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YUGOSLAV CONFLICT.
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Analyzes history & evolution of ethnic/nationalist struggle through 1995, focusing on role of U.N. & international powers in resolution of conflict through military, diplomatic & humanitarian means.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analyzes history & evolution of ethnic/nationalist struggle through 1995, focusing on role of U.N. & international powers in resolution of conflict through military, diplomatic & humanitarian means.
Paper Introduction:
Introduction
This paper presents a case study on conflict management, specifically the experience of the United Nations and other International Government Organizations (IGOs) in the Yugoslav conflict. The purpose of this case study is to describe, analyze and assess a particular conflict situation with a focus on the role played by the United Nations and other IGOs in attempts to manage the conflict and addresses the following specific questions: What is the issue at stake, who are the primary and secondary participants in the conflict, and how are the U.N. and other IGOs involved?
This paper is divided in several parts. The first part provides a historical background on Yugoslavia, prior to the outbreak of the conflict in the past decade. The second part
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Their leaders arguedthat Serb civilians would be at risk from Bosnian Muslims and Croats whomight seek revenge. Because it was acombination of three different cultural components, the Eastern Empiredeveloped very differently from the Western Empire. commanders became conscious of the need not to compromise theirneutrality lest Serb consent for their presence be suddenly and brutallywithdrawn. 3-18). However, the situation in Slovenia andCroatia worsened. The fourth part summarizes the conflictmanagement of the U.N. On the heels of battlefield victories, the Croatian army and Bosniangovernment forces received another boost in attempts to regain territoryfrom rebel Serbs. The heavy criticism, leveled from 1992 to 1993, of theU.N.'s overall involvement in the conflict has softened, mainly because ofa sense of what some would like to call "realism" toward the handling ofpost-Cold War conflicts. The Serbs retaliatedby shelling Zagreb. Introduction This paper presents a case study on conflict management, specificallythe experience of the United Nations and other International GovernmentOrganizations (IGOs) in the Yugoslav conflict. Davis (Ed.). From the outset, the great powers have appeared to devote more timeto developing the case against military intervention than to analyzing theconflict. 91-116). The West basically lost fouropportunities for action in Bosnia. In the wake of the economic changes came political changes. In G. Failure is particularly offensive, given the conduct of the war.Claims and counterclaims of human rights violations aside, the conduct ofthe military operations alone demonstrated that the Bosnian Serbs wereengaged in mass murder and terrorism. The regional organizationshould normally act as the agent of the U.N., always with a mandateapproved in the Security Council, but subject to closer and more directcontrol as the scale of military intervention moves from traditionalpeacekeeping to enforcement. On May 1,1995, the Croatian army stormed across cease-fire lines in western Slavoniaand recaptured previously Serb-controlled territory. Yet,from the moment that Milosevic launched his anti-non-Serb revolution, thatis how they were portrayed in the Serbian media. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosniashould be held accountable for crimes against humanity, without any timelimit, and the international organizations have an obligation to theircitizens to see that justice will be done. In the Yugoslav conflict, the European Community, the United Statesand the U.N. Theburning hatred which Croats and Muslims now feel toward Serbs is by nomeans irrational; rather, it is an understandable reaction to theatrocities which have been committed against them in recent years, simplyon account of their national origins. Ceasefire lines reflect animmediate balance of power that can be institutionalized as the lines gainpermanence and become one step short of a recognized border. With the recognition of theindependence of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian Croats lost interest inkeeping Bosnia within Yugoslavia. The U.N.Security Council may authorize armed mediation, the establishment of aprotectorate, or an effort at nation building, but individual states--and,in practice, the most powerful state of all, the United States--must assumethe burden of such policies. Withoutsubstantial ground forces capable of defending themselves, the contributorsto the U.N. Bosnia, the United States, and the just wartradition. Thewesternized Slovenes particularly liked this idea, since they lookedforward to democratization. Mandelbaum, M. The mission statement, in the form of the mandatecontained in the Security Council resolutions, was constantly changing andbeing modified during the various stages of the crisis. The Bosnian Muslim population feared an OrthodoxSerbian backlash if it lost the relatively strong republics of Slovenia andCroatia as allies. The United Nations' predicament in the formerYugoslavia. 111-115). The sanctions also containedmeasures to compensate those republics that cooperated in seeking anagreement on a new constitutional settlement in Yugoslavia. Shoup, P. Operation Deliberate Forcewas NATO's largest combat mission in its history. One ofthe major fears of the Western world was that, if any of the republics wereto attack any of the nationalities within their own borders, that mighteasily draw Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Italy, or Greece into awidespread Balkan war that would engulf Europe. Not only the Europeans kept the U.N. What ideasit had were captured by the slogan "lift and strike", which rested on theassumption that a properly armed Bosnian government force backed byWestern airpower could reverse the pattern of Serb gains. Reform of the global organizationhas been pointed out. The Croatian army vowed to recapturethe one-third of Croatia that remained under rebel-Serb control. peacekeepingforce could be fielded to support an overall Bosnian settlement. The Muslims allied with the Croats.This situation led to the Serb military campaign in the spring and summerof 1992, when most of the land grab took place. Without firm American determination to defend specifiedinterests, employing military power in support of a well-articulatedstrategy, the European allies defended their own political interests,ensuring NATO's effective impotence in the face of its first real post-ColdWar test. Despite its open-endednature, additional forces were added in December to monitor the border withSerbia. The EC dispatched three foreignministers to Yugoslavia to promote negotiations even as they suspendedforeign aid and placed an arms embargo on the country. 64). This paper is divided in several parts. Meanwhile in Bosnia, UNPROFOR has helped monitor and implement localceasefires, including between the Muslims and Croats, but has not stoppedthe Muslim-Serb war. However, violations were irrelevant todevelopments on the ground. Poulton, H. Bosnia: The struggle for peace.Brookfield, CT: Millbrook Press. Third wasnegative intervention: avoiding the commitment of U.N. With the EC failure to agree on military action in September 1991 andthe general exhaustion of the European initiatives, attention was refocusedon the U.N. U.S. were unwilling to provide. A bitter row developed as the United States professed amore moral stance than its closest allies, but one without evidence ofpracticality or readiness to accept the accompanying risks (Freedman, 1994-1995, p. peace-keeping forces have been attempting in formerYugoslavia is historically unprecedented. Yugoslavia's bloody collapse: Causes, courseand consequences. Yugoslavia's economy was being decentralized at a rapidpace. Had the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina really been a question of Serb rights, Milosevic had ample timeto resolve it. Many other Balkan states also fell to the invadingOttomans. (1993). Westport, CT: Praeger. (1994, Summer). Croatia and Serbia (Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic)had held secret talks about dividing up Bosnia-Herzegovina. This role in itselfposes a problem: it requires forces to be widely dispersed and to operatewith the permission of the dominant forces in the area--in many cases theBosnian Serbs. In T. In the firstcentury A.D., the Romans created the province of Illyricum, encompassingmost of what was later known as Yugoslavia. The parliament of Sloveniaadopted a new constitution, and Serbia was forced to accept Yugoslavia'sloss of Croatia and Slovenia. Advised by the CIA of a real spillover threat which couldultimately ensnare Greece and Turkey, Washington deployed U.S. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was unleashed as the northern republicswere being recognized. The international norm has long beenagainst intervention in another's domestic domain. A ceasefire in Sloveniaheld, but violence broke out in Croatia. forces, throughencouraging settlement by diplomatic means, with intervention by thefriends of the parties involved, and peacekeeping forces provided afterceasefires. The West did not quite know how to handle the worseningsituation since the violence might spread throughout the Balkans. Just as the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were unhappy with becomingminorities in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs were certainlyloath to become a minority in a Muslim, Croat-dominated, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the division of theRoman empire into eastern and western halves, Illyricum was divided intotwo parts: Illyria Graecia and Illyria Romana. One of the greatest difficulties encountered by the U.N. and the IGOs, and, finally, the fifth part providesconclusions about the methods of conflict management used, their pros andcons, and where the future lies for the former Yugoslavia. Former Yugoslavia. Soon thereafter, however, the war resumed and raged out of control.The EC imposed a limited package of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia.The package did not include a ban on trade; it did not cut air links,impose travel restrictions, or freeze Yugoslav assets abroad. The third partreviews the chronological participation of the European Community (EC), theUnited Nations, and the NATO, leading up to the Dayton peace agreement in1995 between the warring factions. Congressionalpressure to allow arms to the Bosnian government further indicated thatpolitical pressure for tougher measures was directed toward helping theBosnians to help themselves rather than intervening directly with U.S.forces. The first is theadministration's extensive review of America's role in U.N. But the results werelimited for several reasons. Tuzla was designated as the major base forthe 2 , Americans headed for Bosnia and Croatia as part of the NATOpeace-keeping forces called "Operation Joint Endeavor." The Americansentered Bosnia with strong firepower and the right to shoot back ifchallenged, unlike the U.N. Toward the end of 1992, the U.N. Instead, thepackage cut aid, worth about $1 billion, reimposed textile quotas, endedpreferential trade treatment, and stated that Yugoslavia would not beinvited to Pan-European economic meetings. intervention could set for future conflicts inYugoslavia, insisted on non-interference. Third,disagreements among members on how or whether to intervene weakened theirleverage militarily. Europe and the war in the Balkans: Toward a newYugoslav identity. While the United States remained fearful of any actions which mightentangle it in Bosnian fighting, the overriding imperative to prevent thespread of fighting motivated one of America's few forward-thinking acts ofpreventive diplomacy. The more industrialized north was growing tired ofcontributing a disproportionate amount of its tax revenue to the country'sbudget, thereby making heavy contributions to the upkeep of the poorerrepublics and provinces. Their initial, and fundamental,task, laid down in 1992, was to create the conditions of peace and securityrequired for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavcrisis. 237-251). The six separate republics of Yugoslavia(Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia)and Serbia's two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) were eachseparate and distinct areas. Washington's hastywithdrawal demonstrated that, in a peacekeeping scenario where casualtiesare likely, America's staying power is highly questionable. Davis, G. Charter and hence believed the U.N. On October 15, 1991, Bosnia declared itself a sovereign state. Humanitarian intervention thus led to political intervention, andpolitical intervention by the strong in the affairs of the weak is as oldas politics itself. Within the context of limited military commitment (that is to say noground troops), the U.S. The warring parties haddetermined that Western threats were idle and that they could carry on withtheir war. 1 6). Halverson (Eds.).International perspectives on the Yugoslav conflict (pp. Forcing the EC to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was a major foreignpolicy coup for Germany and reconfirmed Germany as the dominant economicand political power in the EC. Decreasing American commitment mirrored French and British desiresto withdraw their own desires (Danchev & Halverson, 1996, pp. This involved America'sbrokering of a renewed alliance between the Bosnian government and itserstwhile Croatian allies, thus isolating the Serbs. Inaddition, the White House increasingly turned its attention to problemscloser to home: Haiti, Cuba, Mexico and domestic politics. did harness a number of incremental initiatives inthe beginning of Clinton's presidency to push the Serbs in Serbia andBosnia to reach an acceptable settlement. Foreign Policy, 97, 53-69. Nevertheless, the last peace plan proposed by the Contact Group wouldhave divided Bosnia in mini-ethnic states while keeping the facade of aunitary Bosnian state; it was backed by an explicit threat by the ContactGroup that, if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the latest variant of theplan by July 2 , 1994, the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims wouldbe lifted and further sanctions would be imposed on Serbia itself. That the United Statesfailed to exercise its considerable powers of persuasion says much aboutthe political immaturity of the Clinton administration, and even more aboutsacrificing the demands of justice to the so-called realities of worldpolitics (Davis, 1996, pp. diplomatic interference. Even the revelation of ethniccleansing provoke only rhetoric (Post, 1992, November 2, p. 1. Recognition assured, Croatiaissued a new currency, adopting the Croatian dinar, and told its citizensto exchange their money before the New Year. Those who did not escapebecame subject to a vicious policy of "ethnic cleansing." The humanitariantragedy continued to build, even though the situation on the groundinvolved fewer changes in territorial control after late 1992. Inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia were particularlyvolatile. He was to build and shapeYugoslav politics to his own specifications until his death. In response tothe bold actions of NATO and the United States, the three presidents--Tudjman of Croatia, Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Milosevic ofSerbia (the Serbian president was acting on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs)--met at Wright-Patterson Airforce base in Dayton, Ohio, to talk of peace.Unlike previous peace agreements that had failed, this one was driven bywidespread exhaustion with this war that has killed thousands, uprootedmore than 2 million people from their homes, and shocked the world withterrible human rights violations. S. 176-2 6). Religion and justice in the war overBosnia (pp. However,they did not take any steps to become true Yugoslavs (Djilas, 1991, p. As always, the Bosnian Muslims were caughtin the middle. The dream of a Greater Serbia seemed finally to havebeen dealt a lethal blow. Unable to arm the Bosnians and unwilling to intervene militarily ontheir behalf, Washington finally began to take more realistic negotiatingsteps which would facilitate a settlement. The recognition was calculated to forestalla German promise to recognize these two republics before Christmas.Despite the EC's assurances of recognition, Germany jumped the gun andofficially recognized the separate states of Croatia and Slovenia in lateDecember. 62). Although Tito himself managed to keep nationalism under control, hehad some appreciation that eventually serious problems would emerge. goals. Eknes, A. Slovenes,Croats, Muslim Slavs, and even Hungarians and Albanians were no more bloodenemies of Serbs than Jews were of Germans in the 192 s and 193 s. Clintonsaid that the United States will provide about 8,5 troops to a follow-oncontingent of about 31, in Bosnia. and other IGOs involved? Thousands of Croats and Slovenes wereliving in Germany, working in factories, and storing billions of marks inGerman banks. Freedman, L. Conclusions Lessons about the mistakes of the U.N. Since the U.N. In the four years that had passed since the fall of Vukovar,Croatia had built a more powerful and well organized military--despite theU.N.-imposed arms embargo since 1992. Beyond continuing the Adriaticnaval sanctions blockade, emergency aid drops were organized for isolatedvillages that could not be supplied any other way. (1995). Whether, when, and how strong they intervene alldepend on international norms concerning intervention and on nationalincentives to intervene. By May 1994, America and the contact group had moved far enough tocountenance a Bosnia settlement giving the Serbs 49 percent and the Bosnian-Croat federation 51 percent of the Bosnian territory. They in turn shifted goals to a four-month ceasefire in the hope that a settlement would follow a ceasefire,rather than vice versa. SecurityCouncil to enforce the no-fly zone. The accusation that the U.N. The Croats, on the other hand, did not identify with the new state andimmediately wanted concessions. By mid-September 1995, more than 3,4 missions had beenflown, and, benefiting from the internal turmoil among Serbian forcesduring the fierce NATO attacks, Croatian and Bosnian soldiers recaptured astring of strategic towns. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, militant Serbs set out in a blitz-krieg-styleoperation to exterminate the non-Serb population as well as any Serbs whorefused to go along with the Greater Serbian vision of the republic'sfuture. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press. And Milosevic,president of Serbia-Montenegro, put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs byclosing the frontier between Serbia and Bosnian Serbia. Indeed, in acommunal conflict, a peace-keeping and humanitarian role tends to buttressthe military status quo (Roberts, 1996, pp. Djilas, A. peacekeepers in 1992 were only mandated to operate inCroatia, they could not go into Bosnia-Herzegovina. participation. Russia would agree to sanction air power onlyunder very strict conditions, as indeed would France and Britain, whofeared that America's aggressiveness would endanger their UNPROFORcontingents. The dynamics of the conflict were misunderstood;consequently, the international initiative lagged notoriously. Clashes between Serbs and Croatscontinued to rage, forcing the army to step in as a buffer between thegroups. has indirectlylegitimized ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression does not bite asmuch today, not because it is less true, but because it has become a factof life. If regional organizations are to be a fundamentalpart of a reformed global security architecture, the arrangements of theSecurity Council should reflect this. Pressures against the Serbs were now accumulating. This cultural divisionstill existed when the land was settled by the Slavs. That the European allies refused toacknowledge their own recognition of the former Yugoslav republics was, atthe very least, a gross failure of moral analysis. However, as fighting commenced, a number of Europeanorganizations became involved. supervision; a united presence fromthe Croats and Muslims both in the military and diplomatic spheres, whichalso added to the internationally held view that the Serbs were thevillains in the crisis; and an increase in military activity by the Muslimswith the tacit consent of the international community and an increase ofarms entering Bosnia through the Croatian coastline. troopswith a mandate to neutralize Serb military superiority. 68-69).However, by May 1995, a frustrated Croatian government decided to takeaction. peace-keeping forces have monitoreda ceasefire between the government and the Serb-held areas. (1995). By fall 1995, American involvement was at its peak. The plan also included theformation of a central government with a democratically elected presidentand parliament, the return of all refugees to their homes, and thereconstruction of the country. out of Yugoslavia in the earlystages. However, internationalagencies realized that they had to get aid into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, under the Ohio agreement,NATO was given sweeping powers, including the right to relocate troops orweapons at will. He warned that the Bosnian Muslims, if attacked,would turn to Turkey and other Muslim countries for help. Yugoslavia's domestic situation during the period following theSoviet-Yugoslav split cannot be separated from the examination of foreignpolicy changes. When news of this division surfaced, the Bosniangovernment was outraged and began to move seriously toward independence. Summary The intervention of the European Community and the subsequent actionsof various European organizations, such as the WEU, as well as the U.N.intervention through UNPROFOR, in Yugoslavia was mishandled, to put itmildly. Economic conditions underlay many of Yugoslavia'smisfortunes. Though this wouldstill require considerable Serb withdrawals--who by then controlled some 7 percent of the country--it reflected the realities of power on the groundand a significant backtracking from all earlier U.S. This is illustrated by the way the EC shifted from attempting tosave Yugoslavia to recognizing the secessionist states. (1968). Ricchiardi, S. Withprescience, he was concerned: "If we go on like this, there will be noYugoslavia. peacekeepers. had no role to playunless regional attempts failed. Chancellor HelmutKohl was under pressure from his opposition, especially the BavarianCatholics, to extend recognition. The tactics which Milosevic pursued toward Serb communities outsideSerbia during the 198 s and early 199 s basically involved allegations thatSerbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were victims of Croat and Muslimoppression. Rezun, M. Tito wasunique in the breadth and scope of his influence, for he was not onlypersonally responsible for the creation of postwar Yugoslavia, but wasalso, in the end, directly and indirectly accountable for itsdisintegration (Rezun, 1995, pp. (1991). Recovering credibility, inthe Balkans and elsewhere, will depend on the willingness of politicalleaders to do justice for justice's sake. Post, T. Driven out of Slovenia, losing large areas of Croatia, Serbiadecided to turn its attention to a new problem and a new battleground: themultiethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the need to restrainMacedonia and Serbia's own erstwhile provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovoremained. Communal conflict as a challenge tointernational organization. The Turkish empire lasted from 1371 to 1912, when the first Balkanwar was ended with the Treaty of London. The result was ahumanitarian tragedy of enormous dimensions. But the countryconcluded that, if it went along with Serbia's centralist tendencies, itwould be forced to help support the less prosperous republics from theirown budget. 59). While a great deal of hatred exists in the former Yugoslavia, it ishardly ancient or irrational. Despite several years' saturation media coverage of the Yugoslav warsin most of the Western world, understanding of the conflict among thepublic at large is generally poor. Most important, the peace agreement provided for Bosnia to remain asingle state, with its pre-war borders intact. Hence persistent attempts to deem all sides of the conflictequally guilty, to attribute the failures of mediation first to German andthen to U.S. The United Nations and Civil Wars (pp.1 9-126). A delegation from the EuropeanCommunity (now the European Union) arrived in Yugoslavia to urge all theleaders to stay together. The Croatian military called it"Operation Storm." Within two days, Croatian forces had recaptured thearea known as Krajina. (1996). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. There will be eight dwarf-like economically autarchic states,and it will have no standing whatever in the outside world" (Shoup, 1968,p. (1996). In J.Mayall (Ed.). The Conflict As the situation in Yugoslavia degenerated into total civil war, theworld watched. Germany's unilateral initiative demonstrated that it had becomea power to be reckoned with in the world. troops tonewly independent Macedonia in early July 1993. References Bennett, C. in the conflict. Meanwhile, Croatia was also beginning to stir its nationalistaspirations. After the EC had turned the peacemaking process over to the U.N.Security Council in fall 1991 and once the peacekeepers arrived in Croatia,the war between the Croats and the Serbs seemed to be over. The contested country: Yugoslav unity andcommunist revolution. inits involvement in former Yugoslavia was that the mandate agreed on by theSecurity Council altered as the crisis developed (Economides & Taylor,1996, pp. However, after the end of theCold War, intervention for the United States is not based on gold, glory,or strategic calculation. (1995). During World War II, Yugoslav partisans, under the leadership ofJosip Broz Tito, fought against the Germans while allying themselves withthe Soviets. (1991, November 2). Throughout modern history, countries have expected their neighbors tostay out of their internal affairs. 61-63). 53-69). In the end, theClinton administration lacked a strategy for improving things. Second, the organizations were unable to pursue a consistentpolicy. The state bureaucracy and national economy went through aseries of changes in the immediate post-Tito period. all suffered in their credibility. Secession then became inevitable. By autumn 1993, the Vance-Owen plan ofcantonization of Bosnia was effectively dead. The third opportunity took place in March 1992. He realized that, if he could instillenough fear in the hearts of the Bosnian Serbs, they would revolt, expelthe Muslims and the Croats, and gain Bosnia for his greater Serbian plan.He instituted a media blitz, in which the Muslims were shown to beresponsible for the world's terrorism. (1996). Communism and the Yugoslav question. U.N.-EUmediation proved equally fruitless. However, the plight of the respective minorities was simply apretext for intervention. Hence, for the U.N. How the West lost Bosnia. But it also divided Bosniainto two near-equal parts: one side controlled by a Muslim-Croatfederation; the other by a Serb republic. London: MacMillan Press. Germany was Yugoslavia's largest Westernaid donor and trade partner, but the country did more business withSlovenia and Croatia than with the rest of Yugoslavia. The agreement was scheduled to beformally signed on December 14, 1995, in Paris (Ricchiardi, 1996, pp. The EC took the lead. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were scattered across the republic.The Muslims constituted the largest nation, followed by the Serbs and theCroats (Poulton, 1993, Chapter 1). President Izetbegovic of Bosnia issued a warning to the federal armynot to attack Bosnia. National sovereignty has been understood to be the right ofgovernments to do what they wish within their own borders, withoutinterference from others (Mandelbaum, 1994, Summer, pp. On August 4, 1995, following the Serb retaliation,Croatian forces went on the move again. peacekeepers who had served as monitors. Thefederal government was shocked. The second opportunity was U.N. (1996, November 17). The reluctance to intervene.Foreign Policy, (95), 3-18. A U.N.relief envoy made its way into Sarajevo in early June, and the U.N.Security Council approved sending 1,1 troops into Sarajevo to takecontrol of the airport and allow relief flights into the city. By the end of World War I, theKingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes formally came into being. This premeditated campaign tocleanse ethnically regions earmarked for Greater Serbia finally confinedYugoslavia to the dustbin of history (Bennett, 1995, pp. Tito's economicdecentralization was halted, and some limited centralization wasreintroduced. Baker stated that he did notwant history to repeat itself and warned Slovenia and Croatia not tosecede. In internationalpolitics, the word intervention itself has acquired an unsavoryconnotation. Statesmen and diplomats havegenerally chosen to interpret the war as a particularly Balkan phenomenon,the result of ancient and irrational animosities. forces to take, or encourage NATO totake, tough action against the parties became very difficult. The first was in June 1991 duringSecretary of State Baker's trip to Belgrade. Yet they could not accept the fulllogic of partiality, being unwilling to join the struggle for land at theheart of the conflict. Its most effective performance has been inhumanitarian assistance, including to besieged areas. force in late 1992. troops to remain in Bosniauntil 1998. If their troops had to be withdrawnto spare them Serb hostility, then "lift and strike" would both inevitablyfail for want of support on the ground as Muslim forces would not initiallybe able to cope. Serb targets includedammunition dumps, command sites, key bridges, supply routes, and airdefense systems. NATO limited its initial involvement toresolutions and statements to the effect that its members were "greatlyconcerned" and that they "followed the situation closely" (Eknes, 1995, p.113). New York:Columbia University.----------------------- 6 Human relief efforts were mobilized, but the visit onlycreated symbolism, not concrete help. envoy Cyrus Vance's peaceplan of January 1992, which offered 1 , U.N. In Croatia, U.N. A next majordivision came when the Roman part of the area converted to RomanCatholicism and the Greek part (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and much ofBosnia-Herzegovina) converted to the Orthodox faith. Illyrians, Thracians, and Dacians in the north and Greeks inthe south were the oldest known inhabitants of this area. Yugoslavia's non-Serbswere simply scapegoats for the economic and political failings of communistsociety in the 198 s and a convenient tool which Milosevic was able toexploit to further his own political ambitions. Kempster, N. In midsummer, Slovenia defied Yugoslavia's ultimatum of not strivingfor independence and left the federal government with the options of eitheraccepting Slovene independence or starting a war. The reaction of the European community was a limited and reactiveapproach. 59-93). The first part provides ahistorical background on Yugoslavia, prior to the outbreak of the conflictin the past decade. 91-116). Only one unifying force was left in Yugoslavia, the federal army.However, no one seemed to care very much for a military solution.Political and economic pluralism were among other solutions suggested. Roberts, A. On November 15, 1996, President Clinton agreed to keep Americantroops in Bosnia-Herzegovina until mid-1998, extending by 18 months hisdeadline for wrapping up a peace-keeping operation which he called the onlybarrier to resumption of bitter ethnic warfare in that country. Strong states fear one another. The Onset of the Yugoslav Conflict After Tito's death, internal dissentions and economic rivalriesbecame a real problem. Having British, Canadian, and French troops in Bosnia engagedin humanitarian missions therefore rendered those countries very sensitiveto provoking the Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs complained loudly that the 6 , NATO peacekeeperswould really become an occupying force. 51-85). The most powerful and enduring motive for intervention has beensecurity. The second part describes the specific issues at stakeleading to the conflict, the primary and secondary participants, and theinvolvement of the IGOs and the U.N. The real erosion derived from the rapid souring of theintervention in Somalia, especially after the operation in which a numberof soldiers were killed and more than 7 wounded. The purpose of this casestudy is to describe, analyze and assess a particular conflict situationwith a focus on the role played by the United Nations and other IGOs inattempts to manage the conflict and addresses the following specificquestions: What is the issue at stake, who are the primary and secondaryparticipants in the conflict, and how are the U.N. First was large-scale intervention to enforce a solution,but this would have required resources which the states working with theU.N. The Turkish invasion was mainly possible because the Balkanstates and their neighbors were not prepared to put aside their rivalriesand join together to keep the Turks out of Europe. When allthese were gone, the situation rapidly took a turn for the worse. Early recognition of Bosnia could have forestalledthe conflict. Sparked by continual attacks against civilians, U.S.-ledNATO warplanes began attacking Serb positions. The Croatians feared pluralism because ittended to lead to centralism. What U.N. peacekeepers. At thatmoment, with a pause in the fighting, Bosnia was clearly the next target.The West should have warned Serbia not to interfere in Bosnia or riskisolation. The Yugoslav army, Serbia's army in allbut name, warned the Bosnian government that this move could lead to civilwar. (1996). The Yugoslav conflict brings into the question the relationshipbetween regional and global organizations. President Clinton also began lobbying NATO and the U.N. Slovenia was by far the richest republic. The warring partiesagreed to an EC peace plan that included a three-month moratorium on anyindependence moves. The United States, still involved in the Gulf, insisted on thelogic of the U.N. Althoughtensions remained high in the area, the ceasefire seemed to hold, with fewviolations. The West could have finished the war, but it certainly dragged itsfeet over any sort of intervention. Los Angeles Times, p. The Soviet Union, concerned about theprecedent that U.N. Bosnia askedfor U.N. 474). They were facingseveral oppositions: an international organization which seemed to bethreatening to move from peace-keeping to enforcement with the overt use ofthe military might of NATO under U.N. Historical Background The entire history of Yugoslavia has been one of conflict, disunity,and hate. Thefirst democratically held plebiscite in the history of Slovenia took placein April 199 , and the Slovene separatists handily won the election. ( 1994-1995, Winter). By mid-April, Slovenia and Croatia both announced that theywould secede by the end of June 1991. In addition, the crisis in theformer Yugoslavia demonstrates the overwhelming importance of relatingpolicies to resources. Second was a mode of intervention whichcommitted sufficient resources to make probable that goals agreed on in theSecurity Council, short of enforcement, would be achieved. These factorsreduced determination and interest in the wars of Yugoslav secession. The Balkan tragedy: Why theWest failed. All sidestargeted civilians, which made humanitarian operations exceedinglydifficult, despite the introduction of a U.N. After the end of World War II, Tito became the leader ofYugoslavia, embraced the Soviet Union and turned his back on his Westernbenefactors. intervention may be deduced bythe range of conceivable ways of intervening in former Yugoslavia and theirimplications. As aresult, developments on the ground led to a three-way partition of Bosniareflecting the realities of military power, the consequences of conquest,and the results of ethnic cleansing. It is, rather, based on sympathy. The abandonment ofescort fighters, which might have provoked the Serbs, and the inclusion ofCroat and Serbian villages itself indicated the administration'sunwillingness to do anything which might obviously favor one side over theother. Only since the creation of the Kingdom ofSerbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 have the south Slavs had sufficientdealings with each other to fall out and come to blows. The Serbsaccepted the creation of the kingdom because it united all Serbs. Newsweek,p. Attempts tofind a political settlement also failed. The EC was hoping that pressure from itspartners would force the Yugoslav republics to reconsider secession andarrive at a peaceful solution. The focus was on the areas that exploded, and the objective wasto freeze the situation. In 1989, amendments were made to the republican constitutionthat claimed the right of secession. The Bosnian Serbs were even moreupset over the Dayton agreement regarding Sarajevo, which placed many Serb-held neighborhoods under Bosnian government rule. Because the peace plan cut Serb holdings from 72 percent to 49percent, the plan was accepted by the Bosnian government and rejected bythe Bosnian Serbs (Freedman, 1994-1995, pp. In A. forces were reluctant to endorse any form of coercive actionthat could produce severe retaliation. Enforcement should always be managed by theglobal organization. Finally, the Serbs wanted economic pluralismbut despised the multiparty system (Rezun, 1995, pp. In order toprevent war from spreading south and east, Washington constructed andcultivated a strong diplomatic relationship with the countries south ofSerbia, notably Albania. Bosnia's request was denied, although observersmight have discouraged Serb hostility and deterred the siege of Sarajevo.The final opportunity took place in June 1992 during President Mitterand'svisit to Sarajevo. But this was neveran option, because no country was prepared to commit the necessary troops.Instead, EC mediators aimed to persuade the Bosnia Muslims and Croats toaccept the Serb position and worked toward dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina intoethnic territories, even though such entities did not exist at the time andcould not come into existence without massive population transfers. TheUnited States responded relatively quickly to this destabilizing situationby cutting off all aid to Yugoslavia. By summer's end, the Serbs had lost all but 5 percent of theterritory they held in Croatia and saw their hold of 7 percent of Bosniasteadily decrease. Arguably, pressurefor a ceasefire is always the corollary of impartiality in such a situation(Freedman, 1994-1995, Winter, pp. In their operations--especially in the two major tasks ofattempting to implement ceasefires in Croatia and Bosnia--they encounteredextreme difficulties. The only way that bloodshed could possiblyhave been averted was by massive preventative deployment of U.N. Crucially, once the Somali fiasco of September 1993 made clear thatAmerican ground troops were virtually impossible in Bosnia, Washington'sinfluence atrophied, virtually ensuring that no serious U.N. Their stake was always in favor of a ceasefire,whether at a local level to allow for the steady movement of supplies or ata general level to remove the threat to their troops. The price President Clinton was prepared to pay to influence a peaceagreement or participate in its enforcement has fallen steadily further.Several wider factors reinforce this view. This displeased the Serbs, who wanted to keep strictcontrol over certain areas of Bosnia. The complexities of the Macedonia problem arelegion, and the United States was keen to prevent the conflict fromspreading there. by successfully recapturing westernSlavonia. While Slovenia and Croatia were seriously considering separation, theBosnians were determined not to remain within a Yugoslav federationdominated by Serbia. Economides, S., & Taylor, P. That is, intervention depends both on what theinternational community says and on what its member states want. They also engaged continuallyin war--although these wars were neither religiously nor ethnicallyinspired, but rather territorially driven--until the war between the Turksand the Serbs ended in total Serbian defeat and their becoming vassals ofthe Ottoman empire. The two Croatian offensives, along with gains by the Bosniangovernment and Bosnian Croat forces, created a new balance of power in theBalkans that appeared to be welcomed by the United States and other Westerncountries. The new force will replace the6 , -member force, led by the NATO, which has been patrolling Bosniaunder the year-old Dayton peace agreement (Kempster, 1996, November 17, p.1). Three things kept the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia from fighting oneanother: Tito, Communism, and the fear of the Soviet Union. This warning no doubt told Serbia and the Yugoslav army that itcould use any means to keep the country together without any fear ofWestern intervention. The wars fought inthe Balkans in past centuries were fought, not between south Slavs butbetween and against the multinational empires of the Habsburg and theOttomans. Frustration andbelated realization that nothing useful could be achieved while the majorpowers pursued moderately different policies led Washington to establishthe "contact group" of high-level diplomats from the United States,Germany, Britain, France and Russia. This is partly because Yugoslav affairsare indeed complex, partly because, as in any war, matters have beenobscured and distorted by the propaganda of the belligerents, and partlybecause of Western commentators and statesmen seeking to justify theirpolicy of inaction. Thesesanctions effectively ended the EC's job as mediator. For, in the end, the EuropeanCommunity and the United States both allowed inaction and neglect to do thework of policy. peacekeepingactivities. New York: Routledge. However,President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia repeatedly threatened to refuse consentto a renewal of UNPROFOR's (United Nations Protection Force) mandate, and,in May 1995, he defied the U.N. 35-58). Once the killing started, reconciliation had no chance. operation in Bosnia was stepped up.The U.N. The new peace-keeping policy confirmed a serious loss of faith and interest in suchendeavors and embodied demanded criteria for U.S. Influenced perhaps by the imagery of Desert Storm, many Americansbelieved that air strikes posed slight risks of casualties to theintervening forces and maximized the West's strongest military card.Unfortunately, air power alone would not have sufficed. Yugoslavia used its veto to blocka proposed peace conference. S. London:Cambridge University Press. Until the start of 1993, the full implications of the unequal powerbalance were not appreciated, and international efforts continued to relyon a combination of nonviolent coercion and the Vance-Owen plan, whichprovided a framework for a moderately just political settlement. Similarly, decisions of a constitutive nature,creating new rules or legitimizing new states, for instance throughrecognition, should be taken by the U.N. 62. The government ordered the disarming of civilians and thedemobilization of police reserves in Croatia in order to forestall a war,but was unsuccessful in its attempts. However,the approach lost its momentum as the incoming Clinton administrationquestioned whether enough was being done for the Muslims. Croatia was toreceive a part, Serbia another part, and the remainder would serve as aMuslim buffer zone. Perhaps the most secessionist-minded of the various republics wasSlovenia. Just a week before Christmas 1991, the EC announced that it wouldrecognize Slovenia and Croatia by January 15, as long as they met severalcriteria, which included democratic rule, respect for human rights, andsafety for ethnic minorities. Troop deployments in Macedonia were a preview of a quiet, ambitiousand aggressive American diplomacy in the Southern Balkans. Such anoutcome in Bosnia would have consolidated a grave wrong against the Muslimcommunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. military into thesefour distant parts of the world. 176-2 3). The televisedpictures of starving people in Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Zaire created apolitical clamor to feed them, which propelled the U.S. To avoid a Croat-Serb confrontation over them, the BosnianMuslims decided to consider themselves Yugoslavs. Danchev & T. The Security Council simply should not makedecisions without adequate resources. Western governments could not bring themselves to deny that thejustice of the settlement mattered. This acute anxiety on the part of the Bosnian Serbs waseasily traced to Milosevic himself. Moreover, given the imbalance in firepower between Serbiaand the rest of Yugoslavia and the desperation of the Croatian and Bosnianauthorities, he could easily have obtained a settlement which was verygenerous to the Serb position. G. Numerous alarming signals existed in the Yugoslav republics beforethe June 1991 escalation, but no serious attempts were made to preventconflict. Balkans: Minorities and states in conflict.London: Minority Rights Group. In time, quarreling with the Soviet Union and takingYugoslavia his own way did not take him long. Weiss (Ed.). A newconstitution diminished the control of the central government by givingextensive power to the republics. Fourth was direct intervention by the large states. 2 -25). The new interventionism 1991-1994 (pp. In the next few centuries, Slavic tribes split into individualtribes, such as Russians, Poles, Slovaks, Serbians, Croats, and Bulgarians,and started to settle in today's Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is the largest and most important part of the Balkanpeninsula. This was the first large-scale intrastateconflict on the continent since the end of the Cold War, and theseorganizations lacked the mandate, experience, and structures to cope withit, since they were designed to handle interstate conflicts (Higgins, 1993,p. Far from being perennial enemies, Serbs from Serbia and Croatsfrom Croatia were, until recently, essentially strangers.
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