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Reviews work on concept of observability & its role in scientific empiricism.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Reviews work on concept of observability & its role in scientific empiricism.
Paper Introduction:
The question of observability as examined by Bas C. Van Fraassen and others is an issue of knowledge, of acceptable evidence, of the proper means for testing hypotheses, and of understanding the nature of scientific empiricism. Van Fraassen states that observability has clear limits in science, limits which he attempts to elucidate through examples and analysis. He finds that scientific theory must serve to explain what is observable to be accepted.
Van Fraassen begins by considering the opposition between empiricism and realism, leading to a consideration of the nature of observability from an empirical standpoint. In part, difficulties over the issue of observability can be seen as deriving from the progress of science over time. In earlier periods, realists held sway and depended on observability--what
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He feels that in some ways Maxwell also mixes up the idea ofobservable with exists, when in fact the two do not imply one another.Something can be observable and not exist--the fact that we expect toobserve it and do not is why we know it does not exist. That which requires calculation is unobservable. The first isdirected against the possibility of drawing such distinctions. He rightly notes thatacceptance involves a certain commitment, a commitment to future resultswhich it is now believed will derive from the current theory.[iii] Though Van Fraassen rejects the linguistic conception of the logicalpositivists, he has linguistic aspects in his own approach to the matterand returns to them again and again. Van Fraassen states that observability has clear limits inscience, limits which he attempts to elucidate through examples andanalysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198 .-----------------------Bas C. In part, difficulties over the issue ofobservability can be seen as deriving from the progress of science overtime. If we could cleanse our language of theory-laden terms. It may be that the anti-realist position hasnothing to do with existence--it is not a means of describing an objectiveand never-changing external world. He finds that scientific theory must serve to explain what isobservable to be accepted. Science in fact indicates clear limits on observability. It also implies that if what isobservable changes--if we accept something new as observable that beforewas excluded or unknown--then our belief system will change accordingly.This is the anti-realist position described by Van Fraassen. we would end up with nothing useful. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 198 ), 2.Ibid., 3.Ibid., 12.Ibid., 14.Ibid., 16-17.Ibid., 17.Ibid., 18.Ibid., 19.Ibid., 57.----------------------- 1 The question of observability as examined by Bas C. Before we can observethat, we require a good deal of knowledge in order not only to see but toknow what it is we do see, and the latter is information that cannot beacquired through perception. Indeed, the new beliefsystem is accepted precisely because it explains what has been observedanew as well as those things observed before. Van Fraassen emphasizes the process, anongoing procedure which is expressed in incremental shifts along acontinuum. BibliographyVan Fraassen, Bas C. Maxwell'sapproach allows us to step outside our human form and consider possibleobservability on a much grander scale than would be humanly possible. Van Fraassen thus notes that empiricism requirestheories to give as true account of what is observable, and this does notnecessarily correlate with what is true but only with what can be suggestedas a postulate that fulfills the requirements of what is empiricallyattestable. This approach was rejected bythe nominalists for a number of reasons cited by Van Fraassen, such as therejection of the Aristotelian world for epistemological reasons: The observation of the phenomena did not point unambiguously to the supposed causal connections behind them. The issue, says Van Fraassen, is whether we can divide our languageinto a theoretical and non-theoretical part, whether we can classifyobjects and events into observable and unobservable ones. The way we talk, and scientists talk, is guided by the pictures provided by previously accepted theories.[iv] The observable-unobservable distinction stands as the main target ofMaxwell. Van Fraassen says that on thefirst issue,the question of whether we can divide language into thetheoretical and the non-theoretical, Van Fraassen agrees with Maxwell andstates that Maxwell was well-supported in his argument by Wilfrid Sellarsand Paul Feyerabend: All our language is thoroughly theory-infected. Those things that are observable are those thingswhich are putative, things which we should be able to see if they existed.The act that we cannot observe them shows that they do not exist. He answers that such anobjection is not compelling. The particle is thusnot observed.[v] Van Fraassen has more to argue with in Maxwell's second argument,where Maxwell makes the distinction between what can be observed and whatis. Van Fraassen begins by considering the opposition between empiricismand realism, leading to a consideration of the nature of observability froman empirical standpoint. An object might not be observable for a period of time. A linguisticdistinction is made between observing (a thing, event, or process) andobserving that (something or other is the case). In earlier periods, realists held sway and depended on observability--what they could see served as evidence. VanFraassen rightly notes that citing something as observable does not mean itis observable now--we might observe Jupiter without instrumentation, butfirst we would have to go there. Van Fraassen cites particles in a cloud chamber, sincewe observe a vapor trail and not the thing itself. The central aim ofscience is empirical adequacy, and scientific belief is based on theability of theory to fit the observable phenomena. We mightdetect something through observation of certain phenomena without observingthe thing itself. Van Fraassen says that this seems no more than a trick. The distinction betweenobserving with the unaided eye and observing with instrumentation does notremain a clear-cut distinction when we consider what we could observewithout instrumentation under certain circumstances, while otherobservations would also require instrumentation and calculation. It might still be possible to find acontinuum of what is supposed to be detectable. The objection raised by critics of theanti-realist position applies more to the necessary shifts that have takenplace and will take place as observations change, and for the realist itwould seem that such shifts would be more wrenching because the realistsees science as explaining an objective truth rather than as a process ofaccommodating observations. For Maxwell, theanswer to both questions is not, we cannot. Van Fraassen's concept of observability accepts limits forobservability and accepts the idea of incremental shifts in our beliefsystem as what is observable is incorporated into theory, shaping thetheory in successive stages. The distinction was intended to differentiate between differenttypes of knowledge. If it accommodates what has been observed, it is still in force.If it does not accommodate what has been observed so that a new theory hasto be developed in order to explain the new phenomenon or new observations,then the new theory will present a slightly different view of the world, adifferent set of beliefs that have to be accepted. . The early philosophers of science explained theregularities they could observe in nature. When something new is observed, the existing theory istested. We accept a theorybecause what it says about what is observable to us is true,[vii] but thatis not the same as to equate observable with existing. At some level, though, there areelements of scientific inquiry as of the real world around us which cannotbe observed but which are no less vital and necessary as evidence insupport of a theory. The acceptance of a theory in science requires more than belief,and the acceptance of a theory involves more than one belief. Maxwell says thatthis never happens, however, because the different circumstances could beones in which we have different sense organs, such as electron-microscopeeyes. . . Because ofthis, we should concentrate on that which is observable in principle, andMaxwell says this means that the relevant scientific theory entails thatthe entities cannot be observed in any circumstances. Van Fraassen notes that a current view of scientifictheory holds that a theory accounts for the observable processes andstructures by postulating other processes and structures that are notobservable directly. Theobservable is that which should be ascertained by an unaided act ofperception. ForVan Fraassen, the limitations that should apply in observations are humanlimitations, those limitations that we possess strictly because we arehuman.[vi] Van Fraassen here seems to be denying the use of any technicalmeans to expand our observational powers, from the microscope to thetelescope. The Scientific Image. The picturethat Van Fraassen paints of scientific inquiry is perceptive, indicatingthat science is a dynamic and ongoing activity and that offering a theorymeans becoming involved in a program, a process, a continuing procedure oftesting, reformulating, and testing again. Instead, it has everything to do withwhat Van Fraassen calls "the proper epistemic attitude to science."[viii] Van Fraassen finds that the observability/unobservability distinctionis a philosophical one, but he disagrees and finds that limits toobservation are a subject for empirical science and not for philosophicalarguments. First, Maxwell refers to the continuum of cases betweendirect observation and inference, finding that this list does not give uscriteria which make it possible to draw a non-arbitrary line betweenobservation and theory, between the observable and the unobservable. Van Fraassen andothers is an issue of knowledge, of acceptable evidence, of the propermeans for testing hypotheses, and of understanding the nature of scientificempiricism. The realist position would tend more toward a frozen belief system,and it becomes more difficult to accept the more abrupt shifts in thinkingthat come with new observations. Van Fraassenindeed indicates that some would raise this as an objection to the anti-realist position, finding the position wanting because it does not alwayscome out the same way with the same beliefs. This conception indicates the nature of the human belief system andhow it is based on what is observable. A theory is accepted so long as it explainswhat is observable and rejected when it does not. This idea was coupled in logical positivism with a theory ofmeaning and language, and it is opposed today by scientific realism whichrejects both the views of meaning of the positivists and the empiricaltenets just noted. Van Fraassen writes, My own view is that empiricism is correct, but could not life in the linguistic form the positivists gave it.[ii]Van Fraassen calls his own approach constructive empiricism and holds thatscience aims to provide theories which are empirically adequate, and theacceptance of a theory requires only a belief that it is empiricallyadequate. Whena scientist offers a new theory, the realist sees him or her as assertingthe truth of the postulates, while the anti-realist sees the scientist asdisplaying the theory and claiming certain virtues for it.[ix] The anti-realist position does seem to be the one most in keeping with the processof science, for scientific theories stand only so long as they fit what hasbeen observed. Subsequent scientists intent on clarifying the philosophical basis of their discipline found it ever more difficult to reconcile their professed empiricism and antipathy to metaphysics with an unqualified belief in hypotheses that describe a supposed world behind the phenomena.[i] the question of what is observable and what is not is key toscientific inquiry. He cites an essay by Maxwell thatdirectly counters the logical positivism of Carnap and that, says VanFraassen, demonstrated that the theory/observation distinction cannot bedrawn. The secondis directed against the importance that could attach to those distinctionsthat can be drawn. . Maxwell makes two arguments against observability.
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