietnam.Hammer, Ellen. Arnold, 172.Eisenhower, 351; and Gravel, 56.53. Brown, Prelude to Disaster The American Role in Vietnam, 194 -1963 (Port Washington, NY: Kernikat Press, 1975), 23 .51. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. The Struggle for Indochina. Anderson said "Eisenhower . . Vietnam A History. Taylor in this book is highly critical of the excessive relianceplaced by the Eisenhower administration on nuclear weapons and strategicbombing. In any event, by the time ofthe visit of Churchill and Eden to Washington on July 25, 1954, the Britishbecame supportive of the American plan to create the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization (SEATO) which came into being on September 8, 1954 in Manilawith the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand,Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand as members. Senator Mike Gravel, 471-472. Halberstam, The Fifties, 4 5. and 939 A.D. Arnold, 154.35. Shadow on the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975. General Henri Navarre.According to Halberstam, "the Americans were becoming increasingly nervousthat the French would pull out of Indochina."[xxii] Eisenhower took a number of steps to shore up the French position inIndochina. Bedell Smith's carefully worded statement which was designed to permitthe successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference without restrictingfuture American support for South Vietnam."25 June 1952 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia." In The Pentagon Papers The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I, ed. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1984), 176.28. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Dulles to theGeneva Agreement was scarcely concealed panic . Ibid., 131.3 . Hoopes, 2 2.58. Ambrose, 171.32. In January 1954, he added to the American aid package ten B-26bombers and 2 American Air Force technicians to maintain them. Truman had defeated internationalist candidate Thomas Dewey in1948. David L. .thought a breaching of the chain in Southeast Asia would set off a wholeseries of Communist insurrections throughout Asia."[xlv] At January 1954,at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers, Dulles publicly castigatedChina as "a regime . . Mansfield and the Dulles brothers remained strong supporters of Diemin the United States. . Ambrose, 178.36. Written shortly before the author was killed in a combat zone innorthern South Vietnam, this book contains the last insights andrecollections of one of the world's most prolific writers and perceptivejournalists on Indochina and Vietnam and who covered both Indochinese wars.Very good in its treatment of the failings of the French, but inclined toreflect a French view of American actions in Vietnam.Gravel, Senator Mike (Ed.). By a series of steps between 1862and 1893, the French took control of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, whichtogether they called French Indochina. Ambrose, 178.55. Brigham, Thomas J.Biersteker and Col. Conclusion American policy toward Indochina and later Vietnam was dominatedduring the last three years of the second Truman administration andthroughout the Eisenhower administration by a set of attitudes derived fromthe Cold War, which included the belief that the preservation of SoutheastAsia was essential to American security and that Indochina and afterGeneva, South Viet Nam, were critical dominoes which must not be permittedto fall into communist hands because of the fear that the rest of theregion would succumb. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Churchill Volume VIII 'Never Despair'(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), 861.61. security interests in the Far East wastaken for granted" by the Eisenhower administration.[xx] As the Korean War came to an end, fears grew in Washington that theCommunist Chinese would increase their military support to the Vietminh orintervene there as they had done in Korea. Ibid., 173.38. Anthony G. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Halberstam, The Fifties, 4 5.56. itis certain that the last one will go over quickly."[l] The concept ofSoutheast Asia as a region containing raw materials and markets of vitalimportance to the West and to Japan and of Indochina as the strategic keyto control of the entire region was not new. Brother NgoDinh Can in effect ruled the northern and central provinces. . Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Ibid., 163.39. The important directnegotiations on Indochina took place between the Chinese and the French,which accelerated after Pierre Mendes France became Premier of France onJune 18. The rest relates to the diplomatic complications whichdominated American policy toward Indochina during the rest of the springand summer of 1954. In July 1953, the new French government headed by Premier JosephLaniel requested (in effect as a condition for French acceptance of theEuropean Defence Community) $4 million in additional aid for Indochina.In late September Eisenhower extended them an additional $385 million,which paid for an aircraft carrier, 25 C-47 transport planes andhelicopters. . The Pentagon Papers historians said "American thinkingand policy-making was dominated by the tendency to view communism inmonolithic terms."[xiv] After June 195 , they said "China replaced theSoviet Union as the principal source of the perceived threat in SoutheastAsia."[xv] On June 27, 195 , only two days after the North Koreans attackedSouth Korea, Truman "directed acceleration in the furnishing of militaryassistance to the forces of France . Senator Mike Gravel, 372. Ibid., 123.44. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. ENDNOTES -----------------------1. we did not like, but a great deal would depend onhow [they] . No new foreign troops, armsand bases were to introduced into Indochina, nor were those states to enterinto military alliances.[lxiii] In a separate statement, the United Statesagreed "to refrain from the threat of force or the use of force to disturb"the agreement, but said that it would view "with great concern . This reaction by conservative southern Democrats echoed theskepticism expressed by Democratic Senator John Stennis, who had reactednegatively to the dispatch of the B-26s and the 2 AF technicians when hesaid in February, 1954: "first we send in the planes, then we send them men. New York: Random House, 1969. Hoopes, 123.29. For the next severalyears, the CIA through Lansdale maintained a close working association withDiem. . Peter Lyons, Eisenhower Portrait of a Hero (Boston: Little, Brown,1974), 6 6.5 . 136-137leaves no doubt that Ike was in complete charge throughout the Dien BienPhu crisis despite appearances to the contrary.Halberstam, David. Herbert Y. The best of the Eisenhower presidential biographies. President Truman's announcement of stepped up aid to the French inIndochina in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War."Statement by the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954." In The Pentagon Papers The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I, ed. The United States was, therefore, prepared to underwrite aFrench colonial regime in Indochina which it knew was detested by theindigenous population. Blight, Robert K. Hilsman, 417-418.79. Very comprehensive and highly readable history of the war in Indochinaand Vietnam marred somewhat by sketchy sources.Lyons, Peter. Anderson (Lawrence: University Pressof Kansas, 1993), 27.8. Fall, 197.78. We are going to war, inch by inch."[xxxvi] The intervention optionwas debated in the Senate on April 6. The British were not convinced thatthe Chinese were the prime movers behind the collapse of the French inIndochina. Contains at pp. New York: Penguin Books, 1984. He and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman ofthe American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), came up with a joint plan whichthe French code named Operation Vautour or Vulture under which air strikeswould be launched against the Vietminh around Dien Bien Phu by up to 35 American planes, including naval aircraft based on two aircraft carriers bythen positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin and B-29s from Air Force bases inOkinawa and Clark Field in the Philippines. Diem was quitewilling to let the United States undertake these tasks. James R. Dwight D. According to Hammer, Vietnamesenationalists "fought for independence from France as their ancestors hadfought to oust the Chinese from Vietnam."[ii] Edmonds said "the Frenchversion of the 'white man's burden' was largely a smokescreen to cover anespecially vicious brand of imperialism. 861 into the Conservative government's view ofthe Indochina War and Southeast Asian defense.Greenstein, Fred I. Their aimwas to induce the Vietminh to engage their main force units in battle wherethey would be decimated by superior French firepower. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (Garden City:Doubleday, 1963), 246.24. The Fifties. The French, who had already suffered grievouscasualties (more than 15 , ) during their eight year war in Indochina,lacked both the political will and the means to save their besiegedgarrison at Dien Bien Phu. He also knew that they were not eager to embarkupon another Asian war."[xxxviii] A Gallup poll taken in November 1953showed that only slightly more than one half of those polled supported theuse of American airpower to prevent Indochina from being overrun by thecommunists and only a third supported the use of ground troops for thatpurpose.[xxxix] Hoopes commented: "less than a year away from the pain andfrustration of the Korean War, the American people were not yet ready tocountenance more Americans bleeding and dying" in Asia.[xl] From Eisenhower's perspective, another political aspect of the DienBien Phu crisis was the need to fend off criticism from the right wing ofthe Republican Party. The British, however, based on their unique historical perspective onSoutheast Asia, took a different view. Karnow, 239.91. intervention withair and naval forces alone" and "it is estimated that seven U.S. Greenstein, 5.57. The people were war-weary and discouraged, and there was the additional burden of almost a million Catholic refugees who fled to the South.[lxxvii] With substantial American aid and support during 1954-1955, Diemfrustrated coups plotted against him, crushed dissident sects which hadtheir own private armies, and in October 1955 won by a 98 percent vote areferendum in which the voters were asked to choose between him and BaoDai. Edmonds, 5.4. 11-14 a brief summary of Eisenhower's policy towardIndochina and Vietnam.Eisenhower, Dwight D. New York: William Morrow, 1991. I84. But to do thisanywhere else, said the President with vehemence, how bitterly opposed am Ito this course of conduct. According to McNamara et al. It depended upon a huge American lead in nuclear weapons."[xxxi] Oneof its foremost critics, General Maxwell Taylor, said the New Look was "theold air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now formallybuttressed upon Massive Retaliation as the central strategic concept . Because of their relatively low media profile in the United States,the Indochina War and problems presented by internal strife in SouthVietnam were for most of the 195 s of little concern to the Americanpublic. Gravel, "27 February 195 Report by the National Security Council onthe Position of the United States with respect to Indochina," 361.14. The War in Vietnam. NSC 124/2, dated June 25, 1952,stated that "the successful defense of Tonkin [North Vietnam] is criticalto the retention in non-Communist hands of Southeast Asia" and "Communistdomination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriouslyendanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term,United States security interests."[xix] The Pentagon Papers historians said"Indochina's importance to U.S. They, together withexpenditures on rural internal security units, the Civil Guard, and theurban police, which were controlled by Nhu, accounted for approximately 8 per cent of the more than $2 billion in assistance provided by the UnitedStates for fiscal years 1955-196 .[lxxxi] These reforms basically failedfor two reasons: one Vietnamese and the other American. he was . . Land reform, which had been pressed by Americanadviser Wolf Ladejinsky, stalled, prompting Ladejinsky to go home. Arnold, 232.76. . Britain, France, the U.S.S.R.,China and the United States attended. . By 1952, the Republicans had not held the presidency for 2 years, and, except for a brief period in 1946-1948, had not controlledCongress. Churchill said that "Dulles is the only caseof a bull I know who carries his china closet with him."[lx] The Britishhad first hand experience with a communist insurrection --in Malaya. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) reportedthat ARVN "lacks everything which makes a modern army: leadership, morale,training, and combat experience."[lxxxii] Diem and Nhu consistentlyresisted what they regarded as American interference with the selection ofkey commanders and the deployment of forces because they viewed ARVN as anextension of their rule. The war in Indochina would absorb our troops bydivision."[xxvii] When it came to the use of large ground forces in Asia, the Eisenhoweradministration's bellicose pronouncements concerning rolling back communismin Asia and its New Look economic policies were out of kilter with eachother. By imposing British and Congressional support as pre-conditions to military intervention, Ike transferred onto others the onusfor the failure to intervene and assumed the mantle of peacemaker withoutincurring the wrath of the Republican right. In the summer of 1954, the United Statesagreed to assume responsibility for training, arming and equipping theSouth Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and other military units. David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Villard Books, 1993), 4 .23. . The discussion on pp. David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: Random House,1969), 1 5.42. and promotes open aggression inIndochina by training and equipping the aggressors and supplying them withvast amounts of war munitions."[xlvi] Dulles reluctantly acceded to the wishes of Britain and France that aconference be convened in Geneva in April to deal with Korea and Indochina.When Dulles briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on developmentsin Indochina and the forthcoming Geneva Conference on February 23-24, 1954,Hoopes said that Senate Majority Leader William Knowland (R-Cal) "and othermembers of the China Lobby then moved to vent their fury at any proposalthat seemed to presage a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war, forthis would be, in their view, an intolerable Far Eastern Munich."[xlvii]For Democrats in Congress, the difficulties Eisenhower and Dulles werehaving with the far right over Indochina was payback time after all theabuse the Truman administration had endured over its supposed softness oncommunism in Asia. Ambrose, 179.52. Anderson, 19-42. On February 1, 195 , Acheson noted Sovietrecognition of Ho's government which he said "should remove any illusionsas to the 'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in histrue colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina."[xii]National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 64, dated February 27, 195 ,asserted that "the threat of communist aggression against Indochina is onlyone phase of anticipated communist plans to seize all of SoutheastAsia."[xiii] The outbreak of the Korean War and Chinese communist militaryintervention in Korea persuaded Acheson and Truman that the Indochina Warwas another front in the struggle of the West to contain Asian and globalcommunism. Yet Arnold said "Eisenhower's principaldeputies remained optimistic, an attitude nourished by optimistic reportsemanating from Saigon."[xcv] The continuing success of the Viet Cong, whichby late 1959 was openly supported by the communist party of North Vietnamwhich began sending cadres and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the TayNinh debacle, the April 196 Caravelle Group declaration of 18 leadingcitizens critical of the regime and the failed paratroop-led coup ofNovember 196 gradually opened the eyes of officialdom in Saigon andWashington that they were facing a serious problem in South Vietnam. The Dien Bien Phu crisis did not subside immediately. The former Defense Secretary and his colleagues, American diplomats,military men and scholars, record their dialogue with their NorthVietnamese counterparts between 1995 and 1998 and their own commentsconcerning opportunities for peace in Indochina and Vietnam which either orboth sides may have missed. Collins reported in thespring of 1955 that Diem was "incapable of providing the dynamic leadership[South Vietnam] needed" because "he and his brothers were running'practically a one-man government' and they were stubbornly resistant tohelpful advice."[xc] According to Karnow, Diem had the ballot boxes stuffedin the October 1955 referendum to inflate his margin of victory, againstLansdale's advice, because "his mandarin mentality could not accept theidea of even minority resistance to his rule."[xci] Anderson said the March1956 elections to the National Assembly were rigged to "provide a facade ofpopular government for an ambitious family aspiring to centralizedauthority."[xcii] Almost all observers agree that Diem's rule became increasinglyrepressive after 1955. . . Dulles' bluff and blusterstyle alienated the British. It follows that if the policies of the Eisenhower administrationtoward Indochina and later Vietnam were later shown to have been misguided,that failure was primarily attributable to the policy perceptions anddecisions of the President and his senior advisers. In 1954, the U.S. SEATO was little more than a fig leafto cover French withdrawal from Indochina and the emergence of the UnitedStates as the principal, if not the sole, international supporter of SouthVietnam.[lxxiii] The main thrusts of American policy inside South Vietnam in 1954-1955were to remove the French military and political presence without creatinga power vacuum and at the same time assist Diem establish the authority ofhis new government over the country. Eisenhower, 341.25. According to Mcnamara et al., Dulles "thoughtcoalitions with communists were halfway houses to perdition."[lxvii] Forthe rest of his administration, Eisenhower never wavered from hisconviction that "the survival of an independent, noncommunist government insouthern Vietnam was a vital strategic imperative for the UnitedStates."[lxviii] The United States was prepared to go to considerablelengths to accomplish this purpose, including its later backing of therefusal of the South Vietnamese government, which was not a signatory tothe Geneva Agreement, to permit nationwide elections in 1956. Asia was slipping tothe communists, who seemed to be on the march across the region."[lxv]Eisenhower's public reaction was more measured: "the agreement did containcertain features . in Indo China and the dispatchof a military mission" there.[xvi] That military assistance grew to $3billion by mid-1954 when it accounted for about 8 percent of the costs ofthe French war effort in Indochina.[xvii] Eisenhower's Initial Approach to the Indochina War The most pressing foreign policy priority in East Asia for theincoming Eisenhower administration was not the Indochina War but ratherending the protracted and inconclusive Korean War which was finallyaccomplished by the armistice of July 27, 1953. . As Cold War tensions grew in Europe in 1948-195 , the UnitedStates began to render more active assistance to the French effort inIndochina. . for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than theywere at the beginning."[vi] However, Winston Churchill and Charles DeGaulle vigorously opposed FDR's plans to place Indochina underinternational trusteeship so Indochina's postwar status was leftunresolved. TheUnited States then restricted the export of high octane gasoline to Japanwhich Fall said "hardened the Japanese Navy's insistence upon an attack onSoutheast Asia before its petrol supplies were completely exhausted."[iv]According to the historians of the Pentagon Papers, "ambivalencecharacterized U.S. Senator Mike Gravel, 385-386. Anderson, 51.9 . David L. McNamara et al., 321.86. Hilsman said Diem followed "the debilitatingpractice of appointing generals and other officers not on the basis ofability but of personal loyalty."[lxxxiii] The shocking deficiencies ofARVN became apparent at the Battle of Tay Ninh, 1 miles northeast ofSaigon on January 26, 196 , where the Viet Cong decisively defeated it,because, according to Arnold, "the defenders, despite advance warning, hadnot been alert, and had not fought effectively."[lxxxiv] These and otherweaknesses of ARVN, which were exposed time and time again thereafter, werenot fully appreciated by the American military brass until the last days ofthe Eisenhower administration. . This study, which was commissioned by Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara, is the best source of unclassified documents dealing with thepolicy of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations concerning Indochinaand Vietnam, and is remarkably candid for an official publication, but someof its historical conclusions are unnecessarily qualified and guarded.Gilbert, Martin. Arnold, 198.93. . When the Indochina War brieflydominated the headlines during the spring of 1954, President Eisenhowerquickly took steps to deflect public criticism. Ibid., xiv.45. said "the United States trained the SouthVietnamese for the wrong mission," defense against a conventional Korea-type cross-border air and land invasion.[lxxxvi] As late as 1959, SaigonMAAG Chief General Samuel Williams opposed counter-guerrilla trainingbecause "it interfered with the more important conventionalinstruction."[lxxxvii] Belatedly, JCS decided on March 3 , 196 that ARVN"should develop anti-guerrilla capability."[lxxxviii] According to Hilsman,by the end of 196 , "the Viet Cong had increased their strength to aboutfive thousand regular guerrillas and they more or less controlled aconsiderable portion of the countryside."[lxxxix] Political and economic reforms. Discusses at p. There is,however, a good deal of truth in Halberstam's observation: we would not see the affairs of Vietnam as they really were, mired aswe were in prejudices generated by our own domestic politics. Eisenhower may have made a decision not to intervene militarily tosave the defenders of Dien Bien Phu as early as April 5 when he refused toaccede to the French request to activate Operation Vulture and privatelytold Dulles: "we cannot engage in active war."[li] Arnold holds to the viewthat the decision was made by April 6 when Eisenhower told a hastilyconvened meeting of NSC "there would be no unilateral Americanintervention."[lii] In his memoirs, Eisenhower suggested the final decisionthat "there would be no decision without allies" was deferred until April23 by which time it was clear that the British would not, and only France,Thailand and the Philippines would, support united military action inIndochina.[liii] Much is still not known about the inner deliberations of theadministration during this crisis. . Whatis known is that Diem, who had opposed French rule, was a Catholic and hadstudied briefly at the Maryknoll Seminary in New Jersey. The Dien Bien Phu crisis exposed the hollowness of Republicanunilateralism and xenophobic bellicosity toward Asian communism, themselvesechoes of the domestic political tensions and divisions produced by theCold War. According to Arnold, "when Diem assumed office, his real militarycontrol extended to only a few blocks of central Saigon."[lxxvi] Hilsman,who later became a strong supporter within the Kennedy administration ofthe 1963 South Vietnamese coup which ousted Diem (and resulted in themurder of Diem and his brother Nhu), said: the problems Diem faced as the Premier of half of a war-torn country were overwhelming. Gravel, 55.21. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little,Brown, 1973), 211.27. In late August 1945, President Harry Truman assured De Gaullethat the United States recognized French sovereignty over Indochina. Destruction was everywhere, and the economy was in chaos. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel between Ho's north anda southern half then headed by Bao Dai. Particularly pertinent is Chapter 3 wherein thelost opportunities presented by American acquiescence in French colonialpolicy and in Diem's refusal to permit nationwide elections in 1956 arediscussed. . . Origins of American Policy toward Vietnam According to Edmonds, "Vietnam was no more than a blip on the Americanconsciousness prior to the closing days of World War II."[i] The Vietnamesehave a long history of resistance to foreign invaders, principally theChinese, who controlled most of present day Vietnam, except for shortintervals, between 111 B.C. Greenstein said in 1982: "most of theprimary sources bearing on United States response to the collapse of theFrench effort in Indo-China . Arnold, 143.37. NSC Document 124/2 which is one of several containing the fallingdomino theory and is noteworthy for its emphasis on the perceived ChineseCommunist threat to Southeast Asia."27 February Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with respect to Indochina." In The Pentagon Papers The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I, ed. He and Dullesbelieved that it was necessary to deter the Chinese and the Soviets fromfurther adventures in Southeast Asia. . The Uncertain Trumpet. France exploited Vietnamruthlessly."[iii] After Japan occupied military bases and ports in southern Indochina inJune 1941, the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies lay exposed. The role, if any, of American and/or French intelligenceservices in Diem's recruitment for this post has never been clarified. On January 24, 1944, FDR said: "France has had that country. On April 12-13 Churchill and British Foreign Secretary AnthonyEden met with Dulles in London where they effectively vetoed any plans toinclude Britain in Western military intervention in Indochina before theoutcome of the Geneva negotiations were known. Anotherbrother Thuc was the Catholic Archbishop of Hue. He let the more hawkish elements inthe administration make their case for military intervention in Indochina.They included Radford, Twining and Curtis Lemay, head of the Strategic AirCommand, Dulles, Vice President Richard Nixon, who publicly indicatedsupport for sending in ground troops in a speech on April 16, foreign aidadministrator Harold Stassen and Lewis Straus, the head of the AtomicEnergy Commission. Eisenhower's own somewhat self-serving, but nevertheless lucid accountof the first five years of his policy toward Indochina and Vietnam. Part of the problem was a clash ofpersonalities. . Senator Mike Gravel (Ed.), The Pentagon Papers The Defense DepartmentHistory of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I (Boston: BeaconPress, 1971), 1.6. Operation Vulture split theJCS. "21 July 1954 Geneva Conference Indo-China," in Gravel 571-572.63. "the reaction of . 125-127 a graphic description of Col. Hoopes, 2 5.41. Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1954), 55.3. . Ibid., 2 4-2 5.46. Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,discusses the problems, accomplishments and failures of the Diem regimeduring the 195 s in a hard headed, pragmatic manner at pp. In February 195 , the United States recognized the puppetVietnamese regime of the Emperor Bao Dai, to whom the Pentagon Papershistorians said "the French yielded control only pro-forma, while . Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov of the Soviet Union, Co-Chairmen,played important roles in arranging a settlement. . While Eisenhower, the JCS and NSC ponderedmilitary options, Eisenhower and other members of the administration tooksteps to build a consensus in Congress, to prepare American public opinionand to marshal support abroad among America's allies for whatever course ofaction was ultimately chosen. Arnold, 359.87. Stephen E. Port Washington: Kernikat Press, 1975. . 1 74-A." In The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I, ed. And then Malaya would be in danger." Churchill: "We could hold the [Kra] Isthmus." Montgomery: "Yes, perhaps we might."[lxi] Eisenhower did not agree with this British strategic assessment;however, he laid great store on Anglo-American unity and was wise enough torealize that several weeks of diplomacy were needed to mend the rift whichhad developed in the trans-Atlantic alliance over Indochina. McMahon, "Harry S. . Ambrose, 99 and 173.49. Solid academic treatment of the early period of American involvementwith Indochina and Vietnam, written largely from a standpoint which iscritical of the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.Edmonds, Anthony. As early as April1954, he was being touted as a "the man who should lead Vietnam" by SupremeCourt Justice William Douglas and was strongly supported by powerfulmembers of the American Catholic community, including Cardinal FrancisSpellman of the New York Archdiocese, Joseph Kennedy, and Senator MikeMansfield (D-Mont.), then Johnson's deputy, who ensured that Diem met the'right' people in the Eisenhower administration, including senior CIAoperatives.[lxx] On June 1, 1954, CIA agent Colonel Edward Lansdale beganoperating in Saigon and was assigned to assist Diem. Robert J. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. Ibid., 251.82. which has liquidated millions of Chinese . [and because] hesensed the need not to get too far out of step with developing Republican .. (Ridgway eventually resigned in 1956over his objections to the administration's defense policies and armybudget cutbacks).Arnold, James R. Arnold, 63.11. Few candidates were available who possessed the necessarypro-independence credentials and who were not corrupted by priorassociations with the French. It fortified his conviction thatthe United States had no alternative but to support Diem and helpd blindhim and many other senior officials to the realities on the ground inVietnam. Provides insights at p. Eisenhower had been a distinguished servant of theFDR and Truman administrations. . . McCarthy, together witha collection of right wing supporters of Nationalist China known as theChina Lobby, held the administration responsible for the triumph of MaoZedong's forces in China, which Halberstam said "sent deep psychic shockwaves through the American political structure."[xli] The Republicancriticism of Truman's Far Eastern policy became even more vitriolic afterthe Chinese intervened in Korea, Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthurand the Korean fighting stalemated. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency Eisenhower As Leader(New York: Basic Books, 1982), 137.54. Lawrence: University of Kansas Pre Very good account of the differences of opinion within the Trumanadministration concerning American policy toward Indochina and the effectsof the Cold War had on that policy.McNamara, Robert S., James G. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963. . Fall, Last Reflections on a War (Garden City: Doubleday,1967), 123.5. But . Collins and the French HighCommissioner in Saigon, Ely, established a good working relationship, buttensions developed because the United States believed, according to thePentagon Papers historians, that "France had not done enough for Diem,[and] . New York: Basic Books, 1982. In April,Eisenhower agreed with Dulles that the formation of a bloc of Western andAsian nations (united action) would serve to deter the Chinese and othersfrom taking unnecessary advantage of the French predicament in Indochinaand strengthen the Western bargaining position in Geneva. Lansdale'scolorful personality and helps explain his important and controversial roleduring the early years of Diem's regime.Halberstam, David. . Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. David L. Eisenhower resolved that crisis in a manner that permitted theUnited States to avoid an unsound military intervention in Indochina in1954 but at a price which ensured the deepening of a fundamentallyunrealistic and ultimately unsustainable commitment to prevent thecommunists from prevailing in South Vietnam. . government that Diem was worth therisk."[lxxii] During the summer of 1954, Dulles rallied support around the world forthe SEATO pact which, as noted above, was formalized in early September.SEATO represented an American attempt to create the illusion of acollective security umbrella over what was left of non-communist Indochina;however, its key provision, Article IV, only provided that the partieswould in case of aggression 'meet the common danger in accordance withconstitutional processes.' The SEATO treaty lacked the mandatory 'an attackon one is an attack on all' common defense provision of the North AtlanticTreaty. In hismemoirs, Eisenhower candidly acknowledged "I have never talked orcorresponded with anyone knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did notagree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly8 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho ChiMinh."[lxix] The first task was to find a suitable non-communist alternative to Hoin South Vietnam. After the Vietminh brieflyoccupied Laos in March 1953, Eisenhower obliquely warned China againstentering the Indochina War in a speech on April 16, 1953 and Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles did so more directly on September 2, 1953.According to Arnold, the ending of the Korean War "led to a massiveincrease in Chinese support for the Vietminh," further heightening Americanfears.[xxi] Meanwhile, Eisenhower was receiving conflicting reports fromAmerican military sources concerning military progress the French weremaking in Indochina under their new commander, Lt. In doingso, he acted wisely, but he also removed Vietnam policy from the arena ofdomestic political debate for the rest of his administration, a dubiouslegacy. Ibid., 349.85. Ibid., 127.31. The United States never had anywherenear the influence over the Diem regime, that it believed it had. Eisenhowerdid so, even though he had serious doubts concerning the soundness ofFrench military strategy, in order, he said, "to give the French better airsupport and greater flexibility in the use of their paratroop battalionsand, above all, to insure higher morale."[xxiii] Eisenhower's Handling of the Dien Bien Phu Crisis In early 1954, the French established an advanced base manned by eliteparatroop battalions at a remote village called Dien Bien Phu in amountainous region of northwest Vietnam near the Laotian border. Hilsman, 419.89. In their formal reply, datedApril 24, 1954, the British Cabinet stated: "We are not prepared to giveany undertaking now, in advance of the Geneva Conference, concerning UnitedKingdom military action in Indo-China."[xlix] -on April 7 at his press conference Eisenhower explained to the publicwhy he believed keeping Indochina out of the communist bloc was a vitalAmerican interest, by making his celebrated 'falling dominoes' remarks: "ifsomeone sets up a row of dominoes, and knocks over the first one . does not really matter. InDecember 196 , Ambassador Elbridge Dubrow advised the State Department that"we may be forced, in the not too distant future, to undertake thedifficult task of identifying and supporting alternative leadership."[xcvi]On May 9, 196 Eisenhower told NSC: "heretofore we have been proud of Diemand had thought he was doing a good job. NSC 64, one of the first full explanations of why the United Stateshad a vital interest in the defense of Southeast Asia.Taylor, Maxwell D. Arnold, 31 .81. The alternative to military intervention wasa diplomatic solution. Theyhad tried for some years to interest the United States in joint defenseplanning for Southeast Asia and had been put out by their exclusion fromthe 1951 ANZUS Defense Treaty between the United States and Australia andNew Zealand. McNamara, James G. They were intimately related to and influenced by previousAmerican experience vis-a-vis Southeast Asia. On July 7, 1954, Bao Dai, who rarely didanything important on his own volition, appointed Ngo Dinh Diem Premier ofSouth Vietnam. Prelude to Disaster The American Role in Vietnam, 194 - 1963. Senator Mike Gravel, 57 -571. Blight, Robert K. Tends to mirrorEisenhower's preoccupations, therefore, does a better job coveringIndochina policy during 1953-54 than Vietnam policy during 1955-6 ."Aid to the State of Viet-nam: Message from the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, October 26, 1954." In The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I, ed. Dulles was unalterably opposed to negotiations withthe communists. . In early March CIADirector Allen Dulles informed the President that the French had only a5 :5 chance of prevailing. Mandate for Change 1953-1956. Instead, Diem's paranoia with regard to his personal security, and high-handedness made few friends and many enemies.[xciv] Dulles' opposition to the further expansion of communism in Asiaoverrode almost every other consideration. -On March 29, Dulles gave a speech in which he said that "if communismis imposed in Southeast Asia, the United States feels that the possibilityshould not be passively accepted, but should be met by unitedaction."[xxxiv] -On April 2 Dulles and Radford secretly briefed a bipartisan group ofCongressional leaders. .the ink was hardly dry on the New Look before the episode of the fall ofDien Bien Phu provided a practical test of [its] efficacy and exposed itsweakness."[xxxii] Ambrose added that it was impossible to prevent theFrench defeat in Indochina in 1954 without introducing ground forces and"the New Look precluded such an effort-the troops simply were notavailable."[xxxiii] Political Considerations. Prior to June 195 , American policy makers tended to emphasizethe Soviet threat. . Hoopes, 243.73. Taylor. What was new was that thePresident was seeking to clarify for the public the nature of America'svital interests in the region. BaoDai adopted a retiring and passive role, and turned his government over todiscreditable politicians."[viii] In May 195 , the United States agreed torender the first $1 million of military assistance to France forIndochina, for reasons which Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained asfollows: The U.S. Nevertheless, the State Department wasskeptical of French efforts to suppress nationalism in Indochina. Gravel, 54.15. Well-documented summary of the policies of the Eisenhoweradministration toward the Indochina War and Vietnam, especially penetratingin its analysis of Ike's support of Diem.Anderson, David L. worked out in practice."[lxvi] American Relationship with the Diem Government (1954-1961) The Geneva Agreement envisaged a neutralized Vietnam; however, thenotion of any arrangement under which political power in South Vietnamwould be shared with the communists was totally unacceptable to theRepublican administration. Anderson, "Dwight D. Diplomat George Kennan told Acheson inAugust 195 : "In Indo-China we are getting ourselves into the position ofguaranteeing the French in an undertaking which neither they nor we, norboth of us together, can win."[x] In the late 194 s and early 195 s theFrench position in Indochina deteriorated due, said Edmonds, to "acombination of fierce determination on the part of the Vietminh, strategicand tactical errors by the French and war weariness in France," where thewar became known as la guerre sale, the dirty war.[xi] The most important factor behind the hardening of Americanpolicymakers' attitudes toward the Vietminh movement and increased Americanmilitary and economic assistance to the French was not the fluctuations inFrench military fortunes in Indochina, but rather the intensification ofthe Cold War after 1948, and the threat posed by the expansion of Sovietcommunism to Western interests. Ibid., 2 6.48. Until 196 , McNamara et al. Winston S. Diplomatic Complications. Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest, 125.72. Particularly useful for conveying an authentic feel for Vietnamesereactions and attitudes at that time. The French blackmailed us.[ix] Not all members of the American foreign policy establishment agreedthat this policy shift was wise. Ike had succeeded all too well in disarmingpotential critics of his Vietnam policy in early 1954. McNamara et al., 1 4.67. Diem ruled in a mandarin style,meaning that he took advice from and trusted very few people outside hisown family and immediate circle. In hismemoirs, he acknowledged that he gradually came around to the point of viewthat "the settlement obtained by the French at Geneva in 1954 was the bestit could get under the circumstances."[lix] Nevertheless, this was a bitterpill for the Republican administration to swallow after all its saber-rattling rhetoric and in view of its deeply held belief that the fall ofNorth Vietnam would lead to other falling dominoes in the region. Nhu ran internal security. Gravel, 214.75. Truman and the Roots of U.S. Robert S. concluded: the Diem regime alienated itself from one after another of the elements within South Vietnam that might have given it political support. Anderson, 53.92. Annotated BibliographyAmbrose, Stephen E. New York: Perseus Books, 1999. According to Arnold, "the Senatedebate sent a clear message to the White House: Democrats and Republicansalike were suspicious of administration claims about the war."[xxxvii] According to Arnold, Eisenhower "knew he retained the strong backingof the American public. Arnold, 247.71. . Brigham, Thomas J. Gravel, "Army Position on NSC Action No. "Aid to the State of Viet-Nam: Message from the President of the UnitedStates to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, October25, 1954," in Gravel, 6 9.8 . According to Arnold, "the South Vietnamese regimebegan to take on highly-resented police state features long before theguerrilla threat justified the adoption of some of them for the purpose ofrestoring internal security."[xciii] Thousands of people, including manynon-communists, were arrested by Nhu's secret police and sent to detentioncenters, an action which placed a severe strain in 1956 on Lansdalerelationship with Diem. Its theses are that: (1) from the late 194 s and throughout the Eisenhower administration,American policy toward Indochina/Vietnam was strongly shaped by Cold Wartensions and was dictated primarily by Cold War considerations --i.e. After the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, theEisenhower administration backed wholeheartedly the Diem regime, despiteits increasingly repressive nature, shaky political base and ineffectivearmed forces, because it felt that the alternative of withdrawal wasanathema both from domestic political and national security points of view. McNamara et al., 32 .94. Extremely critical of French andAmerican policy.Hilsman, Roger. Basedon his experiences in World War II and at NATO, he firmly believed incollective security, which partially explains his reluctance to interveneunilaterally. Arnold, 1 1.22. Churchill Volume VIII 'Never Despair.' Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. 1 74-A," 471-472.26. . According to Ambrose, Eisenhower had a somewhat more nuanced view ofChina, but he was nevertheless very much aware of the political dangers ofshowing any flexibility toward it: Eisenhower's thoughts about what to do concerning China ran in the opposite direction of those of the Old Guard. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. According to Fall, later one of Diem's most severe critics, "there isstrong evidence that the population of South Vietnam at first consideredthe . Martin Gilbert, Winston S. . Ibid.4 . . Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993. The first protests against the war inVietnam in America did not occur until the early years of theadministration of President John Kennedy. When NSC Secretary Robert Cutler toldEisenhower that Radford and Twining were considering using tactical nuclearweapons in Indochina, Ike exploded: "You boys must be crazy. . Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. Partly because of its straightened financial situation,Britain had come to terms with Asian nationalism by relinquishing controlof India, Burma, Malaya and northern Borneo. anyrenewal of aggression."[lxiv] The attitude of the United States toward the Geneva negotiations onIndochina was one of acquiescence in an inevitable yet distasteful faitaccompli. However, the United States neverreally implemented such a policy, believing that it had little choice after1955 but to sink or swim with Diem because we had no other acceptablealternative. Once more Eisenhower turned the Frenchdown. Keeping China out of the U.N., and refusing to recognize [its] existence made no sense to him. Gravel, "Statement by the President June 27, 195 ," 372.17. Eisenhower believed that the American public was not ready to think about a new relationship with China. Weldon A. David L. In this assessment, the British were undoubtedlycorrect, but in all probability the combination of American firmness andBritish flexibility contributed to the willingness of China and the SovietUnion to compromise over Indochina at Geneva. . Gravel, 268.88. . The United States left to the French the handling of the Vietminhrevolt which erupted in late 1946. The French conjured up an imaginary threat of Chinese airintervention which proved to be false, but they, nevertheless, created ashort-lived war scare in Washington. One of the first books to explain Eisenhower's unique and oftenindirect style of presidential management. Lawton Collins,who was sent to Saigon in November 1954 as Eisenhower's specialrepresentative with the rank of Ambassador. . Schandler, Argument Without End In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy. McNamara et al., 1 3.65. aware that Republican orators had been demanding to know, ever since 1949, 'Who lost China?' Could he afford to allow Democrats to ask, 'Who lost Vietnam?' He told his Cabinet he could not.[xlviii] -on April 4, Eisenhower sent a telegram to Churchill in which herequested the British to join in united action in Indochina and used thefailure of the West to stop Adolf Hitler in the late 193 s as hisrationale. On his visit to Washington in May 1957, Diem met briefly withEisenhower and was hailed as the 'savior of South Vietnam.'In 1957-1958,the first Viet Cong assassinations of village officials and other terroristincidents began to multiply. Edmonds, 9.12. Gravel, 41.13. Ambrose, 184.62. policy [toward Indochina] during World War II."[v]President Franklin Roosevelt opposed the return of French colonial controlover Indochina. If Indo-China goes,Siam goes too. . . Maxwell D. wereaghast."[xxxv] The leading Democrats there, Lyndon Johnson, Minority Leaderin the Senate, and Senator Richard Russell, elicited from Radford theadmission that JCS were divided. Eisenhower, 372.69. According to Ambrose, "the Congressmen . To Move a Nation. They urgently requested American assistance tosalvage the situation. As Greenstein pointed out, Eisenhower was adept atstage managing the nation's affairs in such a manner as not to contradictthe popular image of himself as "as an aging hero who reigned rather thanruled and lacked the energy, motivation and political knowhow to have asignificant impact on events."[lvii] In fact, Ike was very much in chargeall through the Dien Bien Phu crisis. Radford and Nathan Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, supported it,while the navy, marine and army chiefs were opposed. Hoopes, 114-115.43. Also interesting is the intensity of the bitterness expressed bythe North V
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