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CAUSES OF WWI.
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Conflicting views on what nation(s) and/or event(s) brought on war, focusing on Germany & crisis of July, 1914.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Conflicting views on what nation(s) and/or event(s) brought on war, focusing on Germany & crisis of July, 1914.
Paper Introduction:
This research discusses the outbreak of World War I. The focus is on determining who was responsible for the outbreak. The determination is controversial. The Great War is a difficult war to classify because of the many forces that went into its inception and because the war itself solved no problems and so cannot be judged in terms of clearly defined issues and resolutions.
As Holger Herwig notes, the end of World War I produced the tensions and environment that would lead to World War II:
By placing the blame for the war on Germany and its allies, and by stipulating that they were to pay for the damages incurred by all combatants, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers crippled the Weimar Republic from birth and provided Adolf Hitler and his
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Herwig (ed.). "Introduction." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. The focus is ondetermining who was responsible for the outbreak. Ritter sees it more likely that German intentions in July 1914were to maintain its ally, Austria, as a great power, something that wasthreatened by Russian entry into the Balkans. Gerhard Ritter, on the other hand, does not accept Fischer'shypothesis, seeing it as a radical position that was not supported by hisresearch. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Even when we have records of what was said, we do not always know the tone of voice in which the words were spoken. . The determination iscontroversial. "1914: Germany Opts for War, 'Now or ANever.'" In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. Heath and Company, 1991. "World War I as Galloping Gertie." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. 1-9.Joll, James. 79-86.Ritter, Gerhard. Geissseems to agree with Fischer about German guilt for the start of the war,though perhaps not for precisely the same reasons or through the sameseries of events. . Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. . The reaction of mostgovernments to the crisis depended on past history and presentcircumstances, and placing blame on any one government is an exercise infutility that requires a political determination of who is right and who iswrong, a view then used to justify placing blame. Williamson, for instance, sees Austriaand Hungary as having made the decision to go to war, and he suggests thatConrad von Hötzendorf's military planning actually constituted a calculatedrisk that might open a war. Since none of the powers were willing to accept diplomatic defeat, all chose war as a less undesirable alternative (Farrar 25). Fischer's view would be controversial and would provokea reaction in Germany. He says thatFischer is too hard on Bethmann-Hollweg and underestimates certain concernsof the time. "Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis?" In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. Often sucharguments have been based on different views of guilt over the war--whetherGermany should be guilty, how guilty Germans should feel, and so on. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. 18-23.Lieven, D.C.B. Yet that ignorance certainly contributed to whathappened and to the development of plans for war. "Austria-Hungary Opts for War." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. This research discusses the outbreak of World War I. Heath and Company, 1991. Heath and Company, 1991. The July 1914 crisis was the immediate reason for the beginning ofWorld War I, and it has been enmeshed in the issue of war guilt, embodiedin the Treaty of Versailles with several references to Germany'sresponsibility for the war. . "1914: The Unspoken Assumptions." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. The July crisis was a precipitating event, and the conspirators canbe blamed most certainly for what occurred. Heath and Company, 1991. Other views have been offered, of course, and Germany is not alwaysidentified as the cause of the war. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Had the victors donemore to reduce the underlying tensions among all nations that hadcontributed to the start of the war, World War II might have been avoided. In moments of crisis, political leaders fall back on unspoken assumptions, and their intentions can often only be judged in the light of what we can discover about those assumptions (Joll 19-2 ).Joll finds that prevalent at the time were various ideas and images thatcontributed to the climate in which war was accepted and even welcomed bysome (Joll 24). . Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Williams sees Austria as the instigator and asseeking Germany's agreement rather than succumbing to German power.Williams believes that Austria decided after Sarajevo that the time for warwas at hand and that Austria then had to find a way to gain the asset ofBerlin, selecting Count Hoyos to make the trip to that city and to gain thesupport of Germany: Franz Joseph's government resolved to protect its one imperial acquisition of the late nineteenth century. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Germany hadclaimed that she was being encircled by enemies waiting to attack and crushher, and this doctrine was known as the myth of Einkreisung. Heath and Company, 1991. 24-3 .Fischer, Fritz. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. More than this, Schroeder finds the search for a single cause to befutile, when in fact there was a multiplicity of contributing factors to beanalyzed and related to one another, just as has been apparent for otherwars and historical events: Immediately, one encounters a plethora of "causes" far more than sufficient to account for the phenomenon one wishes to explain, clearly connected with it, and yet not "sufficient" in the sense that any set of them logically implies what occurred (Schroeder 117). The fact that Russia came to accept the idea of a general war isnoted by Lieven, but he does not blame Russia for the onset of the war andfinds that Russia was probably ignorant of the conspiracy leading to theJuly crisis (Lieven 8 ). Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Ritter says that Fischer either cannot orwill not understand the true motive for the many admonitions Berlin gave toAustria to take quick action: It was not a burning eagerness for war of some kind of militarist, but rather the very well-justified fear of the dilatory, half-measures of the Austrians (Ritter 111).The Germans may have been wrong in that they were basing their view on agood deal of speculation, but the point is their motivation is other thanthat ascribed to them by Fischer. Herwig (ed.). He finds that all the major powers in Europe were contributory inthat they were willing to accept a ar based on the myth of the short war,the idea that the war would be quick and would correct a lot of problems ina short period of time: The behavior of the great powers during the early months of the war can therefore be understood in terms of their prewar policies. Heagrees with Fischer as to Germany's bid for world power, though he wouldargue with some of the elements emphasized by Fischer. 1 5-1 7.Herwig, Holger H. Theactions taken against Germany at the end of the war by the victors clearlysignaled their view that Germany was responsible for what had happened, andsubsequent events showed how much Germans resented this view and foughtagainst it, leading in time to World War II. John Röhl sees the controversy over who caused the war to be endingwith a decision that Germany was responsible, and he cites the views ofFritz Fischer and Imanuel Geiss. However,these historians also offer a series of explanations which tend to muddythe central issue, claiming that perhaps all that was wanted was a limitedwar rather than the ferocious world war the Germans got. Herwig (ed.). Works CitedFarrar, L.L., Jr. Thesehistorians now abandoned that myth: The partition of Europe and the world into two power blocks, with the Triple Entente on the one hand, the Triple Alliance on the other, was largely a result of German policy, of the German desire to raise the Reich from the status of a continental power to that of a world power (Geiss 1 6). Heath and Company, 1991. James Joll finds that the reasons for the warmay lie in the personalities of those who were part of the crisis and whohad to react to it, and he finds that it is understandable that theirmotives might be muddied and unclear: When political leaders are faced with the necessity of taking decisions the outcome of which they cannot foresee, in crises which they do not wholly understand, they fall back on their own instinctive reactions, traditions and modes of behavior. Ritter points out that thequestion is whether German actions at that time should be seen asaggressive or defensive. Herwig (ed.). Serbia would be punished and Russia, it was hoped, would be prudent enough to stand aside (Williams 46). The different analyses of the beginning of the war show theimportance of the July crisis and of the different responses made to thatcrisis. Herwig (ed.). These policies collided during the July crisis when each sought diplomatic victory, and, under the circumstances, a diplomatic victory for one power would have required a diplomatic defeat for another. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. The view that Germany was indeed responsible is upheld by FritzFischer, who argued in 1961 that Germany had been inspired by economicinterests and had sought to achieve world power, making a consciousdecision to go to war. Geiss refers to the German historians who attackedFischer and so protected the conservative view of the war from withinGermany. "The Fischer 'Controversy' and German War Guilt." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. 45-51.----------------------- 1 Paul W. Geiss sees the German people as believing that the onlychoice for the Reich lay between rising to the position of a full-fledgedworld power or stagnation: The final logical conclusion was the idea of preventive war against those enemies who tried to block Germany's further rise (Geiss 1 7).The idea of the preventive war was denied even by the Prussian GeneralStaff, but Geiss believes it was prevalent just the same. The assassination in Sarajevo generated conflicting emotions inAustria, and it was not until Berlin pressed the issue that Austria couldbe made to stand against Serbia. Fischer never demonstrates this convincingly (Schroeder 117). This created somecontroversy in Germany, of course, where scholars have argued over whetherGermany was trying to start a war deliberately, was the victim ofcircumstances, or was not responsible at all for what happened. 116-126.Williamson, S.R., Jr. The real issue is what caused the war, though, and Schroederis not convinced that Fischer's argument is strong enough on this point: The difficulty arises in accepting the notion, implicit in all of Fischer's work and explicitly drawn by many historians as the chief lesson of it, that Germany's bid for world power was the causa causans, the central driving force behind the war. Heath and Company, 1991. He says that the motives for what Germanydid are what remain obscure as different theorists have ascribed differentmotives (Röhl 99). Herwig (ed.). In other words, if Germany was encircled, it was because of herefforts to start a war and not a reason for starting that war in the firstplace. Herwig notes that Fischerbelieved that Germany had opted for war in July of 1914, seeing that thetime was "now or never": Far from willing merely to undertake a "calculated risk," Bethmann-Hollweg chose war in order to realize his ambitious scheme of economic and territorial aggrandizement. Fischer sees them as aggressive, and Ritter seesthem as defensive: The relation of the two allies is so portrayed by Fischer that Austrian policy was fundamentally peacefully oriented, and only through the greatest pressure by Berlin did Austria allow herself to be pushed into war (Ritter 11 ). Farrar also emphasizes the different motivations affecting theparticipants in the war and especially those goals that might make them optfor war. "1914: Delusion or Design?" In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. Heath and Company, 1991. Heath and Company, 1991. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. "The Short-War Illusion." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. However, as Geiss further notes, the idea of encirclement played arole because the German people were convinced that it was the case. 52-7 .Geiss, Imanuel. . 1 8-115.Röhl, John. "Russia Accepts a General War." In The Outbreak of World War I, Holger H. Herwig (ed.). Schroeder weighs in on the issue from a differentperspective, considering the nature of the threat perceived by Germany andAustria and whether those perceptions were correct or not at the time. Herwig (ed.). The most prevalent view has been that Germany was responsible for theonset of the war either through design or because of various policies whichproduced the environment that would lead to war. Herwig (ed.). It seems most likelythat assessing blame for the war entails acceptance of the fact that therewere many forces which came together at this time to create the climateleading to war. Herwig (ed.). 99-1 4.Schroeder, Paul W. The opposition to Fischer developed into three groups, one of whichabandoned the old position without giving any credit to Fischer and thenadmitted that Germany in July 1914 had deliberately risked war. Indeed, he argues that Germany developed a war-likestance that extended from 19 to World War II. The Great War is a difficult war to classify because of themany forces that went into its inception and because the war itself solvedno problems and so cannot be judged in terms of clearly defined issues andresolutions. In short, inspired by economic interests, German decision makers, under considerable pressure from right-wing lobbies, deliberately escalated the management of the July crisis into a major war--purposefully choosing not to deescalate it and to produce a diplomatic result short of war (Herwig 5). As Holger Herwig notes, the end of World War I produced the tensionsand environment that would lead to World War II: By placing the blame for the war on Germany and its allies, and by stipulating that they were to pay for the damages incurred by all combatants, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers crippled the Weimar Republic from birth and provided Adolf Hitler and his fellows with a grand propaganda weapon in their campaign to "revise" the Treaty of Versailles (Herwig 2).Was Germany responsible as claimed at the end of the war, or was some otherforce at work in the beginning of the war? Heath and Company, 1991.
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