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NICHOLAS I.
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Analyzes foreign policy of early 19th Cent. Russian leader. Personal & political attitudes, rebellion, pacts, economic problems.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Analyzes foreign policy of early 19th Cent. Russian leader. Personal & political attitudes, rebellion, pacts, economic problems.
Paper Introduction:
An analysis of the foreign policy of Czar Nicholas I must take into account a variety of factors--the revolutionary atmosphere in which he assumed power in December 1825, the personal attitudes he brought with him upon becoming Emperor, and the evolution of what came to be known as the "Nicholas System." Each of these diverse factors had important influences on the course and conduct of foreign policy during Nicholas I's relatively long reign. This discussion, then, focuses on the attitudes and political realities which shaped the foreign policy of Nicholas I.
Nicholas I had barely assumed power when the conspirators
of the "Decembrist" movement acted. The movement had its genesis in a number of secret societies which had the goal of moving
Russia from an autocratic society to a constitutional government
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In addition, the agreements were a solidpronouncement of Nicholas's personal beliefs and system of governing. Having been successful in crushing the Decembrists,Nicholas "came to see himself as the champion of order both at home andabroad. His manner was one of outwardfrankness and candour" (11 -111). In many cases, there seemed to be anelement of sincere friendship in the relations between the Emperor and thediplomats of St. Certainly, the Decembrist revolt was noisolated instance, but was rather indicative of the greater problems facedby the nation. Nicholas I's defense of the established order did not come to himfull-blown with the Decembrist Revolt. The frail Russian economy depended upon the perpetuation of the inequitiesin Russian society. Thus, much of Nicholas's foreign policy was designed tobuffer Russia from revolution. The Munchengratzagreement became binding on Prussia as well a month later when the threepowers "signed the Berlin Convention, which proclaimed their adherence tothe principles of legitimacy, and their support of non-intervention ininternal affairs of sovereign states without express invitation" (147).Nicholas believed that the successful conclusion of these agreements wouldprotect Russia from the menace symbolized England and France. And in later years, even the army suffered fromthe economies imposed upon it. On his first day as Emperor, then, Nicholas I was forced to crush arebellion led by men from some of Russia's best families. Thisdid not mean that the political status quo was to be totally static,however. In a conference at Munchengratz, Russia and Austria agreed to use allmeans necessary to preserve the Ottoman Empire and to mutually guaranteethe security of their respective Polish possessions. This discussion, then, focuses on the attitudes and politicalrealities which shaped the foreign policy of Nicholas I. The agreements of Munchengratz and Berlin would establish theEuropean balance of power that would remain in effect for much of theremainder of the nineteenth century. Themembers of the secret societies would use that situation to set off therevolution. The misplaced priorities would soon be all too evident in therealities. But as he addressed the problems of Russia, Nicholasdevelopedhis own approach to the exercise of power--the "Nicholas System." UnderNicholas, absolute monarchy became the governing principle. The death of Alexander I precipitated the revolt among young officersof the Guards Regiments. These beliefs would also play animportant role in the evolution of foreign policy-under Nicholas I. Nicholas's absolute rule didmaintain order and tranquility at home for the most part throughout histhree decades of rule. And Nicholas I did not ignore the warning issued by theDecembrists. Finally, it must be seen that Nicholas's foreignpolicy designed to preserve order was only a stop-gap policy, working inthe short run, but doomed to failure in the long run. Works CitedLincoln, W. The apparent order and tranquility imposed by the NicholasSystem could not address such basic needs as the emancipation of the serfs. to prevent the infiltration into Russia of dangerousideas from the West; and to preserve order and tranquillity in Poland"(199). But his firsttriumph as Emperor would have far-reaching consequences for his subsequentforeign policy. In the final analysis, the foreign policy of Nicholas I turned out tobe a static policy. Ultimately,revolution would prevail. Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All Russias. "The Polishrevolt of 193 -31 showed even more dramatically how closely some of theinterests of the three Eastern Powers were connected, and made clear thethreat which revolution posed to them all" (145). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 198 .----------------------- 7 "Trustingneither the nobility nor public opinion, he sought to deal with all ofRussia's problems himself or, like an efficient military commander, throughthe offices of his adjutants, his ministers" (78). Nicholas himself called theforeign ambassadors to receive the account of the Decembrist revolt "and inthe few days that followed Nicholas exhibited many of the traits whichwould come to characterize his diplomacy. After the Polish revolt, Nicholas moved tocreate an Eastern alliance composed of Russia, Prussia, and Austria tocounteract the more moderate influences of England and France. Dissent was suppressed,not eradicated. The very hallmark of Nicholas's foreign policy was rooted in theevents and turmoil that accompanied his succession to the throne. The Polish uprisingserved to solidify his views on the extreme dangers of revolution whetherat home or abroad. Rather, his obsession with order isfound in his view of the role of ruler. WhenPolish rebels attempted to throw off Russian rule in 193 , Nicholas crushedthe rebellion just as he had crushed the Decembrists. The approach togovernment he created in the Nicholas System would carry over to foreignpolicy. But Nicholas never allowed the appearances offriendship to temper his duty or the policies that he believed Russiashould follow (111). The balance simply put England andFrance--the two western constitutional states--against the weight of thethree absolute monarchies of eastern Europe, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.The union of the eastern powers was based on the one thing they shared incommon, "the fear of revolution and a desire to construct a barrier whichrevolutionary attacks such as they had witnessed in 183 and 1831 could notpenetrate" (197). Bruce. An analysis of the foreign policy of Czar Nicholas I must take intoaccount a variety of factors--the revolutionary atmosphere in which heassumed power in December 1825, the personal attitudes he brought with himupon becoming Emperor, and the evolution of what came to be known as the"Nicholas System." Each of these diverse factors had important influenceson the course and conduct of foreign policy during Nicholas I's relativelylong reign. 7 ). . Nicholas's foreignpolicy was defensive in nature, but the duties the Emperor assumed were toogrand,,for Russia's limited economic resources. The Decembrists planned to inform the soldiers that Nicholaswas "attempting to usurp the throne, and then would order the men undertheir command to march to the center of the city to defend Constantine'sright to the throne. Convinced that if he could defeat revolution in Russia, he couldalso destroy it abroad, Nicholas defended the established order in WesternEurope both in 183 and in 1848" (47). Ironically, it was Nicholas's role as the gendarme of Europe and theprotector of the established order that contributed to further problems athome and the Russian defeats during the Crimean War. The movement had its genesis in anumber of secret societies which had the goal of movingRussia from an autocratic society to a constitutional government (Lincoln38). For Nicholas, the two agreements represented the verycornerstone of his foreign policy. Nicholas could only stem the revolutionary tidefor brief years. First, Nicholas believed in the divine rightof kings, that their power was ordained by God and that it could never beotherwise. It was obvious from the very beginning of Nicholas I's reign that hewould serve as his own foreign minister. "For, if Nicholas was regarded as the gendarme of Europe in1848, and if his Empire stood as a bastion of order and tranquility, thiswas only a facade which would soon be stripped away-by the victories of theAllied armies in the Crimea" ( 231). The situation in that December of 1825 wasfurther confused by the refusal of Constantine to take the throne. In reality, they planned to do away with theautocracy and to implement some sort of constitutional order in its stead"(39). Nicholas's concept of the rulerhad two fundamental elements. Duty and state policy always were uppermost in anNicholas's mind and the system he utilized to govern and set foreignpolicy. Theagreement solidified Russia's position on the Black Sea, always ofparamount importance for Russia. Secondly, Nicholas saw Russia as "the supreme force of moralityand justice which should dictate to Europe the policies-that were inEurope's best interests" (p. Money went for uniforms rather thanammunition. The economies were false and bordered on theludicrous. Its foundations were the status quo and were solelydesigned to maintain the established order. Petersburg. Nicholas I had barely assumed power when the conspiratorsof the "Decembrist" movement acted. The Russia inherited by Nicholas was beset by social and economicproblems of the first magnitude. But progress would take place within the established politicalsystem (148). . "For his entire policy in Europe after183 would be one of 'gendarmism': to protect the established order in theOttoman Empire . much of the state budgetwent to maintain the army. Priorities were mismanaged. Innovative weapons were rejected because the Russian soldierwould fire too quickly. But Nicholas's foreign policy of insulation couldnot meet the long-term needs of Russia at home.
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