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19TH CENT. GERMAN UNIFICATION.
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Analyzes three wars (1864, 1866, 1870-1871) which resulted in partial unification, focusing on political & military vision & leadership of Otto von Bismarck.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analyzes three wars (1864, 1866, 1870-1871) which resulted in partial unification, focusing on political & military vision & leadership of Otto von Bismarck.
Paper Introduction:
This study will examine the three nineteenth century wars (1864, 1866 and 1870-71) which resulted in the partial unification of Germany. The primary leader behind these wars and German unification was Otto von Bismarck, the creator of what would become the German Empire. Bismarck was the premier of Prussia from 1862 to 1890 and chancellor of Germany from 1871 to 1890. Had there been no Bismarck the history of Germany, Prussia, Austria and all of Europe would have been drastically altered. (The German states included the Rhineland, Westphalia, Bavaria, etc., but especially significant in this study will be the largest entities of Austria and Prussia.)
Therefore, the story of the wars of German unification can be fairly said to be the story of Bismarck himself. Even with the indomitable will of Bismarck, however, there was no guarantee
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that would be preferable to the creation of a truly independent Schleswig-Holstein.[viii] Here Bismarck demonstrated his utterly pragmatic political stance. Theprimary leader behind these wars and German unification was Otto vonBismarck, the creator of what would become the German Empire. The failure of Austria and Prussia to combine against this threat exposed very clearly the military weakness of the Confederation [of German states] and strengthened the growing feeling that a strong Reich was a categorical imperative to enable Germany to resist the hereditary foe [i.e., France].[iii] By the 186 s, then, the states that would be formed through wars intounited Germany were being pummeled by forces from within and without.Internal divisions threatened social, political and economic stability, andpowerful armies from without threatened the very existence of those statesas free entities. Unification ofGermany was an inevitable expression of that ambition, and the wars of 1864and 1866 proved to be preparatory for the war of 187 -71. Carr writes thatthe forces at work in Prussia were at work throughout Europe. was due . . A war with a substantial foreign adversary, howeverovermatched, was not as easily controlled as the war with Denmark orAustria. Although the preservation of the status quo did not greatly interest him either . . Bismarck. And inspire them he did. . As Rich writes,Bismarck sought such a French political stability, in name at the veryleast, in order to ensure a lasting peacebetween Prussia and France: Before Bismarck would proceed with final peace negotiations, he demanded that the French establish a government that represented all of France. Just as important for the future of Germany was theconflict between Bismarck, and his emphasis on the importance of themonarchy, and the liberals in Parliament, who were opposed to the monarchy.To Bismarck, the conflict with Denmark was meaningful only insofar as itstrengthened Prussia and its monarchy: As early as 1856 Bismarck had made no secret of his conviction that the interests of Prussia . He was therefore ready to make special concessions, especially to Bavaria which in time of peace was to retain its own military supreme command.[xxiii] The legacy of Bismarck's three wars and the unification of Germany isunqualified disaster. . . Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period ofUnification, 1815-1871. Hebacked the king's drive for a stronger military and in defiance of theparliament he simply, and illegally, taxed the people in order to fund thatmilitary expansion and modernization. However, Bismarck had a long-term plan which short-termpoliticians could not comprehend. Bismarck recognized that he needed that foreign foe to overcomeresistance from the southern region to unification. Germany. . . Bismarck quickly demonstrated the effectiveness of his conservative power politics in the confrontation with the Prussian parliament. This triumph could destroy the German spirit, drown it by the worship of practicality and power . . For example, the 1848-49 revolution merely resulted in a temporarytakeover by the liberals from the princes.[ii] The revolutions did, however, politicize the populace and makeobvious that some powerful leader would be necessary to bring together themany deep divisions in the nation. Negotiations broke off between Austria and Prussia on May 28, 1866,and Austria befuddledly renewed the debate over the duchies in an impotenteffort to grab the offensive against Bismarck. His rise to power made war inevitable. Bismarck eventually "intended to annex the provinces even if itmeant a confrontation with Austria, but for the time being he was preparedto bide his time until Prussia was strong enough to challenge Austria."[xi] Bismarck in 1863-64 had demonstrated a willingness and an ability towage war and manipulate politically. . British Public Opinion and the Wars of German Unification,1864-1871. The EuropeanPowers, effectively split by Bismarck's manipulations, were unable to offeran effective political solution to the crisis. Was he or was he notbent from the beginning on German unification?: Bismarck began to construct his own myth, one that patriotic Germans (historians included) were subsequently only too glad to believe. New York: HarperPerennial,1993.Bramsted, Ernest K. . This victory perpetuated monarchical supremacy and sped the Prussian climb to military leadership in Europe.[iv] Just as important as the funding of the military and thestrengthening of the monarchy was the emergence of Bismarck as the mostpowerful leader in Prussia. Koch, 36-78. He altered the face of Germany and Europe but indoing so he created a continent which would gradually collapse into chaosin his absence. Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German History. merged with the rest of Germany.[xvii] In fact, victory in the war itself proved far easier to achieve thenthe terms of defeat for France or the terms of unification for Germany.Victory meant thousands of lives lost on both sides, in fact, 3 , Germanand French soldiers died in the battle of Vionville alone.[xviii] The thirdwar was far more devastating than the first two combined, and its effectswere also far more profound. New York:W.W. Certainly Germany was unified, but for what purpose, beyondthe purpose of unification? New York: W.W. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 199 .Rich, Norman. Napoleon and Francefulfilled that essential need: Bismarck . Bismarck did not have tofear British intervention. Thiswas hardly a final settlement, for it exposed divisions between Austria andPrussia. . . Even with the indomitable will ofBismarck, however, there was no guarantee about the outcome for Germany andEurope in the 186 s any more than there is in the 199 s in Central Europe,with respect to the impact of German reunification. The conclusion wasforegone, but the going was not always easy for Germany, and the victoryitself is seen by all the sources as the beginning of a long disaster whichwould culminate in two world wars in the next century. . He "concluded a commercial treaty with Italy,"which led a threatened Austria to allow agitation against Prussia inHolstein, which in turn brought a protest from Bismarck and a strengtheningof the alliance with Italy. . Victory over France would clear the way for unification of Germany, but there were still many obstacles to overcome, not least his own king's reluctance to see Prussia . New York: Dorset, 1978.Moltke, Count Helmuth Von. At each point, ineach war, Bismarck proved a master at manipulating friends and foes toachieve his personal and Prussian ends. . College Park, MD: International Research Institute for PoliticalScience, 1981.Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck manipulated hisweaker foes, in and out of the German states, so that war did break outwith Austria (and other minor German states) before the three months wereup. The Franco-German War of 187 -71. Since Frankfurt days, he told Bernhardi and Bennigsen, his "program" had been confederate reform and a German parliament. . . The Prussian Army needed experience of warfare to prepare it for the sterner tasks ahead . NewYork: Alfred A. . In the Preface to his book The Origins of the Wars of GermanUnification, William Carr emphasizes the uncertainty of the events andconsequences of the mid-nineteenth century in the divided states ofGermany: The story of the creation of a (partially) united Germany between 1864 and 1871 . . . The sources are almost unanimous in questioning the undercurrent ofirrationality in these three German wars and the resultant unification.Even the military mastermind of Bismarck's wars, Prussian Field-MarshalCount Helmuth Von Moltke, himself acknowledges the brutal nature of thedrive to war, although he aims his barbs not at Germany but at France,blaming that nation rather than the provocations of Germany for the war of187 -71: "Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchswhich endangers peace," but instead "the impulses of a nation, itsdissatisfaction with its internal conditions, the strife of parties and theintrigues of their leaders."[xxvii] This description holds true for the nation of Germany as it soughtand won the war with a weakened France. must be the sole determinant of government policy toward the duchies. Bramsted, Germany (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 141.Carr, 69.Ibid., 34.Ibid., 7 .Ian F.D. depended upon many variables: the power-political struggle between Prussia and Austria, their divergent economic interests, the military prowess of the reformed Prussian army, and on the political skill of Bismarck as well as on the desire of the articulate middle class for a nation state to protect itself against French ambitions.[i] The 1864 war (Schleswig-Holstein, or Prussia against Denmark), the1866 war (Austro-Prussian), and the 187 -71 war (Franco-German) were theculmination of a series of economic, political and military developmentswhich had brought the states of Germany back from the humiliation of defeatat Napoleon's hands in the first decade of the century. Bismarck. . Nationalismand liberalism were the most powerful of these forces, but modernization,urbanization, population growth, advanced communications and education,weakening of the Church's hold over the people--all these disruptions, goodand bad, created a Germany ready for the inevitable turbulent change tocome. The Origins of the Wars of German Unification. a congenital distrust . . Bismarcklet all know the nature of the violence to come when he publicly chastisedthe liberals in parliament, "The great questions of our time are notdecided by majority decisions but by blood and iron."[v] William showedfaintheartedness in the battles to come, but Bismarck moved fearlesslyforward from war to war, his eyes always on the prize of a powerfulPrussian-led Germany. The settlement of the war with Denmark, as stated, essentiallyassured a deepening of the struggle between Austria and Prussia. Italy was united in 186 -61, further driving the Germanstoward unity themselves. A great many . All he cared about wasthe increase of Prussian power, and that emphasis was the source of hisdecision: "the incorporation of the duchies with Prussia."[ix] Bismarck preceded the 1864 war itself with masterful diplomacy,dividing all forces inside and outside the German states which were in anyway opposed to his plan for a greater Prussia. Knopf, 1987.-----------------------William Carr, The Origins of the Wars of German Unification(London: Longman, 1991), xii.Ibid., 28.Ibid., 29.John R. Bismarck's more practical approach to post-war decision-making is reflected in his demand that France be unifiedpolitically before terms of peace could be settled. Bismarckentered the struggle between the king and parliamentary liberals who wantedto deny the king's bid to expand and modernize the military. In fact, the confusing and unsatisfyingconclusion to the 1864 war with Denmark left almost every leader and nation(aside from Bismarck and Prussia) disinclined to become involved in any warin Europe soon thereafter. A History of Prussia. The only question was whether and from which statea strong enough leader would emerge to overcome the many differences amongthe diverse groups loosely held together by the vision of a united Germany. He may have somewhat lost control of the war itselfintermittently, but he did oversee the defeat of Napoleon's France, andthen managed to stitch together what would become modern Germany: Bismarck possessed enough historical consciousness to make allowances for the particularist traditions of the German states. Endnotes BIBLIOGRAPHYBarber, John R. to the fierce clash between German and Danishnationalism."[vii] The Danes tried to solidify their hold over the duchy of Schleswig.The German parliament responded with its own declaration regarding theduchy of Holstein. (The Germanstates included the Rhineland, Westphalia, Bavaria, etc., but especiallysignificant in this study will be the largest entities of Austria andPrussia.) Therefore, the story of the wars of German unification can be fairlysaid to be the story of Bismarck himself. He was aJunket, or landowning aristocrat, who had already shown his ability tostand up to liberals, but he was also convinced that middle-class supportwas necessary to carry out his Prussian ambitions for the unification ofGermany. Peel, British Public Opinion and the Wars of GermanUnification: 1864-1871 (College Park, MD: International Researchfor Political Science, 1981), 171.Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: ThePeriod of Unification, 1815-1871 (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 199 ), 323-324.Ibid., 337.Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck (New York: Viking, 1981), 253-254.Ibid., 27 -271.Ibid., 275.Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 185 -189 (NewYork: W.W. National unification had been a majorpolitical issue, but it was not until the French attack on Austria andItaly in 1859 that nationalistic sentiment solidified into the belief thatunity was necessary for security: Many Germans feared that if France won in Northern Italy she would then seize the Rhineland. Bismarck maneuvered asettlement which gave Prussia and Austria control over the duchies. H.W. London:Harper & Brothers, 1914.Morrow, Ian F.D. . Englandeffectively withdrew from any significant role on the Continent, a stepwhich helped bring about both the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austriaand the war of 187 -71 between Germany and France. . Furthermore, the prospect of Prussian aggrandizement, nourished by the earlier propaganda for annexation, had its appeal. Sontag and Peel write, for example, ofthe manipulation of British public opinion by Bismarck in order to gainBritish support against the French or at least keep the British neutral in187 -71. Norton, 1968.Geiss, Imanuel. The three wars were preceded by revolutions in 183 and 1848-49,upheavals which were not comparable to the revolution in France but whichwere indicative of the general turbulence and dissatisfaction in thecountry. From 1866 to 187 Bismarck solidified his powerin Prussia, but that solidification was limited without an external enemyto draw together the still divided factions of Prussia and the other Germanstates. Bismarck waged that war not becausePrussia or Germany was threatened by France, but because the "impulse" fornational unification required a war with a foe strong enough to bringtogether the disparate factions of the German states in a patriotic andnationalistic fervor which resulted in unification. As in the war of 1864, Bismarck in 1866 plotted his path wisely,thinking ahead, weighing the alliances and sowing the seeds of conflictamong possible adversaries. This study will examine the three nineteenth century wars (1864, 1866and 187 -71) which resulted in the partial unification of Germany. . . The army was especially ready, under Moltke, prepared by the previouswars. . Nationalism and militarism were a means of providing cohesion, of overcoming a sense of unfulfilled unity.[xxvi] The very qualities which allowed Bismarck to effectively wage and winthe wars and political struggles of 1864, 1866 and 187 -71--pragmatism,ruthlessness, nationalism, manipulation of friends and foes alike accordingto one's goals--are precisely the qualities which meant that the victorieswere hollow. The impact of the French Revolution also deeply affected the Germansand in fact all Europeans. Bismarck wasthe premier of Prussia from 1862 to 189 and chancellor of Germany from1871 to 189 . Morrow, Bismarck (New York: Collier, 1967), 39.Ibid., 42.Martin Kitchen, A Military History of Germany (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 1975), 113-114.Eyck, Erich, Bismarck and the German Empire (New York: W.W.Norton, 1968), 125.Peter H. . Bismarck simply wanted to be able tosay that he had tried to find an alternative to war with Austria. Bismarck was hardly a nationalist or even a pure believer inunification, certainly not when compared to liberals in Parliament. . That leader would be Bismarck. . He did not care what the liberals thought. Bismarck was already an experienced diplomat in 1862 when he wasappointed, by Prussian King William I, to be minister-president. Austria was seen by Bismarck as "floundering and panicking"[xiii]and the Prussian leader took advantage of the situation by offering whatamounted to a half-hearted peace treaty with Austria, a move which was seenas a palliative to the Prussian king. Koch, A History of Prussia (New York: Dorset, 1978), 269.Crankshaw, 3 3.Fritz Stern, Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German History(New York: Knopf, 1987), 29.Ibid., 29.Helmuth Von Moltke, The Franco-German War of 187 -71 (London:Harper & Brothers, 1914), 1.Carr, 178.----------------------- 3 New York: Collier, 1967.Peel, Peter H. . The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 185 -189 . Bismarck had his way. . Weare no longer looked upon as the innocent victims of wrong, but rather asarrogant victors," not satisfied to defeat the enemy, "but determined tobring about his utter ruin."[xx] Nevertheless, the unification of Germany had been accomplished, andin large part because of the three wars and especially the war with Francewhich served to overcame many major domestic divisions: "[Bismarck's]Lesser German Empire founded in 1871 was a modest affair compared with theday-dreams of many a liberal Greater-German patriot. Norton, 197 .Stern, Fritz. Prussians of both high and low degree [had] . . Napoleon's troops were unprepared in comparison. Specifically, Bismarck found that this war had let several genies outof the bottle. . Nevertheless, Bismarck proved victoriousonce again: Most conservatives were not inclined to take the parliament plan seriously; the violent reaction of the liberals seemed proof of its inconsequence. A Military History of Germany. The major battle of the 1866 war was in Bohemia on July 3, between theprimary armies of Austria and Prussia. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1975.Koch, H.W. Between January and July, 1864, Bismarck fought and gained a diplomatic campaign of a magnitude that only later generations could estimate . that Napoleon might be forced to go to war to make up for his diplomatic humiliation-- and yet he went out of his way to multiply that humiliation. That he needed an exterior threat to weld Germany together was self-evident, and the most plausible threat was France, whose congenital belligerence was widely feared . New York: Viking, 1981.Eyck, Erich. In addition,"the continued interest of the German and Danish people in Schleswig-Holstein . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972.Carr, William. As with the war with Denmark in1864, the 1866 war with Austria was brief and decisive in Prussia's favor.Combined with a conservative victory in Parliament, Bismarck was morepowerful than ever, both politically and militarily. Bismarck demonstrated hisdeep knowledge that both diplomacy and force would be necessary to makePrussia the powerful entity he imagined: Bismarck did not shrink from the use of force. However, as Geiss writes, without Bismarck the history ofGermany would surely have been very different: "It was partly Bismarck'scunning diplomacy and Moltke's strategy of Blitzkrieg . A rift developed between the king and Bismarckas well, over post-war titles. Barber, Modern European History (New York:HarperPerennial, 1993), 165.Ernest K. London:Longman, 1991.Crankshaw, Edward. . "Origins of the First World War: Bismarck's Legacy." In TheOrigins of the First World War, ed. . New York: Taplinger,1972.Kitchen, Martin. Political and military revolution was in theair. Hedid not care what the other Great Powers thought of his decision on theduchies. knew very well . But it establishedPrussian predominance and was accomplished only by three wars in rapidsuccession."[xxi] Bismarck cannot be said to have been singly responsible for Germanunification as a result of these three wars and accompanying politicalmaneuvering, any more than Hitler alone can be said to have created theThird Reich. On April 18, 1864, Europe had its first lesson in Prussian blitzkrieg.[x] The "war" was brief and decisive in Prussia's favor. The bill averted a more seriousconstitutional crisis and severely weakened liberal opposition toBismarck's aggressive takeover. The duchieswere economically insignificant, but strategically crucial. When the climactic moment came, Prussian patriotism and fear of [a repeat of an old Prussian defeat and demilitarization] triumphed over the doubts of conservatives.[xv] The stage was set for the last and most significant of thethree wars of unification. In that year, a long-simmering conflict between Denmark and Germanyboiled over regarding the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Crankshaw scoffs at the notion that he was a man of peace,as he was seen by many after the final of the three wars: Does it make sense to call the later Bismarck a man of peace simply because he was satisfied with the Germany he had made and found the best way to buttress and sustain it was to keep all Europe desperately guessing, and fearing, so that when he had gone there was nobody capable of keeping within bounds the tensions he had created?[xxiv] Germany up to the coming to power of Bismarck had been, as Sternwrites, "a geographic expression, everybody's battlefield, Europe's anvilon which other nations forged their destinies." What was true for the otherGerman states, however, was not true of Bismarck's state: "In the unbrokenannals of defeat, Prussia had been the sole exception; and Prussia hadevolved its own ethos of frugal duty, rectitude, and obedience."[xxv] Under Bismarck, and because of the special set of circumstances whichled the king to first appoint him to a position of power, Prussia ledGermany into a new era of power and pride, an era vacant of any principleor any ideal aside from power and pride: Unification under Prussian aegis, achieved in battle, directed by Bismarck, codified in a constitution that preserved the privileges of a governing elite--that kind of unification was a celebration of force and a denial of earlier hopes of freedom . Bismarck had not only the political will but the diplomatic savvy tocompromise and bring diverse groups together for greater purposes. Norton, 197 ), 139-14 .Crankshaw, 299.Imanuel Geiss, "Origins of the First World War: Bismarck'sLegacy," in The Origins of the First World War, ed. Infact, the liberals saw him as a "blind reactionary"[vi] with no politicalideology at all. Crankshaw notes that Frederick, the crown prince of Germany, was oneleader who recognized the dangers of the drive to crush France: "The longerthe struggle lasts the better for the enemy and the worse for us. . . This treatywas signed two weeks before Bismarck agreed with Austria to bilaterallydisarm. H.W. . . . . . Had there been no Bismarck the history of Germany, Prussia,Austria and all of Europe would have been drastically altered. The nature of his long-term thinking wasrevealed in the first of the three wars in 1864. Koch(New York: Taplinger, 1972), 37.Ibid., 37-38.H.W. . However, even a goodly number of Bismarck'sown conservative colleagues were alarmed at what they saw as possiblydisastrous consequences if they did not try to put the brakes on his loftyambitions for Prussia and Germany. . Modern European History. He faced numerous enemies withinPrussia and without, but in each case he managed to keep those enemiesweak, confused and divided both politically and militarily. Bismarck was an aristocrat, apolitical conservative, and a lukewarm nationalist, but above all he was aprofoundly pragmatic man who was able and willing to do whatever he neededto do in order to strengthen Germany and elevate the Prussian position inthe development of Germany as a powerful and united entity: In short, this supreme practitioner of Realpolitik accepted many aspects of modernity as a way to preserve the ancien institutions that he most loved. Bismarck and the German Empire. All that was missing in Germany was the leader capable of inspiringthe nation, its people and its army. Crankshaw sees theseeds of both victory and calamity in the onset Franco-German war: By the time the two great armies moved against each other on 28 July 187 , Bismarck had irretrievably set the German people on the path to the mastery of Europe--or disaster. that made itpossible for Bismarck to unite the Germans in the face of misgivings inEurope."[xxii] Bismarck in the settlement of the peace with the French ensured aweakened France for the near future, and a strong and relatively unitedGermany. . . To Unruh he spoke of national unity as "the great goal of my efforts for sixteen years." Having chosen the option of national reform, he now described it as his sole objective from the start.[xiv] Bismarck was clearly using different intentions and motivations as hewent along, as they suited his grand goal of Prussian power. . At his insistence elections on the basis of universal manhood suffrage were held for a National Assembly that was to make peace with Germany in the name of the French people.[xix] Still, Bismarck was forced by domestic foes to impose a moredevastating defeat on the French than he would have liked, and the newlyunified Germany suffered in terms of world opinion as a result. The entry of an independent Schleswig-Holstein into the German Confederation could not conceivably benefit Prussia . The citizens paid, and parliament yielded to this unlawful action . . He showed a crafty wisdom in knowinghow far he could push other leaders and nations, and in doing so hemaneuvered Prussia closer to the dominating position it would have in theunification of the German states. The Prussian-Italian treaty, in fact, as muchas assured war between Austria and Prussia by guaranteeing Italian backingfor Prussia if Prussia attacked Austria within three months. Bismarck, with the military brilliance of Moltke, easily defeatedAustria in the field, and in the parliament, driving for reform of theconstitution which would consolidate his power, he forced throughParliament the indemnity bill of 1866. But this foreign manipulation would have been meaningless had henot been able to first inspire the German people to go to war againstFrance. Although the assembly continued to deny royal requests for taxes to support the military program, Bismarck had the funds collected anyway. . of the Frenchcharacter.[xvi] Bismarck showed his political agility in stirring war fever againstFrance abroad as well as at home. The debate rages still today over certain aspects of the wars ofunification, including whether Bismarck intended all along to unify theGerman states and whether he more or less "manufactured the war"[xxviii]with France. Again, the question arises with respect to the long-term intentionsof Bismarck, beyond gathering for himself and Prussia as much power aspossible in the name of the conservative monarchy. However, there is no doubt in the minds of any of the sourcesconsulted for this study that Bismarck is the individual leader mostresponsible for exploiting the national, political and historicalcircumstances of the 186 s to unify Germany and set the stage for the re-making of Europe and the world itself in the twentieth century. Most ofthe sources are openly in doubt about Bismarck's aims with respect to warwith Austria: "It is here pertinent to raise the question, much disputed inlater years by historians, whether Bismarck's intention was from thebeginning, ever since the peace with Denmark in 1864, to make war withAustria."[xii] Still, Bismarck had at no time shown or expressed an aversion to warto accomplish his goals, and those Prussian goals, along with the enmitybetween Prussia and Austria, seemed clear precursors to war. Bismarck for the first time found himself in a seriousconfrontation with the army and other German political and popular forceswhich sought to crush France in a way not desired by the more pragmatic andless impassioned Bismarck.
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